Guidelines for the Philanthropic Response of World Jewry to a Crisis in Israel
Annex to the Conceptual Framework
Civil Resilience Network – Israel's Local & National Resilience

Version A

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The Israel Trauma Coalition (ITC) and the Reut Institute are grateful to UJA Federation of New York for its support of their work. However, the views expressed by Reut or ITC orally or in written materials are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of UJA-Federation of New York.
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Guidelines for the Philanthropic Response of World Jewry to a Crisis in Israel

Iyar 5771
May 2011

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Quick Reading

This document can be skimmed by reading the bolded phrases. Each paragraph contains only one idea that is captured in the bolded sentences. Footnotes do not contain new ideas.

Executive Summary

Background

1. This document is an annex to the conceptual framework Civil Resilience Network – National and Local Resilience in Israel, which was a product of the partnership between the Reut Institute and the Israel Trauma Coalition (ITC), initiated and sponsored by the United Jewish Appeal Federation of New York City in 2008.

2. It offers guidelines for those individuals, foundations, or organizations that aim, through their philanthropy, to either increase Israel's resilience or help Israel respond better to crisis (hereinafter ‘philanthropists’). This group includes individual philanthropists, foundations, Jewish community institutions such as local federations and Jewish Federations of North America (JFNA) in the USA, UJIA in Britain, Keren HaYaseod and other organizations such as Hillel, the Jewish Agency’s Partnership 2000 Program, and Taglit-Birthright.

3. The context for this paper is that, while philanthropists can and should play a significant role in enhancing the preparedness of Israel’s civil society, during future crises it may be harder for them to raise funds within their communities and spend them effectively in Israel. Hence the need to prepare.

Resilience of the Israeli Home Front (2006-2010)

4. The Second Lebanon War (7/06) exposed several key weaknesses in Israel’s society and its security and foreign policy approach. One of them was the gross unpreparedness of Israel's home front, which affected a significant area and a large population in Northern Israel, whose plight mobilized numerous NGO's, volunteers and philanthropists, many from the Jewish world.

5. Since that episode, Israel’s preparedness to crises has been overhauled. The Ministry of Defense has been assigned overall responsibility for the home front and has established the National Emergency Authority (NEMA) (2007) as its civilian arm to work together with the IDF Home Front Command. At the same time, other ministries, mainly the Ministry of Welfare and Social Services, increased their preparedness efforts. This significant investment in resources and routine exercises has led to a remarkable transformation in the preparedness of Israel's emergency authorities, ministries, and local governments.
6. **Operation Cast Lead in Gaza (1/09)** demonstrated evident and significant improvement in the capabilities of the government to respond to a crisis, which is of a limited geographic and demographic scope. However, in Operation Cast Lead and since, there has not been a systematic effort to tap into the resources and commitment of civil society i.e. non-governmental organizations, philanthropy and the business sector.

7. **Hence, despite these efforts and successes, Israel remains vulnerable to a national crisis**, in which a large area and population will be affected by a natural disaster or war. Such a crisis can generate a significant gap between the needs and expectations of the population, on the one hand, and the capabilities and resources of the emergency authorities, on the other hand. Such a gap can lead to local collapses, in the form of breakdown of social norms, mass disobedience and loss of trust among citizens and authorities, similar to what occurred during the Katrina disaster in New Orleans (2005).

8. The conceptual framework *Civil Resilience Network – National and Local Resilience in Israel* views the vision of resilience as the foundation for success on the home front. Resilience means the ability to transcend a crisis by adapting to dramatically changed conditions, by saving and protecting lives, by securing basic quality of life for individuals and communities, by protecting the social fabric and by maintaining functioning community.

Realizing the vision of resilience and addressing the aforementioned gap mandates mobilizing the untapped resources in Israel's civil society based on the following two ideas:

- **Developing a civil resilience network** of individuals, communities, businesses, nonprofits, and philanthropists that are committed to local and national resilience and have the capacities and resources to act both independently and together during crises;

- **Instilling a culture of preparedness**, i.e. a set of values and habits that emphasize crisis preparedness, across all sectors of society including the government, businesses, nonprofits, and philanthropists.

9. **The resilience of the civil network stems from its flat and nonhierarchical structure, as well as from the independence of its units and inherent duplications and overlaps.**

10. **Its most important units are ‘hubs’**, which are nodes that have an exceptional number of connections to other units, and therefore have the greatest influence on its overall performance. Examples include national corporations, community centers, large non-profits, academic institutions or youth movements.
Changes in Jewish Philanthropy and its Ability to Respond to Crisis in Israel

11. The mobilization of the Jewish world to support Israel in times of crises has been the result of a strong sense of solidarity. Many Israelis take this support for granted, and rely on it during emergencies.

12. The platform for the philanthropic response of world Jewry to Israeli crises has been the ‘Emergency Campaigns’, led by United Jewish Communities in the USA (now named JFNA) and similar organizations around the world, such as Keren HaYesod, who would issue a call to raise funds to support the state and people of Israel. The subsequent resources are usually allocated through the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI) and the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC). Since its establishment in 2002, the ITC has also served in this capacity.

13. In 1967 and 1973, significant resources were raised and allocated through these campaigns. And over the past decade, four such campaigns were organized in response to the Second Intifada (4/02), The Second Lebanon War (7/06), the escalation in the Gaza Region (5/08), and Operation Cast Lead (1/09).

14. Yet powerful trends are undermining the capability of world Jewry to respond to a crisis in Israel in an equally effective manner. These include but are not limited to: the change in Israel’s image abroad; the changing relationship between Israel and the Jewish World; Israel’s prosperity; the shift from charity to high-impact philanthropy; economic difficulties in Jewish institutions due to the economic crisis; and the generational transition to the third generation to those did lived through the period of the Holocaust and the rebirth of the state of Israel. Furthermore, in 2006, the judgment, transparency and accountability of the allocation of the emergency funds were questioned.

15. Furthermore, three additional gaps are emerging:
   - One address vs. multiple addresses – While the philanthropic activities of world Jewry in Israel are increasingly decentralized, Israel has consolidated its home front under NEMA and the IDF Home Front Command;
   - Narrative of resilience vs. weakness – While the Israeli mindset is now anchored in the idea of resilience, Emergency Campaigns were based on a narrative of weakness and vulnerability;
   - Preparedness vs. lack thereof – Israel invested heavily in crisis preparedness, while many philanthropists that will mobilize to stand by in times of crisis are yet to improve their own preparedness for effective intervention in Israel.

