Civil Resilience Network

Conceptual Framework for Israel's Local & National Resilience

Version B

Elul 5769
August 2009
"It's not the strongest of the species that survives nor the most intelligent, but the one most responsive to change"
(Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species, 1859)

... 

"The entire people is the army, the entire land is the front"
(David Ben-Gurion, May 1948)

... 

"Israel has nuclear weapons and the strongest air force in the region, but the truth is that it is weaker than a spider's web"
(Hassan Nasrallah, May 26, 2000)

... 

"The durability of spider webs enable them to absorb the concentrated pressure of a weight ten times that of the most durable artificial fiber"
(P. Hillyard, The Book of the Spider, 1994)
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## Definitions and Terms

<table>
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<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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| Crisis                      | A crucial change in the environment that threatens the security and well-being of individuals, households and organizations.  
A crisis can be instigated by security, economic or social causes, as well as by a natural disaster. Some crises may compromise the security and well-being of the entire country. |
| National crisis             | A crisis that affects large segments of the population over extensive parts of the country, and impacts all spheres of daily routine. |
| State of emergency          | A legal status declared by the Knesset or the Government of Israel that grants the Government authority to take certain adequate and necessary measures. Israel has formally been in a 'state of emergency' since its establishment in 1948. The Knesset extends this legal status periodically.  |
| A State of Special Emergency| A State of Special Emergency is a condition declared by the Minister of Defense, based on the authority granted by the Civil Defense (HAGA) Law, in a defined area in which there is a 'crisis' (see above) for a limited period of time. Such a declaration temporarily transfers certain powers and responsibilities from civil authorities to the home front command and precipitate special arrangements. |
| Routine                     | This concept captures the normal reality in Israel: the legal status is 'state of emergency' (see above). There is a potential threat of war and limited terrorist activity that does not impact the behavior of civilians, the economy, the work of government, tourism or foreign investments. Routine can prevail in parts of Israel, while a 'special emergency situation' is in force in others. However, there cannot be a routine during a national crisis. |
| National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment | A specific and theoretical scenario of a crisis, which guides the organization and preparation of the emergency authorities (see below). The National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment reflects the different potential scenarios of crisis, their likelihood and the costs involved in addressing them. |
| Severe Crisis               | Severe crisis is a state in which several different potential threats materialize simultaneously, and thus create a challenge that is more complex and difficult than the National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment. |

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4 See *Civil Defense Law (HAGA)*, 1952.
Responsibility
Achrayut

Responsibility is the duty to attend to a geographic region, a group of people or an issue (such as emergency response). Responsibility can be delegated to others and engenders authorities and powers, as well as obligation to bear the consequences of actions.5

In the context of the emergency response, ‘overall responsibility’ means, inter alia, determining the National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment and formulating responses; allocating resources and defining priorities; advancing legislation, regulations and standards; or coordinating and managing emergency authorities.

Authority
Samchut

Authority is the power of an institution or public office to perform an action. Such power may not be exclusive and it can be stripped, transferred or terminated.6

Home Front
Zirat ha'oref

The Home Front comprises the area within the territory of the State of Israel that is affected by a crisis, as well as by everyone that lives or operates in it.

Emergency Authorities
Ma'arach ha'oref

The agencies that have been granted by the Government of Israel or the Knesset with formal responsibilities or authorities in case of a crisis. These agencies are:7

National Emergency Authority (Rashut Ha'Herum Ha'Leumit – RACHEL) in the Ministry of Defense;
National Emergency Economy Board (Meshek Le'shat Herum – MELACH), which is part of RACHEL and includes agencies in charge of evacuation, assistance and casualties (Pinuy, Sa'ad ve Halalim – PESACH); allocation of gas, supply of electricity, water and food; provision of communication services or operation of infrastructure systems;
The Police, which is subordinated to the Ministry of Public Security;
Fire and Rescue Services (Mechabei Esh), in the Ministry of the Interior;
Home front command, which is part of the IDF and the Ministry of Defense;
Hospitals, clinics and Magen David Adom, subordinated to the Ministry of Health;

Local governments including municipalities, regional and local councils;
Unit for Monitoring Hazardous Materials in the Ministry of Environmental Protection.

Civil Resilience Network
Reshet hosen ezrahit
A network composed of thousands of units (nodes) – such as individuals, volunteers, households, businesses or organizations – that are not part of the Emergency Authorities but have a commitment to enhancing local and national resilience and core capacities to adequately respond to a crisis.

Culture of Preparedness
Tarbut shel muchanut
A set of values, priorities, patterns of conduct and habits that are conducive for coping with crises.

Resistance
Amidut
The ability to respond to challenges and pressures without internal changes.

Resilience
Hosen
The ability to transcend a crisis successfully while adapting to the changing environment, minimizing casualties, securing a basic standard of living, and preserving core values and identity.\(^8\)
Therefore, ‘local resilience’ or ‘national resilience’ are the capacity of a community\(^9\) or a nation, respectively, to demonstrate ‘resilience’.\(^10\)

Collapse
Hitmotetut
Temporary breakdown of social norms, law and order, and a crisis of confidence among civilians and authorities, which may include violence, looting, massive disobedience or uncontrolled population movements.

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\(^9\) This concept is defined as "a particularly constituted set of social relationships based on a common denominator, usually a common sense of identity", (Scott J. and Marshall G., "Community", A Dictionary of Sociology, (Oxford University Press, 2005)). Also based on interview with Baruch Sugerman and Avi Sender, Community Work Service, The Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Services, Jerusalem, 9/17/08.

Civil Resilience Network
A Conceptual Framework for Israel's Local and National Resilience

Executive Summary

Introduction
1. This document offers a conceptual framework for boosting Israel's local and national resilience. It calls for consolidating a Civil Resilience Network comprising thousands of units (nodes) that have embraced a culture of preparedness and thus have basic core capacities to respond to a crisis effectively, independently and collaboratively.
2. The objective of the resilience network is to make a decisive contribution to Israel’s successful response to national crises, when a majority of the population in many areas is exposed to severe danger and shortages.
3. The Civil Resilience Network can be consolidated quickly and at very low costs. Most of its components already exist and most of the required resources are readily available within its potential units.
4. Furthermore, this resilience network should yield many other benefits to Israeli society by strengthening local communities, improving response to local challenges and crises, enhancing social cohesion and thus contributing to quality of life.

Background
5. The Second Lebanon War (7/06) exposed many weaknesses in Israel's national security strategy. Israel's enemies focused their resources on attacking Israel's home front, however this front has been regarded by Israel as secondary in importance to the point that it was neglected.
6. Following this war, Israel's emergency preparedness has been remarkably overhauled: The Ministry of Defense was assigned with overall responsibility for the home front, resources were allocated and emergency authorities were trained and their standard operating procedures were updated.
7. Operation Cast Lead (1/09) demonstrated evident and significant improvement in the functioning of Israel's emergency authorities.
8. Nonetheless, it is widely agreed that the relative success on the home front during Operation Cast Lead does not indicate that Israel is prepared for national crisis, primarily due to the limited scope of the area and population that were under attack.
9. Turning Point 3, the recent national emergency exercise (6/09), simulated a national crisis with full participation of all emergency authorities. However, the manner of involvement of the civilian population in this exercise left a troubling concern that Israel continues to lack an adequate responses to such crises.
Therefore, this document deals with two main challenges: the place of the home front in Israel's national security strategy and the preparedness for national crises.

**The Place of the Home Front Arena in Israel's National Security Strategy:**

**The Need for 'Synchronized Victories’ and National Resilience**

11. Israel has viewed the military front as almost exclusively decisive for its national victory in times of military conflicts. However, the impact of the home front on the overall outcome of such engagements has been increasing to the point where it may be of equal importance. In other words, Israel's success on this front may be a precondition for Israel's victory in future conflicts.

12. Consequently, this document calls for reformulating Israel’s national security strategy based on the concept of ‘Synchronized Victories’, which assumes that our national victory will be consolidated on several interconnected and interdependent fronts: the military front, diplomacy, media and the home front (which is the subject of this conceptual framework).

13. Hence, Israel must define criteria for success on the home front and work towards meeting them.

14. Resilience is the foundation of success on the home front. It is the ability to transcend a crisis by adapting to dramatically changed conditions, minimizing casualties, securing basic quality of life for individuals and communities, and preserving core values and identity.

15. National resilience emerges out of bottom-up resilience of individuals, households, communities, businesses and organizations, as well as top-down resilience of public institutions and a sense of purpose and leadership. Foundations of national resilience are consolidated before a crisis and immediately following one – on the 'day after’, and are tested in the immediate response to a crisis and in its duration.

**The Challenge of a National Crisis**

16. Israel remains unprepared for national crisis in spite of the dramatic overhaul of its emergency authorities since the Second Lebanon War (7/06). In such a crisis, there will be a dramatic gap between the needs and the expectations of the population, on the one hand, and the capacities and resources of the emergency authorities, on the other hand.

17. This gap could lead to collapses in some areas in the form of breakdown of social norms, law and order, mass disobedience and loss of trust among citizens and local and national authorities. Such a collapse would deny Israel success on the home front and consequently also national victory in military confrontations.

18. The reason for this gap is a set of tacit and explicit working assumptions that underlie Israel's present crisis preparedness, which are misaligned with reality. Primarily, while emergency response is considered a 'public product', which must be provided by the government, in reality there is a dramatic shortage of resources and capacities.
19. At the same time, there are tremendous resources in Israeli society – many thousands of individuals, households, organizations and businesses – that are readily available and could easily be mobilized to contribute to local and national resilience. But, they are not.

The Response: A Civil Resilience Network Based on a Culture of Preparedness

20. This document presents a strategy for mobilizing Israeli society to deal with national crisis. The strategy is based on organizing individuals and households, corporations, organizations, and public institutions into a Civil Resilience Network that is founded on a culture of preparedness:
   - The Civil Resilience Network will comprise thousands of units ('nodes') of various types (endpoints, hubs, catalysts, and civilians-volunteers), that are committed to national and local resilience, and have basic capacities to act independently and collaboratively in a crisis;
   - A culture of preparedness is a set of values, priorities, patterns of conduct and behaviors that enable adequate response to crisis.

   The basis for consolidating the resilience network is individuals, organizations, corporations and agencies that already embody a culture of preparedness and possess vast resources that can easily be mobilized.

21. This response requires partnership between 'the State' and civil society at large:
   - The State – Government of Israel, the Knesset, and the emergency authorities – must provide the legislation, standardization and enforcement that will instill a culture of preparedness. The State must also ensure continued proper operation of the authorities that are vital for resilience such as in health, welfare, transportation, education and law and order;

22. A central characteristic of this network is its own resilience and durability that stem from its flat and nonhierarchical structure, the independence of its units and its inherent duplications and overlaps.