16. Hence, the ability of philanthropists to respond to a crisis in Israel and to contribute effectively to its resilience may be compromised in the absence of concrete measures of preparedness.
Guidelines for effective philanthropic preparedness:

17. The following strategic decisions should be taken in advance with regard to the allocation of funds in times of crisis in Israel, noting that long-standing relationships with nonprofits, philanthropists, and government institutions in Israel offer the most effective foundation for crisis-intervention, if prepared properly (see below):

- Whether to primarily support already existing grantees and partnerships, or work through JAFI, JDC or ITC according to their set of priorities;
- Whether to underwrite government needs and priorities such as equipping shelters or military units, and/or to support independent non-profit activities by civil society such as food banks or community centers;
- Whether to support all Israelis including non-Jews or just Jews (this is a moral decision that should not be left to staff);
- Whether to spend all funds in Israel or also on PR around the world.

18. Embracing a culture of preparedness for crisis in Israel through:

- Establishing a forum dedicated to such preparedness (naturally, it may be relevant to other crises as well);
- Holding annual events to increase awareness to preparedness and to maintain appropriate response mechanisms. Main activities should take place in parallel to the Israel's National Emergency Exercise.

19. JFNA and Keren HaYesod, with their main partners in Israel, should have a mechanism for deliberation with the Ministry of Defense, IDF and other relevant government ministries/branches and experts to discuss preparedness and develop a model of operation during crises. Meetings should be held periodically, such as during the JAFI Board of Governors gatherings in Israel.

20. Spending through the JAFI / JDC / ITC tracks, which are coordinated with GOI priorities, requires establishing a common code for allocations in order to ensure rapid, effective and efficient response with minimal red-tape.

21. Philanthropists should develop their independent understanding of the needs that will arise in Israel in times of crisis through their activities and partners in Israel, as well as through engagement with the GOI.

22. Spending through already existing grantees and partners in Israel requires:

- Grantee’s should be categorized into three groups based on the role they are expected to play during a national crisis:
  
  (a) 'Essential service providers', e.g. in the areas of food security, healthcare, welfare or trauma, that MUST continue to and even expand operations;
  
  (b) 'Dual-use organizations', who have assets and capabilities that can be relevant in crisis such as youth movements, sports groups, community
centers, rotary clubs or academic institutions, that SHOULD adapt in times of crisis and mobilize to enhance local and national resilience; or

(c) 'Non-essential organizations' such as twinning programs among schools or museums that will have to SCALE BACK during crises.

- Establishing clear expectations for preparedness by grantees that are ‘essential service providers’ or ‘dual-use organizations’ based on agreed guidelines, that should be developed by government in collaboration with civil society (see example in annex);

- Pre-planning and pre-pledging – All essential and dual-use organizations should present their plan of action in times of crisis every other year. Philanthropists should pre-pledge such that:
  
  (a) essential organizations will have a standing emergency pledge for six months of operation that can be activated immediately to allow them to focus on and expand their operations by 20% (and NOT fundraise during the crisis);

  (b) All dual-use organizations will have a standing emergency pledge for three months of operation to implement their crisis plan (and will pledge NOT to fundraise as well during the crisis);

  (c) Allocation to non-essential organizations will be reduced by 25%-50% during crisis.

23. Partnerships with Israeli philanthropists prior to a crisis, and agreement on priorities and strategies in order to match their NIS, are effective ways to spend money in Israel during crisis.

24. Leveraging platform-to-platform partnerships such as among JAFI's Partnership 2000, JCCA and MATNASIM (Israeli community centers), or Hillels to directly support local Israeli partners – every such organization or platform should have its own contingency plan using its already existing Israeli partners and outposts based on the above guidelines (categorizing of activities, pre-planning, etc.). In addition, there could be collaboration between partnerships in different regions to increase the effectiveness of any given intervention.

25. Giving representatives in Israel petty cash to address small and vital needs such as reading glasses, medication, transportation or clothing. This could make a big difference in times of crisis for many people. The chairperson of the local Partnership could be a candidate to be such a trustee.

26. Spending large sums of money through third-parties in times crisis is a trust-based activity that requires transparency and accountability. Hence, such partners must have a record of diligence, accountability and transparency, and there should be clear distinction among regulators, grantees, and grantors.
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<td>27. <strong>Establishing a fund</strong> toward nurturing a culture of preparedness in Israel. The fund will grow through annual allocations, while its fruits could serve to increase preparedness.</td>
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Guidelines for the Philanthropic Response of World Jewry to a Crisis in Israel

Word of Caution

This report is an outcome of a project carried out primarily in Israel by an Israeli team as part of a comprehensive effort of increasing Israel's resilience in national crisis, and viewing world Jewry as playing a critical role in it.

In spite of all efforts, including dozes of conversations and repeated reviews and feedback sessions, the report may overlook aspects and nuances that may be viewed as essential to the topic, particularly by non-Israeli readers.

Background

28. This document offers a set of guidelines for the Jewish world – its institutions, private foundations and philanthropists – to prepare for effective intervention in a crisis that may occur in Israel due to a war or natural disaster.

It is an annex to the conceptual framework 'Civil Resilience Network – National and Local Resilience in Israel' (hereinafter 'The Conceptual Framework'), which is a product of a collaborative partnership between the Reut Institute and the Israel Trauma Coalition, initiated and sponsored by the United Jewish Appeal – Federation of New York City in December 2008 and published in August 2009.

The Israel Trauma Coalition for Response and Preparedness (ITC) was founded in 2001 at the initiative of the UJA Federation of New York, with the goal of developing a continuum of services in the field of psycho-trauma care and creating models for response and preparedness. The ITC represents 50 community-based organizations that provide treatment and care services to diverse populations on an immediate basis and over the long-term, and trains teams and institutions, including local councils, in emergency preparedness.

ITC's commitment to national and local resilience is based on more that 30 years of experience of its members in developing theoretical models, systems and institutions of resilience and response to individual and communal trauma in the north and south of Israel. Prominent examples include Resilience Centers and Regional Training Centers. In addition, ITC operates in disaster areas around the world. The expertise gained by ITC members has been sought after by national and international bodies such as the GOI, UN, UNICEF, WHO, UNHR, WADEM and recently, the White House Group on Resiliency.

The Reut Institute is a nonprofit non-governmental strategy group founded with the goal of sustaining significant and substantive contribution to Israel's security and prosperity. Reut's unique added value stems from its expertise in identifying
strategic opportunities or surprises, developing knowledge about them and mobilizing the relevant community to adapt.

Reut’s commitment to the issue of national and local resilience stemmed from its identification of Israel’s home front as a weakness in Israeli national security following the Second Lebanon War. Since March 2008, Reut has dedicated a team to this issue.