Instilling a Culture of Preparedness in the Resilience Network

23. The overarching principles of the resilience network should be: coordinating expectations and sharing information with the public; strengthening network hubs (see below), which are its most critical units; imposing mandatory individual and family preparedness on first-responders; continuing operation (to the extent possible) of the public sector, business sector and third sector during crisis; and relying on institutions and patterns of behavior that operate routinely.

24. The Government and Knesset need to formulate the logic and strategy for organizing the home front; to lay the legal foundations of the resilience network and to enforce them in order to create incentives for instilling a culture of preparedness; to update the current operating procedures of government ministries.
and agencies in light of the existence of the resilience network; and to allocate funds and resources to it.

25. Local authorities should be powerful catalysts of local resilience by formulating local resilience strategy, integrating it into the local vision and coordinating it with adjacent local governments; coordinating expectations with local population; and mapping the local resilience network and cultivating it.

26. Continued operation of educational institutions is critical for local and national resilience. In this context, academic institutions with their human and physical resources are an important untapped asset that should be harnessed in advance.

27. Emergency preparedness must be an integral part of social responsibility of corporations toward their employees, communities and society at large.

28. Nonprofits whose continued operation is essential, should be identified in advance and their status and preparedness regulated.

29. The Government of Israel (GOI) needs to support organizations whose objective is to build the resilience network and instill a culture of preparedness on the local level, based on the strategy of national resilience.

30. The Jewish world must be an integral part of Israel's Civil Resilience Network and culture of preparedness. On the national level, preparedness should be a subject of continued dialogue among the GOI, Jewish Agency (JAFI), The Joint (JDC), United Jewish Communities (UJC) and Keren HaYesod. On the local level, Israeli communities need to coordinate their preparedness with their partner Jewish communities or sister cities.

31. Israeli and Jewish philanthropists must also prepare their interventions in times of crisis and their contribution to the Civil Resilience Network, focusing on nonprofits whose continued operation has been recognized as essential for local and national resilience.

32. A designated resilience fund needs to be established. Its fruits will serve to cultivate the Civil Resilience Network and culture of preparedness, while the fund itself – in full or in part – will be used to finance emergency needs.

33. Preparedness of individuals and households should be regularly promoted primarily through workplaces and educational institutions. Thousands of volunteers who are prepared to assume responsibility for other citizens should be mobilized by local organizations and trained accordingly.

34. The personal and household preparedness of first-responders must be mandatory and this group should be expanded beyond policepersons, firefighters, soldiers, doctors and nurses to include other sectors whose continued operation is vital during crises, these include: teachers, social workers, people in senior positions and their staff and managers of community centers.

35. Roundtables should convene regularly in every local authority and district, with the participation of representatives of the local government, businesses and the third
sector. The purpose of the roundtables should be to formulate and update the local resilience strategy and instill it among local residents.

36. A yearly national resilience week should serve to instill a culture of preparedness among emergency authorities and the public.

End.
Civil Resilience Network

A Conceptual Framework for
Israel's Local and National Resilience

Guidelines for Quick Reading

This document can be skimmed by reading the bolded phrases. Each paragraph contains only one idea, captured in the bolded sentences, usually the first of the paragraph. Footnotes do not contain new ideas.

Background

37. This document is intended to serve as a resource for individuals in positions of leadership, authority or influence that have the will and ability to formulate Israel's national and local resilience strategy and work toward its implementation.

38. The document is a product of a collaborative partnership between the Reut Institute and the Israel Trauma Coalition, initiated by the United Jewish Appeal – Federation of New York City in December 2008:

- The Israel Trauma Coalition for Response and Preparedness (ITC) was founded in 2001 at the initiative of the UJA Federation of New York City, with the goal of developing a continuum of services in the field of psycho-trauma care and creating models for confronting crisis. The ITC represents 50 community-based organizations that provide treatment and care services to diverse populations on an immediate basis and over the longer term, and trains teams and institutions in emergency preparedness.

**ITC's commitment to national and local resilience is based on more than 30 years of experience of its members** in developing theoretical models, systems and institutions of resilience and response to individual and communal trauma in the north and south of Israel. Prominent examples include cross-sector partnerships or Resilience Centers. In addition, ITC operates in disaster areas around the world.

- The Reut Institute (Reut) is a policy group founded with the goal of sustaining significant and substantive contribution to Israel's security and prosperity. Reut’s unique added value stems from its expertise in identifying strategic opportunities or surprises that the State faces, developing knowledge about them and mobilizing the relevant community to adapt. Reut provides its services on a pro-bono basis.\(^{11}\)

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11 For more information about the Reut Institute, see Appendix B.
Reut’s commitment to the issue of national and local resilience stemmed from its identification of Israel’s home front as a weakness in Israeli national security following the Second Lebanon War. Since March 2008, the Reut Institute has dedicated a team, led by Ms. Dana Preisler-Swery, to this issue.

The goals of this collaboration are:

1. To offer a conceptual framework for national and local resilience in Israel and a strategy for its implementation (the subject of this document);
2. To examine the Resilience Centers concept lead by the ITC, in light of this conceptual framework;
3. To formulate guidelines for maximizing the efficiency and effectiveness of the Jewish world's emergency fundraising appeals.

This document is based on the following inputs:

- Our work method was based on a package of theory, methodology and software tools developed by the Praxis Institute, headed by Dr. Zvi Lanir (see www.praxis.co.il);
- Study of the Israeli home front, including: analysis of guidelines for operation of emergency authorities (see definition above); analysis of local models and institutions for resilience including ITC's Resilience Centers; and study of the concepts of ‘community resilience’ as developed by the Community Work Service in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Services;
- Meetings with dozens of professionals and experts in all relevant sectors, including in the public sector, in local authorities, in the business sector, in non-governmental and philanthropic organizations, in the media and academia (see the list of acknowledgements above);
- Study and review of the major reports written in Israel, most prominently: Machshava Report on National Resilience; State Comptroller Report on Home Front Preparedness and Functioning During the Second Lebanon War; National Security Council Report on internal security in Israel; and the documents produced by the Ayalon Committee for Examination of National Preparedness for Emergencies (for the full list, see Appendix C);
- Comparative review of international literature and resilience models in the U.S., Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Sweden and the UK;

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12 See document by the Reut Institute: Israel's National Security Concept is Irrelevant.
13 See CRRT – Community Resilience and Response Team Portfolio, (Community Social Work, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Services) (in Hebrew).
Presence in the Gaza area during Operation Cast Lead (1/09) and during debriefings held following the operation in the Eshkol, Sdot Negev and Sha’ar Hanegev regional councils (1-3/09).

40. This document is an expanded version (Version B) of the document entitled 'National Resilience: Victory on the Home Front' (10/08) (Version A), written following the Second Lebanon War (7/06). Following this war, the Reut Institute recognized the systemic inferiority of Israel's national security strategy as compared with the strategic principles guiding the network of nations and organizations that reject its right to exist (the 'Resistance Network'). This inferiority is focally expressed in the home front arena.

Therefore, the Reut Institute dedicated a policy team to comprehensively research the challenge that Israel faces in the home front arena and offer a response that will increase Israel's national resilience (3/08). The outcome of this effort is a new conceptual framework that calls for consolidating a national Civil Resilience Network based on a culture of preparedness.

The approach was initially formulated in Version A, which was submitted to the Government Committee tasked with preparing Israel for national emergencies, headed by the former Minister Ami Ayalon. The document was adopted by the Committee (11/08).14

Subsequently, the United Jewish Appeal – Federation of New York City proposed a collaboration between the Reut Institute and the ITC, with the goal of expanding and upgrading this conceptual framework (12/08). Hence, over the past months we have collaborated in preparing this document.

This document is a second milestone in a continuous study of Israel's home front and the challenge of national and local resilience. Version B replaces the abovementioned Version A and improves upon it by incorporating new areas of vital knowledge, specifically:

- Integration of the home front and national resilience into the wider context of Israel’s national security strategy;
- A better understanding of how a national crisis can precipitate collapses in the home front due to the gap between the expectations and needs of citizens in contrast to the capabilities of the emergency authorities;
- Formulating a set of principles and guidelines for emergency preparedness based on a culture of preparedness that can boost local and national resilience.

Introduction

41. The Second Lebanon War revealed weaknesses in Israel's security strategy. In spite of its clear quantitative, qualitative and technological superiority, not only did

14 See Ayalon Committee Evaluating the Home Front's Preparedness – final report (February 2009), p.4. (in Hebrew)
Israel fail to achieve a decisive victory, but it also experienced unprecedented blows on its home front that were met by ill-prepared emergency authorities, government and population.  

Furthermore, this war was another event in which Israel was effectively frustrated in the political-security-diplomatic arena by the 'resistance network', which is composed of states and organizations – such as Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah and international non-governmental organizations – that reject its existence and act to annihilate it.

Israel's home front was exposed as one of its weak points in part due to the asymmetry between Israel and its enemies in this area – Israel's enemies strategically focus their efforts on systematically targeting the home front. Israel has viewed this arena as secondary in importance to the military front, where decisive military victories should cripple any attempts to hit its civilian population. Consequently, in the years prior to the Second Lebanon War, Israel neglected the home front in every possible aspect including strategic planning, management attention, budgets or personnel, thus compromising its ability to address the needs of a large population in crisis.

Hence, shortly after the war began, numerous NGOs, volunteers and philanthropists – many from the Jewish world – stepped up to fill this void.

Yet, this effort was insufficient, leading to the unprecedented underperformance of Israel's home front – A large gap between the expectations and needs of the population, on the one hand, and the response of the government, emergency authorities and non-governmental organizations, on the other hand, led to the discontinuation of vital services, mass and unorganized population movements and consequent breakdown of confidence in national and local institutions.

Following the Second Lebanon War, Israel's emergency preparedness has been overhauled. The Ministry of Defense now carries the overall responsibility for the home front, including for formulating a strategy for its organization and management. In addition, a National Emergency Authority, RACHEL, was

See the report of the State Comptroller: “It found that the handling of the home front during the war was negligent … the nation’s decision makers invested most of their efforts in combat in Lebanon, and not in the care of the home front, which was under widespread attacks from the first days of the war. This policy created a ‘vacuum’ in the home front and left civilians exposed and vulnerable … this severe negligence led to a near systemic collapse”. (State Comptroller and Ombudsman, Report on Home Front Preparedness and Conduct During the Second Lebanon War, (July, 2007), p. 8) (in Hebrew).

However, it should be noted that there is a debate about the assessment of the government's response during the war. While some are harshly critical, others claim that the emergency authorities successfully continued to provide critical services, but failed to communicate their actions and logic.

See the documents presented by the Reut Institute to the Winograd Commission of Inquiry into the Events of Military Campaign in Lebanon 2006: Updating Israel's National Security Strategy (4/07); A Strategic Support Unit for the Prime Minister (4/07); Re-Organization of Foreign Policy in Israel's National Security Strategy (8/07). See also Reut documents: Logic of Implosion: The Resistance Network's Political Rationale (12/06); Terror is an Existential Threat (11/06).
established, and extensive resources have been allocated to debriefing, strategizing, planning, institution and capacity building and training.  

45. **Operation Cast Lead (1/09) demonstrated significant improvement in Israel's emergency response.** Various emergency authorities have demonstrated significant improvement compared with the Second Lebanon War. These include: The Prime Minister’s Office; Ministry of Defense; Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Services; RACHEL; the home front command; the Police; numerous NGOs; and local authorities in the Gaza border region, as well as in Beer-Sheva, Ashkelon, Kiryat-Gat and Ashdod.  

46. **However, Operation Cast Lead did not amount to a national crisis that would test the capabilities of Israel's emergency response.** The size and scope of the area and population attacked were limited; the frequency of the attacks was low compared with the Second Lebanon War or scenarios of future military conflicts; the quality of weapons used against Israel was limited compared to the capabilities at the disposal of Hezbollah, Syria or Iran; the conflict was anticipated and therefore well prepared for; and Israel had absolute control over the Gaza airspace. As a result, the Israeli government was able to focus attention and resources on the Gaza border area and respond to the needs of the population.  

47. **Therefore, one should not infer from Israel’s relative success in the home front arena during Operation Cast Lead that Israel is prepared for a national crisis.** This cautionary note is widely accepted among those involved with emergency preparedness in Israel.  

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17 See Government resolution number 1577 (4/15/2007). Until the Second Lebanon War, there was no ministry that had overall responsibility for the home front (see State Comptroller’s Report, p. 4). After the war, a debate ensued regarding whether responsibility for the home front should be in the hand of the Ministry of Defense or the hands of a civilian body, such as the Ministry of Public Security. Finally, responsibility was placed on the Ministry of Defense for a limited period of five years (2007-2012), during which the issue of permanent responsibility for the home front arena would be examined (See: Ayalon Committee Report Evaluating the Home Front's Preparedness - final report (February, 2009), p.9). The two central arguments for placing responsibility on the Ministry of Defense are the close ties between the home front arena and the military front, and the Ministry’s outstanding operational capabilities compared to other ministries.

In spite of the above, the budget for home front is not an integral part of the defense budget (see: Brodet Committee Report for the Assessment of the Defense Budget, May, 2007, p.16) (in Hebrew). Deputy Defense Minister Matan Vilnai said: "The real gap is budgetary … we need to establish a budget for the home front, separate from the defense budget … this will happen around 2010." (Amos Harel, "Israel is not protected from Rocket attacks on its Home front," Haaretz, 5/9/08, in Hebrew).


19 The number of rockets fired on Israel from Gaza during the first week of Cast Lead amounts to 30% of the daily average daily during the Second Lebanon war. (See Elran M., "Operation Cast Lead and the Civilian Front: An Interim Summary” (INSS Insight, Issue 87, January, 2009) (in Hebrew).

20 This observation was widely agreed upon among the speakers at the conference of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) (6/09). Among the speakers: Deputy Defense Minister Matan
48. Turning Point 3 (6/09), the national home front exercise, was designed to test Israel's preparedness for a national crisis. During this exercise, the Government of Israel, its emergency authorities, local governments and several NGOs simulated throughout the country events that could potentially be precipitated by crisis. A centerpiece of the exercise was an emergency drill in which sirens were sounded across the country and the entire population was asked to enter the safe spaces for 15 minutes (6/2/09).

49. Unfortunately, we have concluded that Turning Point 3 actually provided further proof that Israel lacks a comprehensive response to a national crisis. While it focused on drilling the emergency authorities, it neglected the civil society; it did not simulate the scope of the emergency needs, nor did it reflect the potential impact of a prolonged conflict; and its logic seems to have been predominantly a top-down military one.

50. Therefore, we have concluded that Israel does not have a comprehensive approach to coping with a national crisis and remains exposed to a risk of local collapses. This is due to the significant gap that persists between the expectations and needs of the population, on the one hand, and the resources and capabilities of the emergency authorities, even after their overhaul and dramatic improvement, on the other hand.

51. Hence, this document deals with two issues: (1) The place of Israel's home front in its national security strategy; (2) The response to a national crisis.

52. The structure of the document is as follows:

- **The first chapter** deals with the place of the home front within the national security strategy. Here, we have suggested the broad framework of ‘Synchronized Victories’. This framework assumes that Israel's 'victory' in future confrontations requires synchronized successes on the military front, the home front and media and diplomatic spheres. In this context, 'success' in the home front means resilience;

- **The second chapter** elaborates on the challenge of a national crisis;

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Vilnai, Head of Rachel Zeev Zuk-Ram and GOC Home Front Command Mayor General Yair Golan (See Elran M. (Ed.), "The Civilian Front", INSS Memorandum, No. 99 (TA: INSS, June, 2009)).

21 Turning Point 3 was the largest-scale exercise in Israel's history. It was managed by the Ministry of Defense and RACHEL and simulated a three-month long escalation that included a war in Gaza, a northern front and internal unrest. In addition to the war scenarios, drills were also conducted for a terror attack, natural disaster, epidemic and or accidents in a hazardous materials facility. Participating in the exercise were the IDF, the Home Front Command, Melach, the Police, government ministries and local authorities, citizens, media, schools, the political-security cabinet and the national information agency.

22 For example, citizens were asked to enter shelters at 11:00 AM, with the sounding of a siren, and to remain there for 15 minutes. In reality, in a similar scenario, citizens would probably cause the collapse of the cellular phone networks and flood the roads on their way to pick their children up from school.
The third chapter introduces 'Civil Resilience Network' and 'culture of preparedness' as two organizing concepts for response to a national crisis;

The fourth chapter offers a set of principles and guidelines for consolidating the Civil Resilience Network and embedding a culture of preparedness;

The fifth chapter summarizes the recommendations.
Chapter 1:
Home Front and Israel's National Security Strategy – 'Synchronized Victories' Approach and National Resilience

Existing Mindset: Victory is Achieved in the Military Front

The current mindset underlying Israel's home front is based on two powerful assumptions (among others):

53. **Victory will be achieved on the battlefield** – Israel’s security strategy emphasizes the development of military superiority that would lead to decisive and quick victories on the battlefield, while neglecting the capacity of Israeli society to withstand long and painful conflicts. Hence, the military front will determine national victory and the goal of the IDF is to achieve such victories.

54. **Therefore, the purpose of the emergency authorities is to support the military effort.** Their focus has been minimizing casualties and ensuring continued operation of essential services and industries in order to provide the government the societal and material foundations essential for waging the military campaign.

Diverging Reality: Success in the Home Front is Critical

In reality, powerful trends are undermining this logic:

55. **The importance of the home front is growing due to its increasing impact on the outcome of conflicts** – In the conflicts that Israel faced over the past 20 years – the Gulf War (1991), the Second Palestinian Uprising (2001-2005), the Second Lebanon War (2006) and the conflict surrounding Gaza (2005-2008) – the home front has become the central target of Israel’s enemies and a decisive theatre for these confrontations.

56. **Moreover, the range of threats to the civilian population is expanding.** Therefore it is not possible to anticipate, plan for or prevent them.

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23 “Israel’s security strategy can be defined in a single sentence: almost complete waiving of endurance in favor of maximal striking force”, (See Tal Israel, National Security: The Few Against the Many, (Dvir, 1996), p.52), In addition, see Bizur Avraham, The Home Front in Israel's National Security Strategy 1948-1956, PhD Thesis ,(Bar Ilan University, 2003). The 1948 War of Independence the home front was systematically targeted and heavily invested in. However, since the 1967 Six Day War, the home front has been distant from the military front.

24 The main objectives of the emergency authorities are: (1) continued and uninterrupted functioning of the government and its institutions; (2) continuing civilian routines and enhancing resilience of individuals and communities; (3) minimizing casualties and destruction. (From a conversation with the Head of RACHEL, Zeev Zuk Ram, 3/9/08). See also the Home Front Command website.

25 See the statements of Ayham al-Ayubi, a prominent Syrian-Palestinian military theorist: “We cannot defeat Israel in the conventional battlefield... in order to win, we must attack them in their weak home front, their women, old people and children... then they will surrender." (See Bialer, A. “Thinking the Unthinkable: The Possibilities and Implications of Strategic Bombing of the Israeli Home Front in the Next War”, from State, Government and International Relations, 11, 1977, p. 71-84).

57. **Success on the home front is essential for a national victory in future conflicts.** Moreover, in certain situations, such as in the case of a natural disaster or in a conflict similar to the Gulf War (1991), the home front may be the only front to be tested. **Furthermore, the ability to withstand crises successfully may even become an asset to Israel’s national security and part of Israeli deterrence** (don't try it, because it is not going to work, so to speak).

### Home Front Success Critical for 'Synchronized Victories'

58. **Against this backdrop, the report of the Meridor Commission on Israel's Security Strategy (4/06) recommended adding a defensive element to Israel's security strategy** that historically had been based on three pillars: deterrence, early warning and decisive victory. Naturally, this recommendation did not compromise the centrality of the military front, but encouraged a revisiting of priorities and allocation of resources. **However, the Meridor Commission did not go as far as framing the home front as critical to Israel's victories.**

59. This paper concludes that **Israel's national security strategy must ensure 'synchronized victories' on several fronts and arenas simultaneously**: the military front and the home front, as well as diplomatically and in the media. Since these arenas are interconnected and interdependent, they must be referred to as a systemic whole.

60. **Israel’s security strategy clearly defines the essence of military victories** in using simple concepts such as 'surrender', 'annihilation', 'decimation', 'occupation' or even 'mental scar'. Since it is all too clear that these definitions are vital for the operations of the military and security forces, they are instilled down to the very last soldier, and are communicated to the civilian population.

61. **There is no parallel strategy for the home front: the essence of success has not been defined, instilled among all the stakeholders and communicated to the general public.** The objectives of the emergency authorities – such as supporting the war effort, minimizing casualties or continued operation of essential services and industries – are clearly relevant. Nonetheless, they are not sufficient to inspire the population to take action in the case of a war that lasts for more than several days. Moreover, in cases when there is no military front such as in a natural disaster or if only the civilian population is attacked, these objectives are less relevant.