29. The recommendations of this document are based on the following:
   - **Praxis work method**, which is based on a package of theory, methodology, and software tools developed by the Praxis Institute, headed by Dr. Zvi Lanir and Mr. Boaz Israeli (see: www.praxis.co.il);
   - **Application of the logic of The Conceptual Framework** to the world of philanthropy and the relationship between Israel and the Jewish world;
   - **Meetings with dozens of professionals and experts** from federations, foundations, private donors, Israeli NGOs, the Jewish Agency (JAFI) and the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) (for the full list of acknowledgements see annex A);
   - **Review of literature**, most prominently by the JFNA and the Brookdale Institute (for the full bibliography see Annex B).

30. The structure of the document is as follows –
   - **The first chapter** deals with the transformation of the Israeli home-front since the Second Lebanon War (2006-10);
   - **The second chapter** deals with the changes in Jewish philanthropy and the challenge of resource allocations to Israel in times of crises;
   - **The third chapter** deals with the emerging fundamental gap between the patterns of conduct of the Jewish world in the context of preparedness for crisis in Israel, on the one hand, and the changes that have taken place in the Israeli home-front, on the other hand;
   - **The fourth chapter** offers guidelines for future Jewish philanthropy crisis response based on instilling a culture of preparedness in the key philanthropic institutions of the Jewish world.

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Chapter 1: Resilience in Israel's Home-Front (2006-2010)

Israel's Challenge of Resilience

31. The Second Lebanon War (7/06) exposed many weaknesses in Israel's national security doctrine. Prior to the P – front-Israel's home-front failure was a major one. Second Lebanon War, the Israeli government neglected the home-front in planning and allocation of resources, thus compromising its ability to address the needs of a large population in crisis. As the national institutions and local governments had difficulties to effectively address civilian needs, numerous NGOs, volunteers and philanthropists, many from the Jewish world, filled the void.4

32. Following the Second Lebanon War, Israel's emergency preparedness has been overhauled – The Ministry of Defense (MOD) was charged with the overall responsibility for the home-front, including for formulating a strategy for its organization and management. A National Emergency Authority, 'NEMA', was established (2007) within the MOD, complementing the IDF's Home Front Command (HFC). An extensive effort has been made to improve the preparedness of Israel's emergency authorities, albeit much work remains to be done.5

33. Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza region (1/09) demonstrated evident and significant improvement in the functioning of Israel's emergency authorities and local councils, while there is still room for improvement of the effective collaborations between different government ministries and with non-governmental organizations.

34. Despite the effort that has been made in the past four years, there is still much to be done. Israel remains unprepared for a national crisis, which may erupt due to natural disaster or war, and affect large parts of Israel's territory or population. In such an event, a dramatic gap will emerge between the needs and expectations of the population, on the one hand, and the capacities and resources of the emergency authorities, on the other hand.

35. Such a crisis may expose the home-front to the risk of local collapses in the form of breakdown of social norms and law and order, mass disobedience and loss of trust among citizens and local and national authorities, similar to the ‘collapse’ that took place during the Katrina disaster in New Orleans (2005).6 Such a collapse

3 See the Reut Institute documents presented to the Winograd Commission of Inquiry into the Events of the Military Campaign in Lebanon 2006: Updating Israel's National Security Strategy (4/07); A Strategic Support Unit for the Prime Minister (4/07); Re-Organization of Foreign Policy in Israel's National Security Strategy (8/07).


5 Prior to 06', no ministry had such overall responsibility (State Comptroller’s Report, p. 4).

6 Academic research has shown that disasters can strengthen social cohesion, and preparedness can be seen as a tool to create the necessary conditions for this.
may deny Israel success on the home front and consequently also national victory in military confrontations, while, adequate preparation and leadership could have the reverse effect of strengthening community cohesiveness.

36. The reason for this gap is a powerful mindset that views crisis-response as a 'public product' that needs to be provided by the defense establishment in the national government and by local authorities, and thus the role of civil society organizations is viewed only as secondary.

37. Meanwhile, only effective mobilization of civil society – including the business sector, non-profits and philanthropists – can fill the dramatic shortage of resources and capacities that is expected in case of a national crisis.7

38. Resilience is the foundation of success on the home front – Resilience captures the challenge of transcending a crisis by adapting to dramatically changed conditions, minimizing casualties, securing basic quality of life for individuals and communities, and preserving core values and identity.8

39. National resilience emerges bottom-up from individuals, households, communities, businesses and organizations, as well as top-down from public institutions, a sense of purpose and leadership. Its Foundations are consolidated before a crisis and immediately following one on the 'day after', and are tested in the immediate response to a crisis and in its duration.

40. Boosting local and national resilience calls for organizing Israeli society as a civil resilience network founded on a culture of preparedness:

- The civil resilience network is to be comprised of thousands of units ('nodes') – individuals, households, communities, central and local governments, businesses and corporations, nonprofits and philanthropists and Jewish communities and institutions overseas – that are committed to improving local and national resilience and have sufficient capacities and resources to act both independently and in coordination during crises; 9

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7 Israel’s relative success in the home-front during 'Operation Cast Lead' (1/09) does not indicate national preparedness due to the limited scope of the challenge (See: Elran M. (Ed.), "The Civilian Front", INSS Memorandum, No. 99 (Tel Aviv, INSS, June 2009)).


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A culture of preparedness is a set of values, priorities, patterns of behavior and habits instilled in all levels of society to ensure preparedness for crises. This culture must be embedded among individuals and within households, communities, central and local governments, businesses and corporations, non-profit organizations and philanthropists.10

The basis for consolidating the resilience network is individuals, organizations, corporations and agencies that already embody a culture of preparedness and possess vast resources that can easily be mobilized.

41. A civil resilience network based on a culture of preparedness requires partnership between 'the State' and civil society at large:

- The State – Government of Israel, the Knesset, and the emergency authorities – must provide the legislation, standardization and enforcement that will instill a culture of preparedness;
- The Civil Resilience Network will mobilize resources, personnel and infrastructure toward local and national resilience in times of crisis.

42. The generic characteristics of networks make them resilient as an outcome of its flat and nonhierarchical structure, the independence of its units and its inherent redundancies and overlaps. Networks are sensitive to local, as well as global, contexts and conditions, while sharing general national characteristics.

43. The 'hubs' are key to the success of The Civil Resilience Network – Hubs are units of the network with an exceptional number of connections, are thus have the greatest influence on their environment and the overall performance of the network. For example, hubs in the network can community centers, or the major philanthropic funds and federations.

44. The philanthropic sector in Israel and abroad is an integral part of the civil resilience network to the extent that it can become a part of the national fiber empowering local resilience and responding to disasters.