62. **Therefore, we are calling to define the essence of success on the home front within the framework of the ‘synchronized victories’ approach, as well as to**

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27 See former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert: "The next war will reach the cities and houses of Israeli citizens and our enemies’ target will be the home front… there will be no more wars in far away battlefields that will leave civilian life unchanged" (Ravid, Ha'aretz, 8/20/08).
design a strategy and to build the institutions and capacities that will bring it about.

Resilience is the Foundation for Home Front Success

63. There are 'success stories' in home fronts during crises. It is expected that every crisis affecting a civilian population is supposed to end with a sense of pain, suffering and loss due to the casualties, destruction, shortages and prolonged insecurity. Yet history shows that societies have transcended such crises successfully even under the harshest conditions. This was true in Britain during World War II, in New York in September 2001, among the Palestinians (the concept of ‘Tzumod’) and in Israel around the Gaza Strip-Palestinian during the Second Uprising (2001-05)Operation Cast Lead. and

64. The common denominator of these home front successes has been resilience, which is the ability to transcend a crisis while adapting to the changing reality, minimizing casualties, securing basic quality of life and preserving core values and identity. In this sense, resilience is different from courage, sacrifice or extraordinary actions by individuals and groups fighting danger or confronting an enemy.

65. The foundations of national and local resilience – The comparative study that the Reut Institute and ITC have carried out indicates that national resilience is based on the following foundations:

- National resilience emerges out of resilience of individuals, families, organizations, corporations and communities;

The challenge of life under fire for eight-year around the Gaza Strip has led to the development of networks of social services and connections among various communities. In many ways, these communities are stronger than prior to this conflict. See for example the nonprofit Gvanim in Sderot, the Resilience Centers in the Sha’ar Hanegev Regional Council and in Sderot. (Based on conversations with Nitay Schreiber, CEO of Gvanim; and with Hanna Tal, Director of the Resilience Center and Marva Myseles, Director of Social Services Department, in Sha’ar HaNegev Regional Council, 2/11/09).


i.e. National resilience stems from the ability of smaller units of society to adapt to the conditions of the crisis while minimizing casualties, securing a basic quality of life and preserving core values and identity. For example: Resilience of individuals and households is influenced by physical safety; availability of essential services; realistic expectations; level of relevant knowledge and preparedness; confidence in the leadership and public institutions and the strength of the supporting social network;

Resilience of communities is influenced by strength of the social networks; the quality of local leadership; trust in the regional and national institutions; level of preparedness of emergency authorities; a sense of fairness in the division of responsibilities and resources within the community;
Preparedness and realistic expectations – National resilience increases the more thorough the preparation and planning is, and the more relevant the expectations of the citizens, businesses and various organizations are to the anticipated hardships;

Solidarity, values and conduct – ‘Success stories’ of societies that have withstood the ultimate test of their civilian population highlight values such as solidarity, sacrifice, restraint, camaraderie, discipline and trust. The number of casualties or scope of destruction – that to a great extent stem from the behavior of the enemy or from fate – are secondary in these stories;

Purpose – In crises, it is vital to understand the purpose that justifies withstanding and overcoming the hardships individually and collectively;

Leadership – The central goal of leadership in times of crisis is to clarify the purpose; to preserve hope and faith that success is possible; to define core values and defend them; to determine priorities; to set the expected norms; to mobilize for action; and to thwart forces that are capable of undermining society’s resilience.

Leadership can emerge from authority figures or from other places including from the Prime Minister, President, Ministers, Knesset Members, public servants, heads of local authorities, civil society, businesspeople, community activists or ordinary citizens.

66. Life cycle of crisis / four chapters of success stories on the home front – Comparative study of home front success stories as well as existing literature, indicate that crises have life cycles of four phases. These phases also comprise 'chapters', so to speak, of stories of success or failure on home fronts. They are:

National resilience emerges from the resilience of smaller units but is also influenced by the level of trust in national institutions and leadership; the continued operation of national institutions; law and order; and a fair division of resources and responsibilities


These values also are an outcome of the level of Social Capital, i.e. the amount of social ties and their quality. See Putnam, R., Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, (Simon & Schuster, 2001) p. 19. and Giddens, A., Emile Durkheim; Selected Writings, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 184.


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Preparedness – This stage includes a range of actions that are continuously implemented during the period that preceded the crisis, such as training emergency and rescue forces and volunteers; preparing emergency plans, procedures, infrastructure and supplies; mobilizing civil society; instilling a culture of preparedness (see below); or calibrating expectations;

Immediate Response – This stage spans 24 to 48 hours from the outbreak of the crisis and includes the transition from normal daily routine to full activation of all the relevant emergency frameworks administrated by the emergency authorities and within civil society. This stage is characterized by shock, trauma and even panic, disorder or life-saving efforts, and presents an ultimate test for the health, transportation and communications systems. It challenges numerous citizens to collaborate efficiently and in composure;

Crisis Routine – This stage may last days, weeks, months or even years (as was the case in Sderot). In its duration, the entire home front is challenged to demonstrate resilience. A necessary condition for success is the continued functioning of the public sector, business sector and third sector, with the necessary adjustments and full mobilization of civil society. This is when restraint, volunteerism, camaraderie, benevolence and solidarity need to come into play;

The Day After – This stage begins at the end of the crisis, with the home front returning to 'routine', and ends with the completion of the debriefing process, it includes repair of damage, renovation and reconstruction that turn damage into development opportunities; decoration of the heroes of the home front; and exercise of legal and public measures against those who did not fulfill their civil or legal duties. The goal of this stage is that the condition of the state be superior to its condition prior to the crisis.

Table: Summary of the Four Stages for Success of the Home Front

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Highlights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preparedness</td>
<td>Prior to the crisis</td>
<td>Actions taken prior to the crisis to prepare, e.g. training of emergency and rescue forces and volunteers; calibrating expectations; planning and capacity building; mobilizing civil society; instilling a culture of preparedness and consolidating the resilience network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate Response</td>
<td>First 48 hours of the crisis</td>
<td>Transition from routine to full deployment of emergency authorities and mobilization of civil society; focus on minimizing casualties; health, transportation and communications systems will face a supreme test.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Routine</td>
<td>Until end of crisis</td>
<td>Emergency authorities and resilience network operate at full capacity toward ensuring local and national resilience; continued operation of public, private and non-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36 See the American government report following the events of September 11, 2001: "Emergency response is a product of preparedness", in The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 278.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Highlights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Day</td>
<td>After crisis</td>
<td>Back to daily routine. Debriefing and learning; from damage to development; decorating heroes and taking measures against offenders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After</td>
<td>ends</td>
<td>governmental / nonprofit sectors; test of will &amp; character: restraint, volunteerism, solidarity and benevolence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 2:
The Challenge of a National Crisis

Existing Mindset: State Provides Response in a National Crisis

The current structure and deployment of the emergency authorities are based on the following working assumptions:

67. **The safety and basic welfare of the population are 'public goods'.** Therefore, the State has an overall responsibility to provide services and essential needs during a crisis, through the Ministry of Defense, emergency authorities and other government ministries and agencies.

   The local authorities are the building blocks of the emergency response in the sense that they are the platform of the central government for providing basic services to citizens. The local authorities and their heads are responsible for preparing for crises and for managing their communities in its duration, with the assistance of representatives of the home front command.

68. **The State will continue to provide essential public services and even expand them** – During a crisis, the State assumes full responsibility for food security, welfare, medical care, or even for transporting the population away from the area under attack for rest and relaxation. These are services that in ordinary times are the responsibility of civilians as well as of many corporations and nonprofits.

69. **Central command and control – The logic for the management of the home front is similar to the military front:**

   - **Knowledge and wisdom are in the hands of the commanders that are physically located in a situation room** – A successful response to a crisis requires rapid identification of the events implications by the central command, consolidation of the principles of response and handing down operational instructions;

   - **Preparedness based on national and local exercises** (such as Turning Point 3). During these exercises drills are conducted and procedures are set by various government bodies. The expectations from the population are to act as instructed (for example: enter a shelter and remain there for 15 minutes);

   - **During a crisis, citizens will be obedient (like soldiers on a battlefield)** and will follow the instructions;

70. **Citizens should be self-sufficient for 72-96 hours until help arrives** – The working assumption is that in a national crisis, several days may elapse until the

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37 See for example Dinur Ra'anana, Former Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office: “the government should care for the basic services and civil society will take care of additional services” (see Local Authority – Front and Home Front?!, Union of Local Authorities in Israel, November, 2007, p. 23).

relevant authorities reach all citizens.\textsuperscript{39} Hence, citizens are expected to be self-sufficient for 72-96 hours.

71. **The Jewish world will unite and mobilize behind Israel** – During a crisis, Jewish communities overseas will mobilize to help Israel financially through emergency appeals, diplomatically and even by sending volunteers.\textsuperscript{40}

**Diverging Reality: No Capacities for Responding to National Crisis**

In reality, these working assumptions are weak:

72. **During a national crisis, complex needs at tremendous scopes may arise**, such as many casualties and large-scale damage; widespread trauma and need for mental support and relief; significant shortages of food, water and medicine; pressing obligations to attend to populations with disabilities and special needs; confusion; breakdown of law and order; or management of traffic.

**Israel does not have the resources or capacities for addressing a national crisis.** Nor does it plan to have them. This is different from the military front, on which Israel does prepare itself for severe crises, such as a military conflict on several fronts simultaneously, by enlisting and training the necessary personnel and accumulating weapons and equipment.\textsuperscript{41}

**Low level functioning of local authorities during routine may exacerbate during a crisis** – Many local authorities in Israel do not perform well during routine, so it is unreasonable to expect them to perform exceptionally during a crisis.

73. **The scope of services during a crisis will decrease (while needs and expectations increase)** –

- **Shut down of the education system** – When a crisis occurs, the education system shuts down and its institutions are not expected to continue their operation. As a result, during the immediate response stage, there will be huge pressures on the transportation system by hundreds of thousands of parents hurrying to pick up their children. During the crisis routine, many parents will be unable to perform their duties.\textsuperscript{42}

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\textsuperscript{39} For example, the Ministry of Health operates on the assumption that in the case of an earthquake, 48 to 72 hours will be required until authorities reach all citizens (based on an interview with Daniel Laor, Director of Emergency and Disaster Management Division, Ministry of Health, TA 2/12/09).

\textsuperscript{40} The funds raised by Jewish communities abroad and by Christian organizations that support Israel were central in financing assistance activities during the Second Lebanon war (See Ruthi Sinai, *Haaretz*, 11/7/07; Eli Ashkenazi, *Haaretz*, 9/24/07, in Hebrew). See also: *The Jewish Agency Mobilization During the Second Lebanon War – Moving Forward to Rebuild the Galilee* (The Jewish Agency for Israel, December, 2006), and Bavli Michael, Radi Francis, Dabush Avi, Eitan Hadas *Civilians on the Frontlines: Citizen's Views of Home Front Failures during the Second Lebanon War*, Summary Report, Shatil, (February, 2007), p. 24. (in Hebrew)

\textsuperscript{41} See Prime Minister Ehud Olmert: “There may be extreme situations in the home front in which we will have a limited ability to respond”. (*Globes*, 12/3/00). (in Hebrew).

\textsuperscript{42} Schools that have no proper shelters close. Furthermore, some educational infrastructure is designated to PESAJ (governmental body in charge of evacuation, assistance and casualties) to serve
Partial operation of the business sector based on 'MELACH' definitions
– The MELACH Committee has formulated a list of vital services and industries that are essential for the war effort. All other facilities are under no obligation to continue to operate; 43

Furthermore, incentives exist for discontinuing operation in private and public sector – Current financial incentives encourage workers to stay at home in crisis; 44

The nonprofit (third) sector has no obligation to continue operating nor does it have plans to do so (in spite of good intentions) – This sector provides many essential services in areas such as food security, welfare or health care. Nonetheless, its continued operation in crisis is unregulated. While many in this sector are self-motivated, they are often unprofessional in the areas of emergency preparedness. The roundtable initiated by the Ministry of Defense with representatives of the business and third sector has not addressed this topic. 45

74. The logic behind the management of the home front arena – which requires empowerment, decentralization, inspiration and mobilization – is different from the military top-down logic:

Wisdom and knowledge are in the field units – These units have more information and are more sensitive and responsive to the needs of the local population. They have a better capacity to innovate and improvise. Therefore, civilian field units tend to question the logic and sometimes even the motives of those 'above' them;

Citizens are likely to behave according to their logic and capabilities, and not necessarily according to the instructions of the home front command – Hence, mass compliance with the guidelines of the home front command depends on these guidelines seeming to be logical and relevant. At the moment, there is no systematic effort to explain to the population the logic of the response;

Emergency exercises and drills will not prepare civilians for the conduct expected of them during a crisis, although there is no doubt that they help the emergency authorities build their capabilities. In their present format,
these exercises are not relevant to most projected scenarios, are not perceived by many as valuable, and therefore are often disregarded.

75. **Citizens do not have the awareness or basic skills required for self-sustainment for 72-96 hours** – The ability to self-sustain for several days depends, first and foremost, on mental and technical preparedness as well as on basic capacities. All these components are currently missing.

76. **Mobilization of the Jewish world may not reach past levels** – The Jewish world, its institutions and philanthropy, are going through deep changes. For example, the combination of Israel’s perceived prosperity and military might, on the one hand, with the effect of the global economic crisis and criticism of the transparency and efficiency of Israeli public institutions, on the other hand, will affect the mobilization of world Jewry during a crisis.46

**Implications: Resilience may be Undermined to a Point of Collapse**

77. **Potential dramatic gap between the expectations and needs of the population, on the one hand, and the state’s resources and capacities, on the other hand** – As mentioned, while the government and emergency authorities assume full responsibility for providing and even expanding essential services, government institutions, nonprofits and the private sector will decrease their operation and sometimes even bring it to a halt. Consequently, the quantity and quality of services provided to the population may be abruptly and severely compromised.

78. **A crisis of trust: why didn’t they tell us?** – Israel runs the risk of a crisis of confidence between the civilian population and the political leadership and state institutions if expectations of citizens are not calibrated and the opportunity to prepare adequately is not offered. This may erode the foundations of local, and thus, national resilience.

79. **Graver still, social fabric in various regions may collapse** – The combination of ill-preparedness, unrealistic expectations and a breakdown of trust may culminate in a 'collapse' in certain areas, particularly where the social fabric is weak and vulnerable. This may take the form of breakdown of social norms and order manifested in violence and looting; disintegration of solidarity and mutual responsibility (‘dog eat dog’); loss of confidence in leadership and institutions; rumors; mass public disobedience; and even unexpected and uncontrolled population movements.

80. **These instances will damage Israel’s ability to succeed in the home front and achieve national victory, even if the IDF’s achievements on the battlefield are impressive** – Moreover, lack of functioning of the home front will reinforce the perception that Israel is vulnerable on this front, damage deterrence and encourage future attacks.

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46 About changes in the character of Jewish philanthropy in recent years, see "In Defense of Strategic Philanthropy", *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, (Vol.149, No.2, June 2005), p. 132-140. Also, from an interview with Elisheva Flamm-Oren, Israel Office Planning Director for the Caring Commission, UJA – Federation of New York, Jerusalem 7/12/09.
81. Therefore, Israel must design a strategy to address national crises which exhausts its untapped resources and capacities. As mentioned, at present, significant resources and capacities – within central and local government institutions, among corporations and nonprofits, as well as in civil society at large – are not mobilized to the national effort.

Table: Gaps between Existing Mindset and Diverging Reality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing Mindset</th>
<th>Diverging Reality</th>
<th>Implications</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The security and basic welfare of citizens are considered ‘public goods’, which the State is responsible for providing:</td>
<td>In national crises, complex needs on tremendous scales will emerge, above and beyond the capacities of the emergency authorities:</td>
<td>During a national crisis, quantity and quality of services to citizens will be severely compromised;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ The local authorities are the ‘building blocks’ of emergency authorities;</td>
<td>▪ No resources or capacities to cope with national crisis;</td>
<td>Pressing needs on individual and household levels;</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ The State will continue to provide essential public services during a crisis, and even expand them;</td>
<td>▪ Many weak local govs. Also, scope of services will be reduced:</td>
<td>Without calibrated expectations, potential crisis of confidence between citizens and the government;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Citizens will need to self-sustain for 72-96 hours.</td>
<td>▪ Shut down of education system;</td>
<td>Social fabric in various regions may collapse;</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>▪ Negative incentives for operation of the public sector, organizations and the business sector during crises;</td>
<td>These instances will compromise Israel’s ability to succeed on the home front and achieve national victory, even if IDF wins on the battlefield;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Partial operation of the business sector according to MELACH definitions;</td>
<td>▪ Many untapped resources in Israeli society.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>▪ Third sector’s emergency response is unregulated.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>No calibration of expectations; citizens do not have awareness or capacity to self-sustain.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logic of management of military front and home front is similar – central command and control:</td>
<td>Logic of management of home front is very different (empowerment, mobilization, inspiration or decentralization):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Knowledge and wisdom are in the hands of the commanders;</td>
<td>▪ Wisdom and knowledge are dispersed among field units that are sensitive and responsive to local needs;</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Preparedness through exercises – people will obey instructions;</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Existing Mindset
- In a crisis, citizens will be disciplined (like soldiers).

## Diverging Reality
- Emergency exercises and drills do not prepare civilians for emergencies;
- Citizens will respond based on their logic and capacities, and not necessarily according to the instructions.

## Implications
- The Jewish world will unite and mobilize to provide funds and other resources.
- Mobilization and support of Jewish world not guaranteed at past levels.
Chapter 3: Response: Civil Resilience Network, Culture of Preparedness

Introduction

82. **The Vision: Israeli local and national resilience** – National resilience is essential for successfully confronting a national crisis. It is also critical for victory in future conflicts, but must be compounded by successes on the media, diplomacy and military fronts (see the ‘Synchronized Victories’ approach). It emerges out of numerous occurrences of local resilience across the country.

83. **This vision requires mobilizing all resources of Israeli society** to improve our crisis response and bridge the gap between the needs and expectation of the population, on the one hand, and the resources and capacities of the government, on the other hand.

84. **In this document, we contend that boosting Israel's local and national resilience calls for organizing Israeli society as a 'Civil Resilience Network' founded on a 'culture of preparedness'.** This network will complement the emergency authorities and become an integral part of Israel's crisis response.

85. **This network will add substantial value to Israeli society beyond national resilience.** Not only will it increase the resilience of individual communities in local crises, but it will also make them more cohesive, empowered and possessed of a better quality of life and even with higher standard of living.

Culture of Preparedness

86. **Culture of preparedness is a set of values, priorities, patterns of behavior and habits instilled in all levels of society to ensure preparedness for crises.** This culture must be embedded among individuals and within households, communities, central and local governments, businesses and corporations, non-profits and philanthropists.

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47 This strategy does not challenge the overall responsibility of central and local governments for crises response.

48 This point is agreed upon by many experts but it falls beyond the scope of this project.

49 The Home Front Command designated 2009 as the Year of Volunteers and Precincts. Major General Yair Golan, Head of the Home Front Command: “Civilian-volunteers during a crisis are important not only because the Home Front Command lacks personnel, but because we want civilians to take responsibility for their destiny”. (INSS Conference, 3/22/09). See also the Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Services, **CRRT – Community Resilience and Response Team**, June, 2002).

50 For reference on "culture of discipline" see Jim Collins in **Good to Great**, (NY, Harper Collins Publishers, 2001), p. 120-143. A culture of preparedness exists in Florida in the U.S., in preparation for hurricanes. During a crisis, State operations are supported by thousands of civilians that mobilize to assist rescue forces; the State maintains partnerships with the business sector and nonprofit sector,
87. **A culture of preparedness requires partnerships and collaboration among State institutions and civil society**

- Three primary roles of the State: *First*, to articulate the policy for consolidating local and national resilience; *second*, to train and prepare the emergency authorities and to instill a culture of preparedness in them; *third*, to provide the infrastructure and to create the incentives for consolidating the resilience network and instilling a culture of preparedness (see below);

- The role of civil society: To mobilize infrastructure, personnel and resources on a national scale for resilience.

88. **A culture of preparedness** is founded on two pillars:

- ‘Preparedness’ – The physical and technical dimension or crises response such as food and water supply, vehicles, special equipment, first aid and rescue capabilities, contact lists or meeting points;

- ‘Culture’ – The mental and moral dimension that are vital for local and national resilience and are expressed in common patterns of behavior and habits.