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Chapter 2:
Changes in Jewish Philanthropy's Relevancy in Crisis

Jewish Philanthropy during Crises in Israel

45. **The Jewish world have repeatedly extended extraordinary financial support to the Jewish Yishuv in Eretz Yisrael and then to the State of Israel** – Inspired by a feeling the general solidarity of Jews (arvut hadadit), particularly in times of crisis (lo ta'amod al dam re'e'ach) and by the special stature of the Jewish communities in Eretz Yisrael, support of world Jewry has been central to Zionism since its inception. Special financial mobilization took place in times of crisis and need, such as during the 1948 War and during the first years of the State of Israel (1948 and early 1950s), or before and during the Six-Day War (1967) and the Yom Kippur War (1973).

46. **The majority of support came from North America**, where the most affluent and well organized Jewish community lives. Its leading institution – The Jewish federation system of North America – started at the beginning of the 20th century based on the European model of 'Va'ad Ha'Kehila' and came to represent the collective Jewish voice in North America. The united fundraising mechanism for overseas activities, the United Jewish Appeal (UJA), was formed in 1939, and divided the resources it raised between world Jews under the values of Tzedek and Hesed through the JDC and Eretz Yisrael through JAFI. Meanwhile, Federations nurtured a parallel fundraising operation to support their local needs.

In 1999, the United Jewish Communities was established and merged all fundraising efforts based on a formula for allocation of resources, which, historically, was 75 percent to JAFI and 25 percent to the JDC.

In 2009, the UJC became JFNA to reflect its true character as the organization of the federations of North America, still with the mission of protecting and enhancing the well-being of Jews worldwide and in Israel, through the values of 'Tikkun Olam', 'Tzada' and 'Torah'.

47. **The 'Israel Emergency Campaigns' (IEC) have been continental efforts of North American Jewish communities to help Israel face crises and recover from them.** IECs are generally organized as a specific concentrated effort – 'campaign' – in which federations raised money from their communities over-and-above their ordinary commitments, and transferred the funds to UJC / JFNA, which

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12 See: [Jewish Virtual Library Web site](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org) and the [JFNA Web site](http://www.jfna.org).

13 In past years, the creation of the UJC (1999) caused a shift of power from JAFI and the JDC to the umbrella organization. Consequently the formula of funds allocations to JAFI and the JDC has been eroded in favor of direct giving to organizations such as the Israel Trauma Coalition (ITC) and the Ethiopian National Project. (Conversation with Dr. Devora Blum, former Vice President, Israel Planning, UJC, Jerusalem, 10/15/2009. See also: [JFNA Web site](http://www.jfna.org)).
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confers it upon its Israelis partners – mainly JAFI and the JDC – to spend in Israel. Since 2002, the ITC has also been a recipient of such emergency funds.

48. **In the past decade (2000-2010), three such campaign took place**  
   (in addition to the constant support for the population around the Gaza Region prior to Operation Cast Lead (see below)) –
   - **The Second Intifada (April 2002)** – This campaign took place in response to the needs of Israelis under the war of terror from the Palestinian side. $364 million were directed towards alleviating critical needs in Israel, including in areas such as children safety, transportation or healthcare;
   - **The Second Lebanon War (July 2006)** – This campaign raised $360 million that were distributed until 2009. The funds were divided among immediate and urgent needs emanating directly from the war; needs for the ‘day after’, concentrating on rebuilding the north and repairing damages; and needs of strengthening the social fabric. Beneficiaries included the education system, community institutions, small businesses, post-trauma care, support for vulnerable and immigrant populations and advocacy efforts;
   - **Operation Cast Lead (January 2009)** in response to the humanitarian and social needs in Southern Israel, the JFNA launched the ‘Israel Solidarity Drive’ that aimed to raise $10 million.

49. **Following the Second Lebanon war the mechanism, judgment and ethics of allocation of resources was challenged by some funders.** The main claim of these funders was that funds were not used in a transparent and accountable way that corresponded with the commitments made to them. This criticism reflected the powerful trends that have been transforming the relations between Israel and the Jewish world, on multiple levels, including in philanthropy.

**Shifting Sands of World Jewish Philanthropy Capacity for Crisis Response**

**Note:** some of the following trends are relevant to the entire philanthropic world in general or within the Jewish world, but we find them to have a significant effect on the preparedness for response to a crisis in Israel.

50. **Israel is strong and prosperous, and, in some cases, employs questionable policies. Why does it need our help? Why should we support it?** – In the past, it was assumed that in case of an emergency in Israel, Jews and Jewish communities

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14 In addition to the mentioned below IECs, there are also special appeals organized to support specific causes in Israel such as large-scale immigrations waves. Other emergency campaigns include response to large-scale global natural disasters and human suffering, such as the 9/11 attacks, Hurricane Katrina, and the Tsunami disaster in south-east Asia.


will mobilize quickly to help Israel financially and politically. However, in recent years two powerful trends are undermining this potential mobilization: First, the perception of Israel as secure and prosperous. Second, many criticize Israel's domestic and foreign and security policies. Hence, the ability to support Israel may be compromised, particularly in cases when the crisis is not evidently dramatic.

51. **Growing diversity of fundraising platforms and direct giving challenge the value proposition of the intermediary** – In the past, Federations, UJA-UJC-JFNA or Keren HaYesod were the indispensable intermediaries between grantors in world Jewry and grantees in Israel (mainly through JAFI and JDC). They served to bridge distance, lack of information and operational difficulties. Nowadays many federations and philanthropists have their own direct designated giving platforms and programs and work directly with their grantees in Israel. Furthermore, some of them belong to other umbrella organizations such as the Jewish Funders Network (JFN), Israel Philanthropy Advisors (IPA) or 'Forum Ha'Kranot'.

52. **Shift from 'charity' to 'strategic philanthropy' and impact** – This trend shifts resources from general support to address immediate needs of poverty, hunger, illness or misery, that represent intractable social problems and a bottomless pit for financial investments, to philanthropic enterprises that address societal problems in a long-term, systematic and structural manner with the objective of alleviating them.

53. **The meaning of success: from how much raised to how it was spent** – Success of the emergency appeals used to be determined by the scope of the funds that were raised. Over the past few years, we have seen a second focus also on how funds were spent and the actual impact they had during and following the crisis. This is a natural evolution of the trend of strategic philanthropy that was mentioned above. Furthermore, it was compounded in the aftermath of the global economic crisis and the Madoff scam.

54. **A backlash against overspending** – Experience teaches that surplus of money and pressure to spend it quickly lead to a wasteful culture of financial leakages and non-

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19 Conversations with Rebecca Caspi, Executive Director, JFNA Israel office; Lee Perlman, Planning Manager, JFNA Israel office, (Jerusalem, 8/19/2009, 12/21/2009 and Tel Aviv, 9/30/2009); and Toni Young, chair of the Center for Jewish Philanthropy, JFNA, 3/3/2010.