**The Civil Resilience Network**

89. A **resilience network** must comprise tens of thousands of units – individuals, households, central and local governments, businesses and corporations, nonprofits and philanthropists and even Jewish communities and institutions overseas – that are supposed to provide immediate humanitarian support (See Bush, J., "A Bottom-Up Strategy for Catastrophic Events", in: Himberger, D., Sulek, D., Krill, S., "When there is no Cavalry", *Strategy + Business*, No. 48, 2007) and see the website of the U.S. Ministry of Homeland Security [http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/homeland/index.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/homeland/index.html).

For more about partnerships between State institutions and society, see the Forum of Roundtables at the Prime Minister’s Office (*The Government of Israel, the Civil Society and the Business Community: Partnership, Empowerment and Transparency*, Department for Policy Planning, February 2008). Roundtables are also convened at the local level, such as in Sderot, where a roundtable was held in partnership with the municipality, the community and NGOs operating in the city (Michal Greenberg, "Southern City with an NGO in its Center", *Haaretz*, 8/5/08). See Talias M., Yadin E., Ben Yair S., Ansali H, A Guide for Development and Management of Inter-Organizational Partnerships in the Public Sphere, (Jerusalem, ELKA-JDC, 2008) p. 8.

RE the two dimensions of preparedness, see the comment made by Ifat Linder, Director of Northern Region, Municipal Section, ELKA-JDC, and Oren Yonatan, Senior Program Manager, ELKA-JDC, 7/18/09. Also see Edwards, *Resilient Nation*, (Demos, London, 2009), pp. 63-85.
are committed to improving local and national resilience and have necessary capacities and resources to act both independently and in conjunction during crises.

90. The characteristics of this network are based on the natural attributes of networks⁵⁴ that are a common pattern of organization in nature and human society. Social networks are created based on common denominators, for the purpose of exchanging information and providing services, security or prosperity. They share general characteristics such as:

- **Flat, nonhierarchical structure** – Networks do not have any single node or unit that is the top executive, manager, commander or leader, nor do they have a command-and-control center that issues instructions or orders. The status of the units in a network is ‘meritocratic’ in the sense that it is based on the quality and quantity of the connections that each unit has with other units and is not determined by decisions, ranks or titles. The network is mobilized and activated through inspiration, mobilization and vision and not by orders, instructions or standard operating procedures.

- **Universal characteristics as well as unique character** – On the one hand, the nodes of each network share many universal characteristics such as values, code of conduct, goals or protocols of communication. On the other hand, each node has a unique character, which reflects attributes such as geography, social status, religion, gender or age;

- **Independence of action, sensitivity to context, flexibility and innovation** – Most nodes of a network operate primarily according to their own logic, will, discretion and capacities as part of their social fabric. Hence, in spite of their being members of large ‘networks’, their response is likely to be sensitive

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to the local environment, needs and sensitivities. Therefore, they are more likely to be quick to adapt to the changing reality;

- Duplications and overlaps, as well as efficiency – As nodes of a network are autonomous to choose the mode and timing of their operation, numerous overlaps exist. Nonetheless, these duplications are not a 'waste' but rather a mechanism of efficiency: First, as these units are flexible to shift focus and attention, networks have the ability to quickly move resources and energy from one issue or arena to another. Second, these duplications increase the resilience of the network itself in case some of its units are damaged;

- Networks have codes of communication and conduct, rituals and meeting places – Every network is based on patterns of behavior and norms regulating the communication among its units. The network also has a joint virtual and physical culture. Ceremonies, gatherings, symbols, and heroes develop the network by embedding its values and rules of conduct;

- Networks are resilient – Networks are non-hierarchical and 'flat', so to speak, and therefore cannot be toppled. In addition, they have duplications and therefore can suffer significant losses without being crippled. In fact, networks can withstand loss of a very large number of units without losing their vitality and livelihood. Only simultaneous damage to critical mass of hubs, which are units with an exceptional number of connections (see below), can cripple a network.

91. The units – the individuals, households, organizations, businesses or institutions – to comprise Israel's Civil Resilience Network can be classified into four types of units, as follows:

- Endpoints (nekudot katzeh) – Primarily households, businesses or organizations – that fulfill the basic requirements for preparedness as defined by the emergency authorities. Therefore, these units are not supposed to be a burden on emergency authorities or on the resilience network when a crisis occurs. In contrast, anyone who does not meet these requirements is likely to increase the burden in crisis, and therefore can not be considered an 'endpoint' or a part of the resilience network. In general, endpoints do not bear additional responsibilities toward other units of the resilience network.

55 These rituals or ceremonies are commonplace in the field, but do not receive proper exposure. Nearly all local authorities in the south held honorary ceremonies following Operation Cast Lead (1/09) (from an interview with the Deputy General Manager of the Municipality of Ashdod, Dina Barulfan, 2/5/09), Community Resilience and Response Teams were sent for recreation in the Dead Sea (3/26/09) and RACHEL held an evening in honor of the activities of the third sector during Operation Cast Lead (3/12/09) (See Summarize Letter of the Joint Inter-Sector Activities During the Emergency Situation in the South, Ministry of Defense, Tel Aviv, 3/12/09).

See for example the debriefings by local authorities after Cast Lead, with the support of RACHEL, IDF, Home Front Command, MELACH, the Israel Trauma Coalition, JDC, and CSPC (See Eshkol Regional Council, led by the Head of the Regional Council Haim Yalin, 2/11/09).

resilience network or the general population, and in most cases they do not have many links in the network;

- **Civilian-volunteers (ezrahim-mitnadvim)** are units of the network that meet three requirements: self-preparedness, basic skill and capacities, and responsibility – In other words, they are units that (1) fulfill the threshold requirements for preparedness as defined by the emergency authorities; (2) have basic skills – such as first aid, management of jammed intersections, fire fighting or rescuing – to assist other people in their vicinity; and (3) take responsibility for their immediate vicinity, such as their neighbors, building or street in which they live. For example, the Community Resilience and Response Teams (CRRT) are composed of civilian-volunteers.

Civilian-volunteers are different from first-responders who are usually civil servants with an official role in crisis that have been trained, prepared and equipped accordingly.\(^{57}\)

- **Hubs (rakazot)** are units with extraordinary number of connections with other units. Therefore they are the pillars of the network with the greatest influence on their environment and its overall performance. Examples for hubs include local community centers (MATNASIM), branches of youth movements, Rotary or Lions Clubs, synagogues or *Hever* (association of military veterans). The status of each hub depends on the number of links it has and, collectively, the hubs will determine the overall performance of the network;

- **Catalysts (zarazim)** are units that have the status and capacities to develop the network. Catalysts recruit new units, for example, they turn individuals, households and organizations into 'endpoints' or turn end-points into civilian-volunteers. In addition they strengthen existing units by researching and disseminating information; educating and training; improving the interface with emergency authorities; increasing awareness and branding the network; or increasing its connectivity.\(^{58}\) While every local government should be a catalyst of the resilience network in its own area,

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\(^{57}\) The Red Shield of David (MADA) is the exception, as a significant part of the organization is comprised of civilian-volunteers.

\(^{58}\) Connectivity is identified with the term ‘social capital’, which means the amount of connections between individuals in society. The level of social capital impacts on the ability to cope with crises and demonstrate resilience (See Billig Miriam, *Community Resilience of Settlements in the Binyamin Regional Council*, (Ariel University Center, May, 2008), p. 16; and Norris, F.H., “Community Resilience as a Metaphor, Theory, Set of Capacities and Strategy for Disaster Readiness”, *American Journal for Community Psychology*, (Vol. 41, 2008), pp. 137-139.

There are technologies that help to map networks. See for example the communications system operated by the Resilience Center in Sderot, or the project led by the Department for Community Services in the Haifa Municipality for mapping the social networks in the Hadar neighborhood (from an interview with Shapira Yael, Director of Hadar Social Affairs Department, Haifa Municipality, 5/5/09).
other examples of catalysts include Resilience Centers, the ITC, Community Centers, the Cohen-Harris Center, the JDC and consultants operating in this field.

Some of the catalysts, such as the Resilience Centers, are also hubs, since they have many links within the network and with the general population. Furthermore, some of the most important catalysts – such as local authorities – are also part of the emergency authorities.

92. The ultra-orthodox sector and minorities are an integral part of the resilience network. As mentioned, an advantage of the network is its sensitivity to local context and conditions that do not compromise its general logic and structure. Hence, the resilience network must be established among all sectors of Israeli society, including among the ultra-orthodox community and among minorities, where the starting point is low due to many years of neglect.

Chart: The Civil Resilience Network

[Diagram showing the Civil Resilience Network]

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59 Resilience centers are operated by local authorities based on a government decision and with the assistance of ministries and the Israel Trauma Coalition.

The Cohen-Harris Center for Trauma and Disaster in Tel Aviv, operates based on strategic partnerships with the Tel-Aviv Municipality and collaborates with various government ministries and emergency and rescue organizations, and a range of parties in the community. (See Laor N., Spirman S., About the 'Empowerment' Model: Municipal Preparedness and Civic Resilience Facing a Mass Disaster, (June, 2008), p. 6-7) (in Hebrew).
Chapter 4: Instilling a Culture of Preparedness in the Civil Resilience Network

Basic Principles

93. Based on the analysis presented above, we propose the following basic principles for instilling a culture of preparedness in the Civil Resilience Network:

- **Transparency: Coordinating expectations and sharing information** – Coordinating expectations and sharing information among central and local governments, the resilience network and the general population are essential for consolidating the resilience network and for instilling a culture of preparedness. For example, it is extremely important that citizens know in advance whether teachers will stay in schools to take care of the children when a crisis breaks or whether they must ‘manage on their own’ during the first 72 hours;

- **Hub-focus: Shaping their responsibilities and building their capabilities** – The strength of the hubs will determine the strength of the resilience network. Therefore, emergency authorities, catalysts and particularly local governments must focus on hubs, identify them, define their responsibilities and cultivate their capabilities. Concurrently, every organization that views itself as a hub must prepare itself for emergencies;

- **Expansion: Adding ‘endpoints’** through a variety of platforms – such as workplaces, schools, public institutions, academic institutions, cinemas and mass media – allows for households, businesses and organizations to join the resilience network;

- **Standards: Regulating and benchmarking** – It is necessary to define standards of preparedness for local authorities, organizations and corporations, and even for schools, community centers or youth movements, in order to enable them to join the network;

- **The show must go on** – At present, the general rule is that most governmental institutions, businesses and nonprofits halt their work when a crisis emerges, unless explicitly mandated otherwise. The general rule should be the opposite: their activities should continue, unless they are explicitly instructed to halt operations. Financial incentives should also be reformulated in this manner;

- **Dual use in routine and crises** – Crisis response needs to be based, to the extent possible, on institutions, patterns of behavior, habits and infrastructure which operate during routine times. Reliance on institutions that leap into action when the crisis occurs should be limited;

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60 See training booklet published by the Home Front Command, Population Department, Behavioral Sciences Sector, *Preparing My Family*.

61 This issue relates to insurance regulations that apply during times of crisis.
Mandatory preparedness for first-responders – First-responders – such as policemen, soldiers, fire fighters, doctors and nurses – must be required to prepare their homes and families according to the regulations of the home front command;

Big bang for the buck – The contribution of the resilience network to national success will be decisive. Parts of this network already exist, and most of the resources required for its emergence are scattered within its various units. Therefore, it is worthwhile to invest the relatively negligible resources required for its consolidation.

Based on these principles, we propose instilling a culture of preparedness among the following parties:

Government and Knesset: Laying the Foundations

The Government has been working vigorously since 2006 to prepare Israel for crises through its various emergency authorities. In the following sections, we highlight additional areas of focus for government work that are required in order to mobilize civil society toward local and national resilience by instilling a culture of preparedness and consolidating the resilience network:

Formulating a comprehensive approach for the home front as part of the ‘synchronized victories’ approach. The goal: Success of the home front during crises. Only the Government can formulate such an approach through the Ministry of Defense, RACHEL, Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Services and the National Security Council. Know-how and experience can come from emergency authorities, as well as from already existing hubs and catalysts of the resilience network in civil society. Furthermore, the logic of the resilience network calls for this strategy to be communicated to the general public.

Adapt the operational approach of governmental ministries and agencies to the existence and capacities of the resilience network. The network is designed to consolidate into a highly significant national resilience resource. Therefore, each government ministry should tap into its resources according to its needs. For example:

Health – The resilience network – with an emphasis on civilian–volunteers and on students in the fields of medicine, social work or welfare – may support evacuation, rescue and first aid efforts in numerous sites simultaneously; provide support for hospitals and clinics; and assist in the treatment of victims of anxiety and stress and in dispensing medication;

Welfare – The resilience network – with an emphasis on organizations working in the psycho-social field and their volunteers, community centers or youth movements – may help in supplying basic products and services to the needy; establishing and operating information centers; staffing and operating Community Resilience and Response Teams (CRRT); providing emotional support; accommodating families; or evacuating people with special needs;
Transportation – The resilience network – specifically civilian–volunteers with designated training – may help in ensuring the smooth flow of traffic in central junctions or providing transportation to citizens during a crisis;

Education – The resilience network – and particularly retired teachers and students – may help in preparing educational institutions for crises; supporting immediate response in schools; reinforcing teaching staff during the crisis in schools, workplaces or shelters;

Law and order – The resilience network – and in particular veterans of the defense establishment or members of youth movements – may help organize centers for the distribution of supplies and ensure public order;

Media – The resilience network – and in particular media companies or high school students – may help in creating a real-time information distribution network and assuring the continuation of postal services;

Economy, industry and commerce – The resilience network – primarily based on the mobilization of nation-wide corporations, above and beyond the MELACH requirements – may help ensure the continued operation of the national economy;

Tourism – The resilience network – through students or volunteers – may support and assist tourists;

Agriculture – The resilience network – through high school students or volunteers – may help farmers harvest and distribute their crops.

97. Legislation, standards, enforcement, budgets and infrastructure –

- Incorporating the resilience network into deliberations of government plenum and relevant ministerial and Knesset committees that discuss the home front, emergency authorities and crises preparedness;

- Establishing standards for preparedness that will accelerate the consolidation of the resilience network, such as standards for preparedness of local authorities, nonprofits that are ‘essential organizations’ or corporations (see below);

- Designing and embedding partnerships for preparedness at the national, regional and local levels, via roundtables among first sector (central and local governments), businesses and third sector (nonprofits and philanthropists);

- Enlisting civil servants into the resilience network – Central and local governments and their agencies must ensure that their employees (1) constitute endpoints of the resilience network, meeting the home front command’s threshold requirements for preparedness; (2) have a role during a crisis; and (3) report to work during a crisis to ensure the provision of public
services. Legislation should be changed and civil servant employment contracts adjusted accordingly.\(^{62}\)

**The IDF should consider releasing from reserve duties civil servants that hold essential roles in the resilience network**, particularly in hubs (such as vital social workers, heads of community centers, etc.);

- **Providing budgetary and financial incentives for consolidating the resilience network**, such as directing resources from the emergency authorities’ budget to hubs and catalysts of the resilience network, contributing to a Resilience Fund (see below), or creating financial incentives for civilian-volunteers or for continued operation during a crisis.

98. **A National Preparedness Week should be the formative annual event of the resilience network**, during which the culture of preparedness should peak.\(^{63}\) This should be a national event that reaches every household, business or organization and is recognized by the central government.

99. **National Preparedness Week differs from the Annual National Emergency Exercise** because it focuses on the components of the resilience network and not on the emergency authorities. All units of the network, and primarily the hubs and catalysts, will participate, according to standards which are previously defined, in training and refresher courses, drills, exercises and ceremonies; it emphasizes awareness, as well as technical exercises; and organizations’ and people’s motivation to participate stems from personal benefit and public responsibility. Hence, **the National Preparedness Week is complementary to the National Emergency Exercise**, and holding them in a combined manner should be considered.

**Local Authorities: The Key Catalysts of the Resilience Network**

100. **Local authorities are seen as ‘building blocks’ of the home front with the role of ensuring provision of basic services during crisis**. The head of the local authority is deemed responsible for his/her jurisdiction according to the guidelines of emergency authorities and especially MELACH and the home front command.\(^{64}\)

101. **In parallel, the local authority may be the most powerful catalyst for mobilizing and consolidating the local resilience network**. As mentioned, catalysts are units of the resilience network that have the authority and capacity to build it. The following points elaborate on the scope of roles local authorities may undertake to instill a culture of preparedness and consolidate the resilience network:

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\(^{62}\) From an interview with Giora Eiland, former Head of the National Security Council, (Tel Aviv, 7/19/09).

\(^{63}\) National preparedness week may be the end of a year long process of gradual preparation of citizens and local authorities (from an interview with Dr. Avraham Bizur, Tel Aviv, 7/16/09).

Designing a strategy for local resilience as part of the local vision – Crisis preparedness and resilience should be integrated into the local economic and social fabric. Moreover, the resilience strategy of each local government should be integrated into the resilience strategy of its region.65

Mobilizing local authorities' employees for the resilience network – Local authorities must ensure that their employees are: (1) endpoints of the resilience network; (2) have an additional role during a crisis if their routine role is rendered irrelevant; (3) are obligated to report to duty during crisis. It may be necessary to adjust legislation or revise employment contracts accordingly;

Mapping local endpoints, civilian-volunteers, hubs and catalysts of the local resilience network and linking and training them for crisis response – The mapping must include, for example, local community centers (MATNASIM), clubs such as Rotary or Lions, youth movements, sports teams, providers of psycho-social services, volunteer groups and business organizations with important resources deployable in crisis;

Pinpointing special needs and securing basic services – For example, mapping all households in which people with disabilities live, and preparing to provide them with assistance through the relevant professional organizations;

Coordinating expectations with residents through a pact between the authority and its residents, as well as local businesses and nonprofits;

Establishing a local roundtable with the business sector and the third sector with the goal of instilling a culture of preparedness;

Coordinating emergency plans with neighboring local authorities – Most local authorities have relationships with the emergency authorities and primarily with the home front command and MELACH. The logic of the resilience network calls for each local authority to also develop ‘flat’ horizontal relationships with neighboring local authorities as part of the culture of preparedness;

Decorating and honoring prominent units in the local resilience network, such as civilian-volunteers or local hubs;

Preparing emergency plans for mutual support during crises with sister cities and Jewish communities – Preparedness for crises should be made a permanent component of the agenda and relations between local authorities in Israel and their sister cities and with Jewish communities outside of Israel.

Strategies for local resilience are often unique as they take into account geographic, demographic, social and economic characteristics. Maor, M., "Local Government Training in England and Wales, Denmark and Israel", Israel Affairs, (forthcoming). See for example the HQ work led by Oded Pilot, Strategist, Sha’ar Hanegev Regional Council, who prepared the Perennial Local Strategic Plan (2004); see also the Strategic Education Plan - Ashdod 2025.
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(particularly for local authorities that are part of the Jewish Agency’s ‘Partnership 2000’ program). 66

Education System: A Critical Component of the Resilience Network

102. **In immediate response: Continued operation of educational institutions is essential.** Teachers must remain in schools and care for the students during the first several hours. Otherwise, parents will desert their jobs and duties and clog traffic arteries when simultaneously traveling to pick up their children.

103. **Education system must continue to operate during crisis with necessary adjustments.** For parents to continue to function effectively there must be a proper solution for the occupation of children. Therefore, schools and kindergartens must be able to continue to operate, and educational frameworks for children in temporary sites, such as workplaces or shelters, must be provided. 67

104. **Teachers and students can be part of the resilience network** during the preparedness, immediate response and crisis stages, as per the home front command plans. 68

Academic Institutions: Anchors of Local Resilience

105. **Academic institutions are an untapped asset of the resilience network.** Universities and colleges – their campuses, facilities, students and teachers – can be important assets of national resilience and anchors of the local resilience network. For this purpose, they must:

- **Mobilize students and staff that do not have reserve duties in relevant fields** – such as social work, education, psychology or medicine – for the resilience network. 69
- **Assist State institutions located in their vicinity,** primarily schools, kindergartens, senior citizen homes or soup kitchens;
- **Establish special emergency teams** comprised of students to support the local authorities; 70
- **Encourage personal preparedness among students and staff;**
- **Research the field of preparedness and resilience.**

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66 The Jewish Agency’s Partnership 2000 plan includes 45 partnerships between nearly 100 local authorities in Israel and 550 Jewish communities from all over the world.

67 Some education institutions are assigned to PESACH, and are supposed to be transformed into evacuation centers. (From an interview with Col. Dr. Soffer Chilik, Head of the Population and Protective Kits Department, Home Front Command, 7/27/09).

68 Minister of Defense Ehud Barak decided to re-establish the HAGA (Civil Defense) network, composed of volunteers and high school students (See Rapaport Amir, **Enlisting High School Students to Help the Home Front During War**, NRG, 9/22/08).

69 A forum of representatives of these faculties operated in the past, but has ceased to convene in recent years. (From an interview with Prof. Lahad Mooli, President of CSPC, Tel Aviv, 4/30/09).