20 Kenneth Kaiserman, the Jewish Federation of Greater Philadelphia: “People prefer the hands-on approach. It helps them feel they know where their money is going…” His community has been among the first to break with the long-established funding system in which federations provided their donations to the umbrella organization (Nathan Guttman, "Funding for Overseas Jews In Disarray as Agencies Duel", Jewish Philanthropy, 11/19/2009).


prioritized response; to overblown and sometimes even fictitious needs by grantees; and to favoring those that are physically close, with greater access and louder voice. Notwithstanding deep sentiments of gratitude, this also breeds disrespect and sometimes even resentment both among grantors and grantees.24

55. **In Israel: change of discourse from vulnerability to resilience** – Since the Second Lebanon War, ‘resilience’ has become a key concept for Israel's home-front and its authorities in the IDF and Ministry of Defense. The discourse of vulnerability, misery and weakness, which has driven emergency campaigns overseas, is in tension with the narrative that Israel would like to project.25

56. **In Israel: from improvisation to preparedness** – Since 2006, Israel's home front has undergone a transformation of preparedness, manifested in the growing commitment of local councils to prepare, and in countless exercises and drills that peak in the National Emergency Exercise held usually in May/June (this, notwithstanding Reut's criticism that the paradigm of this work has been irrelevant, and that in a national crisis this setting may collapse in certain localities). The Jewish world has been largely absent from this transformation, except for a few notable Jewish organizations who have taken an active and leading role supporting Israel's preparedness, such as the UJA Federation of NYC, mainly through its support of the ITC.

57. **In emergencies, a challenge is to spend fast even micro sums** – Due to regulation, central and local governments in Israel have a hard time spending micro sums addressing specific individual needs of the population, such as buying medication, replacing broken reading glasses, or even paying for a taxi. Hence, besides the need to support the continuation and expansion of social services provided by local councils and nonprofits to the population, effective crisis philanthropy includes the ability to spend micro sums on-the-spot addressing immediate individual needs.

58. **Grantors: Israelis (Jews and non-Jews) or just Jews** – The 2006 Second Lebanon War highlighted this tension to unprecedented level: while the logic and motivations of many among world Jewry are to help Jews in need, the areas that were hit during the war inhabit half non-Jewish, primarily Arab, population.

While the GOI policy was to treat all communities equally and addressed local needs as they arose, overseas the debate surfaced. Some said that their philanthropic giving is directed toward the Jewish communities alone, and that the non-Jewish population should fall under the responsibility of the Government of Israel and their local authorities, particularly when the missiles were fired at Israel from Lebanon and in a few cases were welcomed by local Arab citizens. Others said that not only their support is to the State of Israel, who has full responsibility toward all its

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24 See the example of the local municipality of Kiryat Shmone during and after the second Lebanon war (the conversation of the philanthropists' roundtable, Natal house, Tel Aviv, 3/25/2010).

25 For example, the Ministry of Defense roundtable meetings during Operation Cast Lead decided not to allow a disorderly supply of food to the cities in the south (from the conversation of the philanthropists roundtable, Natal house, Tel Aviv, 3/25/2010).
citizens, but also this is a unique opportunity to build strong bridges of coexistence among communities.

59. Growing number of partnerships in Israel e.g. philanthropists, municipalities and nonprofits – In the past, spending was carried out primarily through the platforms of JAFI and JDC. Nowadays, not only that Israeli philanthropists serve as equally attractive spending partners on the Israeli side, but also local partners such as mayors or non-profits are potential grantees based on the already preexisting relationship. While they mostly lack a systemic view of needs as the JDC, JAFI or ITC possess, they do have intimate acquaintance with certain grassroots operations.

60. From underwriting government needs to focusing on civil society – In the past, funds of emergency campaigns were used to underwrite government needs. In recent years philanthropists have increasingly distinguished their role from the GOI’s calling it to take full responsibility for its core mission such as safety, food security or education, and while focusing their own philanthropy on areas where they have distinct added value.26

61. From no-authority to an effort to consolidate one central authority – The Second Lebanon War exposed an Israeli home front with little or no central planning. Thereafter, the backlash has been an over-centralized approach through so-called ‘round tables’ where the Ministry of Defense expects to control and coordinate philanthropic activity and priorities in crisis.27 As these meetings are held occasionally and have not produced the desired collaborative effect among the players, many philanthropic organizations continue to rely on their own sources for information.

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26 In the past, world Jewry underwrote significant budgetary needs of the Israeli government. During past emergencies, representatives of the federation system and JAFI convened in the Israeli Ministry of the Treasury, and decided together on the clauses of the national budget that they would sponsor. For example, during the second Intifada, JAFI and the federations thus sponsored security needs, such as armored vehicles for children in the settlements. During the Second Lebanon War, Jewish federations sponsored activities under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education, and directly responded to needs expressed by mayors in the north of Israel (conversation with Jeff Kaye, Director of Resource Development and Public Affairs, The Jewish Agency, Jerusalem, 9/22/2009).

27 Following the Second Lebanon War, the MOD established a roundtable to coordinate the response of non-profits and philanthropic organizations during a crisis in the home front. However, this forum has yet to create a relevant strategy to coordinate the vast amount of civil society's organizations that are active in the home front. Moreover, the current forum has only met sporadically and mostly during or post events, and does not distinguish between philanthropists, non-profit service providers and umbrella organizations. As a consequence, the roundtable has not developed a systemic approach to promote effective collaboration between the different players, has not contributed to develop their institutional preparedness for crises and is not effective in providing on-time information about the needs and resources needed to prepare the home front.
62. **Part of the emergency funds should go toward PR** – In the past, all emergency funds were allocated in Israel. In recent years, there are calls to spend some of the resources on local needs such as PR.  

63. **Growing need to review how emergency funds are spent in Israel** – In the past, JAFI, JDC, and since 2002 also the ITC, were the primary vehicles for allocation and distribution of funds in Israel working with UJC offices in Israel. Meanwhile, the Second Lebanon War brought to the surface the crisis of trust over the allocation mechanism in Israel, its professionalism, transparency, accountability and judgment. This criticism prompted a decision by UJC / JFNA, major private foundations and donors to review how emergency funds raised for Israel were spent. We feel this development to be formative for effectiveness future crisis response. While there is a feeling that people have moved on, this crisis is lurking and may erupt in the most inconvenient moments and with greater force if not properly addressed.

**Implications: Potential Relevancy Gap in Future Emergency Campaigns**

64. **The combined effects of these trends is that in future crises the ability to raise money and spend it effectively may be severely compromised**, unless appropriate action is taken, due to the following:

- **It will be harder to raise money** due to Israel's image as a strong and prosperous nation; due to criticism of Israel's domestic and foreign and security policies; due to the narrowing base of federations; and, possibly, also due to the tension between the discourse of a vulnerable Israel and the narrative of a resilient Israel;

- **It will be harder to spend money effectively through the existing mechanism** due to the 06’ crisis of trust that will tie the hands of the operators. Also, without a systemic preparedness plan on the part of grantor and grantees, confusion is likely on the ground as the multiple actors that are receiving funds and allocating them have not identified the needs and resources in advance.

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28 For example during the second Lebanon war IEC, only 0.45 percent (~965,000$) of the funds were invested in advocacy (See: JFNA website). See the Reut institute document: The Delegitimization Challenge: Creating a Political Firewall, (2/14/2010).

## Table: Summary of Relevancy Gaps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Past Mindset</th>
<th>Changing reality</th>
<th>Implications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparedness</td>
<td>Neither Israel nor Jewry embraced a culture of preparedness. There was no pro-active preparedness to crises.</td>
<td>Israel is transitioning into preparedness. World Jewry, in general, is not, except for certain participation of some representatives in Israel's emergency drills in their capacity of philanthropists.</td>
<td>In order to lead or at least make a unique contribution in times of crisis, world Jewry should also be a part of Israel's preparedness, and prepare itself for crisis in Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilience or misery</td>
<td>Emergency campaigns used narrative of a society in pain and misery that needs help.</td>
<td>Israel is embracing the narrative of resilience and preparedness, which is in contradiction to that of misery.</td>
<td>Need to think through ahead of time the narrative of the emergency campaigns in order not to contradict Israel's resilience narrative.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Guidelines for the Philanthropic Response of World Jewry to a Crisis in Israel

**Iyar 5771**  
**May 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Past Mindset</th>
<th>Changing reality</th>
<th>Implications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fund raising</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shrinking base of support</td>
<td>In emergency in Israel, the Jewish people will unite and mobilize to support Israel.</td>
<td>Israel perceived as secure and strong. Widespread questioning of Israeli domestic and foreign policies. Narrowing base of support for community institutions.</td>
<td>Harder to communicate Israel's message and to raise money.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who runs emergency campaigns?</td>
<td>Federations spearheaded emergency campaigns. They dominated communal fundraising.</td>
<td>Growing diversity of fundraising and giving platforms, primarily through private and family foundations who have independent projects and links in Israel.</td>
<td>Harder to have a concentrated effort. JFNA / Federations can 'lead without authority' by creating an agreed set of principles and guidelines for grantees and grantors to increase efficiency and decrease duplications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focusing on preparedness or emergency response</td>
<td>Emergency campaigns are the primary vehicle to contribute to Israel's resilience in a crisis.</td>
<td>Growing need to promote Israeli communities' preparedness, resilience, and response in advance to crises.</td>
<td>Without advancing preparedness in Israeli communities, the response efforts are less effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spending</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charity or charitable investments</td>
<td>Past logic was primarily charitable: helping poor and needy people in times of crisis, pumping them with resources, sort to speak.</td>
<td>Overspending is criticized. Strategic philanthropy, which would pressure transitioning as soon as possible to intermediate and long-term charitable investments.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Guidelines for the Philanthropic Response of World Jewry to a Crisis in Israel

### Issue 1: Spending on Israelis or just Jews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Past Mindset</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This was a non-issue primarily because the home front wasn't hit or only Jewish communities were targeted.</td>
<td>Jewish and non-Jewish communities are targeted.</td>
<td>A primarily ethical question that requires an articulated statement on philosophy of resource allocation. This should not be left in the hands of the operational people to decide, as ethnically and in practice resilience is above gender or religious identity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Issue 2: Spending big or spending small

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Past Mindset</th>
<th>Changing reality</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The focus was on the big checks with large sums of money that cover the deficits of the governments, local authorities or JAFI / JDC.</td>
<td>In crises there is a growing need to be able to spend relatively small, even petty, sums on an ad-hoc situational logic (buying reading glasses, paying for a taxi or covering grocery store bills).</td>
<td>This trend is in tension with accountability and transparency and requires a much higher level of trust.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Issue 3: Underwriting Israeli authorities or focusing on civil society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Past Mindset</th>
<th>Changing reality</th>
<th>Implications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the past, world Jewry underwrote government budget lines, and recently also municipalities.</td>
<td>Growing criticism of underwriting government budget lines and alleviating it of its responsibilities. Role of civil society in Israel has expanded dramatically.</td>
<td>Differentiate between those needs that the GOI should and can provide fully, and those that can be provided through collaboration with civil society and the Jewish world.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Guidelines for the Philanthropic Response of World Jewry to a Crisis in Israel

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<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working with Israel's emergency authorities.</td>
<td>During the crises of the past decade, Israel's home front authorities did not provide authoritative guidance to philanthropic spending in crisis.</td>
<td>Following the 06’ Lebanon War, MOD and IDF are trying to control and even dominate resource allocation, through ad hoc roundtables, which have had little success so far and are a vulnerable system.</td>
<td>Urgent need to coordinate preparedness and response efforts of the GOI, grantors and grantees. The roundtable platform must be regularly convened to discuss its own preparedness and operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending in Israel or also overseas primarily on advocacy</td>
<td>All funds of emergency campaigns should be spent in Israel.</td>
<td>There is a growing need for Israel's voice to be heard, particularly in war. Hence, there will be pressure to spend money on PR, including within the Jewish communities.</td>
<td>Advocacy may become a central issue and significant budget line. This issue must be thought of and discussed in advance, and guidelines for spending should be agreed upon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust among grantees, grantors and their intermediaries</td>
<td>Trust-based operation among the grantors, JAFI / JDC / ITC and the grantees</td>
<td>2006 crisis of trust over transparency, judgment and accountability is lurking.</td>
<td>The crisis must be addressed. Ethics and principles for raising and spending money should be agreed upon in advance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 3: Guidelines for Jewish Philanthropy Crisis Response in Israel

Background

65. **The overarching idea: developing a culture of philanthropic preparedness** – Unfortunately, Israeli society faces a national challenge due to war every decade, and since 2000 even twice a decade. Past neglect has been replaced by on-going efforts by government agencies and non-governmental organizations to improve preparedness and increase resilience.

66. **However, the existing paradigm of the emergency authorities has been challenged to be insufficient in case of a national crisis** by the joint work of the Reut Institute and the Israel Trauma Coalition.

67. **Our alternative logic calls for instilling a culture of preparedness in Israel's civil society and organizing it as a civil resilience network. World Jewry and philanthropists are critically important within this network, and should embrace a culture of preparedness as well in order to play a constructive, efficient and effective role within it.** The following are principles, guidelines and examples for this preparedness.

Principles and Guidelines

68. **Few strategic directions and decisions that should be taken in advance:**

   - **Defining the unique value proposition in crisis** – philanthropic institutions should identify in advance the areas and tasks they are willing to take upon themselves during crisis in Israel. In this context, organizations should choose whether:
     - **to underwrite government activities** either through direct contact with government officials and local councils or through support to the initiatives that are undertaken in collaboration with the government; and / or
     - **to focus on areas of unique value and contribution** in which the government is not and will not be involved. The latter choice may help fundraising efforts;

   - **Israelis or just-Jews** – This is an ethical decision that has many practical implications in a crisis where non-Jewish population is hit as was the case in 2006. It should be taken at the highest organizational level and not left to the operational people, while taking into consideration that the GOI does NOT

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distinguish among people on any religious basis and to address local needs as they arise.

69. **Making sure there will be funds to spend. Establishing a fund** – As mentioned, the ability to raise money to support Israel in times of crisis may be compromised by powerful trends. Hence, we suggest that each organization establishes a fund by annually allocating one percent of the budget toward it. Its fund will be used for nurturing a culture of preparedness in Israel (see below).

70. **Principles for distribution of funds in times of crisis in Israel:**
   - Prepare a rainy day fund (see above) for the immediate response;
   - **Coordinate expectations on all levels:** ethics, strategy, structure, funding, accountability, transparency, etc.
   - **Spending emergency fund through the JAFI / JDC / ITC track:** JFNA / Keren HaYesod should develop an ethical code for allocation, transparency and accountability;
   - Spending emergency funds through the designated giving track: create a culture of preparedness among already existing grantees and partners in Israel that will allow them to receive, use, as well as allocate to others emergency funds;
   - **Internal reallocation**, for example, from development to operation, will generate significant resources.

71. **Preparedness overseas: developing a culture of preparedness for crisis in Israel and among world Jewry** –
   - **Committee: a designated forum** – Every major institution – JFNA, Keren HaYesod, Federations and such – should have a forum dedicated to preparedness for crisis response in Israel (naturally, this forum may be relevant in other crises as well);
   - **Calendar: annual calendar, peaking at the National Emergency Exercise in Israel** – The forum should decide on annual calendar of actions for preparedness that peaks during the week of Israel's National Emergency Exercise, where the community – locally and in Israel – drills itself;

| **Direction:** Decide in advance on allocation among: (1) designated giving and/or working through JAFI, JDC or ITC; (2) between government and civil society; (3) all Israelis or just Jews. |
| Code of conduct: develop an ethical code and principles for giving in times of crisis – This should be done in dialogue with the partners in Israel, such as JAFI / JDC / ITC and other nonprofits. |
| **Continuity:** long-time partners and unique contribution represent best shot for effective crisis response – The long-standing relationships with... |
nonprofits, philanthropists and government institutions in Israel, are the foundation for crisis-intervention, if prepared properly (see below).

- **Roundtable for philanthropic organizations with the GOI** – JFNA and Keren HaYesod, with their main partners in Israel, should create a roundtable with MOD / IDF and relevant government branches – Health, Welfare and Social Services, Treasury and Education – as well as experts in preparedness and social resilience, to discuss preparedness and develop a pre-planned model of operation during crises. This roundtable should meet periodically, including during the meetings of the Board of Governors of the JAFI in Israel.

72. **Preparing to spend through the JAFI / JDC / ITC tracks** –

- **Ethical code and principles for action** – Ensuring rapid, effective and efficient response with minimal red-tape through this track that would not be challenged as was the case in 2006 requires developing an ethical code and principles for action that will ensure accountability and transparency;

- **Guidelines for allocation** – In principle, this track submits allocations in Israel to priorities of the GOI or JAFI, JDC, and ITC. Hence, any philanthropist that has specific preferences should communicate them in advance.

73. **Preparing to spend through the designated giving track** – create a culture of preparedness among already existing grantees and partners in Israel that will allow them to receive, use, as well as allocate to others emergency funds: As mentioned, long standing relationships should be the primary platforms for crisis intervention in Israel, based on the following guidelines:

- Every philanthropic institution should assign, in advance, all its Israeli grantees and partners into one of three general categories (this categorization should be based on the standards created by the government in collaboration with civil society):
  - 'essential service providers' that have a core mission that is relevant in times of crisis and must continue to operate and even expand operations, primarily those that provide for food security, healthcare, welfare, mental health and trauma care, or child care;
  - 'dual-use organizations' whose core mission may not be directly relevant to crisis but have assets and capabilities that can be made to be relevant in crisis such as youth movements, sports groups, community centers, rotary clubs or academic institutions;
  - 'non-essential organizations' whose core mission is not relevant to crisis and whose assets and resources cannot be directly reassigned toward improving resilience such as twinning programs among schools or museums.
Pre-planning and pre-pledging – All essential and dual-use organizations should be expected to present a plan of action for crisis. We suggest that this will happen every other year. Jewish world institutions should pre-pledge as follows:

- **All essential organizations** will have a **standing emergency pledge for six months of operation** (as opposed to development) on a pro-rata basis in order to allow them **to continue and expand their operation** by 20%, and to dedicate themselves to their mission and NOT to fundraising. For example, if the annual grant for operation is $100, the standing emergency pledge will be for $50 + $10. This pledge will be activated immediately upon declaration of crisis situation;

- **All dual-use organizations** will have a **standing emergency pledge for three months of operation** (as opposed to development) to allow them to implement their crisis plan. This standing pledge will be activated upon their declaring the implementation of their crisis plan;

- **All non-essential organizations** will know ahead of time that their allocation may be sliced by 25%-50% during crisis.

Pre-partner with Israeli philanthropists as crisis-partners – Some Israeli philanthropists – such as Raya Strauss Ben-Dror, Nochi Dankner or Avi Naor to name a few – have a proven record of stepping up to the challenge in an effective and generous way. Picking a partner, agreeing on priorities and strategies, and then matching their NIS could be a very effective strategy for crisis response.

In addition to the Federation system, Partnership 2000 may prove to be a critical platform for effective intervention in a community and must be a part of the culture of preparedness – P2K partnerships, particularly those that are well-functioning, proved to play an important role in the crisis response to the 2006 Second Lebanon War. Hence, the partnerships should be expected to prepare themselves in advance for their special role in times of crises, based on the above guidelines (categorizing its activities, pre-planning, etc.). In addition, there could be double or triple teaming among north, center or south partnerships to allow effective intervention.

Give trustees petty cash to spend – Very small sums of money – for reading glasses, medication, transportation or clothing – could make a big difference for ordinary people in times of crisis. For example, the chairperson of the local Partnership should be a candidate for being such a trustee. The idea here is to give trust-worthy individuals who are leaders of their community the resources to solve practical problems on the spot;

Ensure transparency and accountability – Spending large sums of money through proxies in times crisis is a trust-based activity. Grantees must have a record of diligence, accountability and transparency.

End.
Annex A: Acknowledgements

The Reut Institute is grateful to the following individuals who generously contributed to this document in good will, time, experience and wisdom:

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- **Gidron David**, ITC staff
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- **Ginsberg Daniel Adv.**, Chairman, Board of Directors, ERAN, ITC member
- **Habib Jack**, Director, Myers – Brookdale Institute, JDC-Israel
- **Hersher Gideon**, International Relations Division, JDC-Israel
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- **Kaye Jeff**, Director of Resource Development and Public Affairs, The Jewish Agency
- **Karp Marty**, Director of Israel Office, Jewish Federation of Greater Los Angeles
- **Kellermann Natan**, Project Director, Amcha, ITC member
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Guidelines for the Philanthropic Response of World Jewry to a Crisis in Israel

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- Natan Maya, Director, JFN Israel
- Perlman Lee, Planning Manager, JFNA Israel office
- Remis Shepard, Chair of Global Operations: Israel Overseas, JFNA
- Reting Ed, Acting Director, American Jewish committee
- Schmidt Hillel, Director, The Haruv Institute
- Schwartz Doris, Board Secretary, The American Friends of the Reut Institute
- Shaley Binny, Senior Consultant and Israel Program Director, Russel Berrie Foundation
- Shalgi Yael, Programme Director, Civil Society, Yad Hanadiv
- Sharf Yehuda, Director, Israel Region, The Jewish Agency
- Shmueli-David Eran, Galilee Panhandle representative and Director of the Israel Emergency Campaign, Magbit Canada
- Segelman Ronit, Deputy Director – Partnerships, Rashi Foundation
- Solomon Jeff, President, Andrea and Charles Bronfman Philanthropies
- Trakinski Liz, Director of Community Investments, Matan
- Yanai Ahuva, CEO, Matan
- Young Toni, Chair of the Center for Jewish Philanthropy, JFNA
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- Billig M., Community Resilience of Settlements in the Binyamin Regional Council, Ariel University Center, May, 2008.


- Conference on 2010 Israeli Philanthropy, Tel Aviv University, 5/6/2010.

- Conference on the preparedness of the Civilian Front, INSS, Tel Aviv, June, 2009.


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- Schmid H., Jewish Philanthropy and the Israeli Third Sector in a Changing Environment, Center for the Study of Philanthropy in Israel, 11/16/08


Books


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Newspapers
- Calcalist.
- Ha'aretz.
- Jewish Colorado.org.
- Jewish Philanthropy.
- The Jerusalem Post.
- The Jewish Journal.
- The Marker.

Selected Internet Sites
- Israeli Center for Third Sector Research.
- Jewish Agency website.
- Jewish Library website.
- JFNA (UJC) website.
- NEMA website.
Annex C: Guidelines for Preparedness in Essential Nonprofit Service Providers

NGOs that provide essential services such as in the field of food security, welfare or health services or trauma are a key part of the Resilience Network and must develop the capabilities to continue to operate in a crisis. The following offers practical guidelines for developing a ‘Culture of Preparedness’ in such organizations to strengthen Israel’s resilience:

1. **Determine the vital services that the organization will continue to provide** during a crisis, and transmit the information to stakeholders.

2. **Map needs** that will arise during a crisis:
   - **Logistics** – Emergency equipment, safe and protected buildings to continue operations during crisis, etc;
   - **Staff** – Map workers and volunteers that are likely to continue to work during an emergency;
   - **Target population** – Provide information tailored to the population's needs, adapting essential services to the changing circumstances on the ground.

3. **Pre-establish strategic partnerships** to secure financial resources needed to continue operations during a crisis:
   - **Hold an annual meeting with major donors and strategic partners** to plan for continued collaboration during crises;
   - **Cultivate partnerships with volunteer organizations and youth groups** to receive extra assistance during emergencies.

4. **Establish regular contacts with the National Emergency Authority (NEMA)** to receive information and participate in the national emergency drill (see below). 03-6976401, 03-6976816; [www.rahel.mod.gov.il](http://www.rahel.mod.gov.il)

5. **Cooperate with local councils** in advance to secure participation in local emergency drills and plan for necessary collaborations during emergencies.

6. **Train staff and volunteers to ensure their ability to perform emergency roles that were established in advance** (providing first aid, assisting with evacuations, running the organization’s emergency information center, etc). Free training programs are provided by the IDF Home Front Command ([http://www.oref.org.il/720-he/HAGA.aspx](http://www.oref.org.il/720-he/HAGA.aspx); 08-9784128), including for persons with special needs. Other training courses and expert consultation and services are available through the Israel Trauma Coalition (ITC – 02-6722618; [www.itc.org.il](http://www.itc.org.il)).

7. **Strengthen staff’s families’ preparedness for emergencies** – When employees know that their families have a plan for emergencies and are taken care for, they will be better able to continue to function during a crisis. The organization can
provide essential preparedness information to the families of its workers (booklet available for download at www.oref.org.il/sip_storage/FILES/6/1036.pdf).

8. **Ensure shelters and protected areas are equipped to address the needs of the staff and the target population** that will use them in the case of an emergency, and that they are accessible.

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**The Annual National Emergency Drill**

Each year Israel conducts a national emergency drill named Turning Point (currently scheduled for June 2011). During the drill a siren is played and use of shelters and protected places is practiced. It is highly recommended to use the platform of the drill to promote a 'Culture of Preparedness'. Activities that can be held during the exercise include:

- Convene a board meeting to discuss the organization's emergency preparedness;
- Meet with key philanthropic partners to pre-plan and pre-pledge resources required to continue to provide essential services (and expand operations) during an emergency;
- Participate in the drill through collaborations with the relevant local authority;
- Map volunteers and employees that are likely to be absent during an emergency; contact volunteer organizations / youth groups to receive reinforcement in a crisis;
- Provide training for the staff and volunteers / the target population of the organization with the assistance of the Home Front Command or other expert organizations (see details above);
- Send an e-mail to volunteers and to the target population with information about the organization's planned activities for an emergency;
Acknowledgments

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- CSPC, the Community Stress Prevention Center – ITC member
- ELEM – Youth in Distress in Israel
- ELKA – JOINT Israel
- ERAN for Emotional First Aid – ITC member
- GVANIM, Association for Education and Community Involvement
- IDF Home Front Command
- ILAN, Israel's Foundation for the Handicapped
- INSS
- ISRAEL FLYING AID
- K Consulting Group
- MATAN, Investing in the Community
- MATOV – ITC member
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