70 As was the case in Sapir College.
Corporations: Preparedness as Part of Social Responsibility

106. **The role of the business sector in Israeli society has expanded. Its continued operation is essential** – Naturally, continued operation of certain industries in times of crisis has always been deemed critical and thus regulated accordingly by MELACH. However, the logic of resilience calls for continued functioning of the entire sector during a national crisis, with necessary adjustments. Furthermore, over the past 25 years, the role of this sector in Israeli society has significantly expanded at the expense of the public sector, and the business sector is currently responsible for providing vital services for the daily lives of citizens.

107. Currently, **there are three 'logics' governing the conduct of corporations during crises**:

- **General regulations** on preparedness, which apply to every corporation in Israel usually relating to shelters or fire drills;

- **MELACH**: Every industry that is defined as vital to the war effort must continue to operate – The duties and obligations of ‘vital facilities’ to continue to function during emergencies are detailed by law. All other businesses are exempt from this duty, and can halt their operation at will. In fact, existing incentives encourage them to do so;

- **Business continuity** – There are businesses that are not defined as ‘vital facilities’, yet choose to continue to operate in a crisis due to their logic. For example, Intel, Amdocs and Teva continued to operate during the Second Lebanon War. This logic contributes to local and national resilience even if it stems from business motives;

- **Philanthropy** – Many businesses volunteer to contribute to the national effort by providing for the needs of the population through philanthropic activities (see ‘Philanthropic Funds’ section below).

108. **Yet, to fully tap into the resources of the business sector, the culture of preparedness must become an integral part of their corporate social responsibility.** In Israel, there are some 450 corporations that support more than one million people. Some of these corporations – such as banks, cellular companies or service providers – employ thousand of employees and have branches across

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71 Among their duties: Continuation of vital activities for the war effort, storage of hazardous materials, positioning of HAGA trustees, purchase of equipment for civil defense and obligation to conduct training and instruction (See selected parts of the Civil Defense (Haga) Law of 1951 from the Home Front Command’s website, and MELACH, Planning and Organizing the Crucial Economy for Emergencies, Procedure no. 1, (May, 2001), p. 4).

72 The Israel Standards Institute has defined a management standard for the issue of business continuity in crises (See Dan Landau, Security Resilience Management – Israeli Standard, in the website of the Israel Standards Institute). In addition, on business continuity see Cabinet Office, How Prepared Are You?, HM Government, United Kingdom.

73 **Maala** is a nonprofit that serves as the professional umbrella organization dedicated to promoting corporate social responsibility in Israel. The organization was founded in 1998, and is part of an international network. 62 of the corporations that participate in the Maala ranking employ 120,000 workers, impacting on the lives of more than half a million citizens.
Israel. This is a major largely untapped asset of local and national resilience that can be mobilized by means of setting clear expectations and instilling a culture of preparedness.

109. Preparedness for crises as part of corporate social responsibility implies undertaking a set of obligations that are beyond its legal obligations or business logic. This responsibility may include the following: encouraging workers to become endpoints of the resilience network by preparing their homes and families; ensuring the continued operation of the corporation based on a logic of resilience and continued provision of services to all consumers; offering support to nonprofits whose continued operation is essential during crises; allocating workers for volunteer activities in the community or training civilian-volunteers (see below); providing support for the resilience network and local authorities such as equipment, means of transportation and emergency infrastructure, and participating in roundtables on local and national levels.

110. In addition, SMEs (small and medium-sized businesses) should be encouraged to continue operating during times of crisis. These businesses employ approximately one million workers, and are an integral part of the social fabric and local resilience.

Third Sector: Regulating Preparedness

111. Continued operation of the third sector during a crisis is crucial for local and national resilience. Like the business sector, the role of the third sector has expanded significantly over the past two decades, as the public sector has shrunk. Currently, basic services of food security, welfare and healthcare are often provided by nonprofits and supported by philanthropists, sometimes in coordination with and supported by central or local governments. Hence, the continued functioning of certain sections of the third sector during national crises, with the required modifications, is a necessary condition for local and national resilience. Currently, nonprofits are not obligated to prepare for continued operation during crises.

112. Some nonprofits are essential for local and national resilience – 'Essential organizations' (irgun hiyuni) are nonprofits that (1) provide services in areas such as healthcare, emergency response, psycho-trauma, food security or welfare; (2) and whose continued proper functioning and expansion of operations during crises is crucial to local and national resilience. In other words, when an 'essential organization' ceases to operate during a crisis, the burden on the emergency authorities increases. The number of 'essential organizations' is estimated in the hundreds. While some of them operate on a national scale, others are small and local.

74 Currently, the law grants the Minister of Labor the right to obligate any facility in Israel to allocate part of its equipment for national needs in emergencies (See Work Service in Emergencies Law, Chapter B, section 5a). Yet large corporations often have assets and infrastructure that can be vital during a crisis such as underground parking lots, buildings, or vehicles. These assets can be integrated into the resilience network in advance if good will exists on the part of the corporation.
113. Therefore, a Standard of Resilience (tav hosen) for essential organizations should be established in order to define the expectations from these organizations, as well as their rights. Such a resilience standard must be national, regional or local, and recognized by the central government or by regional or local authorities, respectively.

114. Criteria for a Resilience Standard for 'essential organizations' should include:

- Direct and strong linkage between the organization's mission and resilience, expressed in services provided by the organization, skills of its members or its professional knowledge developed;
- Ability to continue and even expand its operation during a crisis, based on operational plans prepared in advance and examined by relevant emergency authorities;
- Institutionalized collaborations and partnerships with emergency authorities or units of the national or local resilience network such as with local authorities, other organizations or the business sector;
- Managerial and budgetary transparency based on the highest criteria of transparency and accountability;\(^{75}\)
- Essential organizations' employees as endpoints of the resilience network according to criteria of the home front command.

115. Organizations that meet the Resilience Standard should have priority in access to resources and roundtables:

- National resources – Organizations granted a Resilience Standard should have priority access to human, material and financial resources during crises. State institutions must consider allocation of designated resources, personnel and budgets to essential organizations;
- Resources of the Jewish world through emergency appeals – Essential organizations with Resilience Standard should have priority in receiving resources from emergency appeals initiated by the Jewish world at the national level (through organizations such as the Jewish Agency or the JDC) or at the local level, through the network of partnerships of the Jewish Agency's 'Partnership 2000';
- Roundtables – As mentioned, roundtables are a central tool in consolidating the resilience network on the national, regional and local levels. Essential organizations that meet the Resilience Standard should have priority access to the roundtables.

Nonprofits that are Catalysts of the Resilience Network

116. Some catalysts of the resilience network are organizations with the mission of consolidating the network at the national, regional or local level, based on

\(^{75}\) See, for example, the Midot organization that evaluates nonprofits in Israel: [http://www.midot.org.il/](http://www.midot.org.il/).
instilling a culture of preparedness – This refers to a small number of organizations that serve a mission of increasing resilience and have the conceptual approach, deployment, relationships, status and recognition by government agencies that allow them to serve this mission. Examples include the ITC, JDC-ELKA and the Cohen-Harris Center for Trauma and Disaster.76

117. Possible criteria for recognition as 'catalysts' of the resilience network – (1) eligibility for a Resiliency Standard; (2) ability to map the network and increase its interconnectedness;77 (3) working relationship with relevant emergency authorities; (4) capacities for research and debriefing;78 (5) ability to brand the resilience network in order to mobilize its member; (6) capacity to train and certify.

Jewish World: The Strategic Depth of the Home Front79

118. The Jewish world and Israeli Diaspora have been and will remain the strategic depth of the Israeli home front – During crises, they have mobilized on behalf of Israel through financial contributions, diplomatic and public support, and by sending volunteers. The working assumption is that they will continue to serve in this role.

119. Yet the Jewish world is growing distant from Israel – In recent years, powerful trends are drifting the Jewish world away from Israel due to ideological, economical, social and demographical changes. One expression of this trend is the crisis of confidence placed in the Government of Israel following criticism related to its use of philanthropic funds during the Second Lebanon War.80 The contrast between the recent economic setback, which was experienced by many Jewish

76 The Israel Trauma Coalition provides a range of services in the field of psycho-trauma and developed models for dealing with crises. In addition, the Coalition trains professional teams and teams of volunteers.

ELKA and the JDC's Division of Volunteers and Philanthropy run the MACHAR program (MACHAR stands for Emergency Services for Local Authorities). This program has three tracks: YUVALIM program for serving needy populations, support for heads of local authorities and a framework for coordination of and support for volunteerism.

77 See for example the tasks assigned by the Resilience Center in Nahariya on the Neighborhood Resilience and Response Teams of volunteers (NRRT), which include filling in “building cards” with social-economic data about their residents. This type of activity establishes advanced familiarity with the region’s residents and parties in the local authority that are relevant to emergency situations, preserves the volunteering framework and creates long term commitment (from an interview with Alaluf Iris, Director of the Resilience Center in Nahariya, 2/18/09).

78 The interface between the national level and local level, which allows for encounters among people in various fields and levels, is essential for creating new knowledge. (From an interview with Dr. Lanir Zvi, CEO of Praxis, Tel Aviv 3/30/09 and interview with Levanon Talia, President of the Israel Trauma Coalition, Ramat Efal, 6/17/09).

79 The continuation of this project will be dedicated to examining the issue of emergency campaigns of the Jewish world for Israel and formulating guidelines for these appeals.

80 See Shefer Gabriel and Hadas Rot-Toledano, Who is the Leader? About Israel-Diaspora Relations, (Jerusalem, Van Leer Institute, 2006), as well as an interview with Flamm-Oren Elisheva, Israel Office Planning Director for the Caring Commission, UJA – Federation of New York, Jerusalem 7/12/09, and the comments of Dinur Ra’anan, former Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office, 7/21/09.
communities around the world, and the economic stability that Israel has maintained may exacerbate this trend. Therefore, the extent of support for Israel in general, and during a crisis in particular, may be reduced.

120. Israel must view world Jewry as part of the resilience network in which a culture of preparedness must be instilled in order to integrate this asset into Israel’s overall preparedness. Therefore, the interface between Israel and world Jewry must be planned in advance.

121. Based on past experience and as a confidence-building measure, it is necessary to determine principles for allocating emergency appeals so as to ensure their designated, effective and efficient use. For example, such funds may be directed to nonprofits recognized as 'essential organizations' meeting the preparedness standard.

122. Instilling a culture of preparedness in partnerships between Israeli local authorities and Jewish communities around the world – As mentioned, crisis preparedness should be a permanent component in the relations between local authorities in Israel and in Jewish communities throughout the Jewish world, particularly within the framework of the Jewish Agency’s 'Partnership 2000' platform.

**Philanthropic Foundations and the Resilience Fund**

123. The role of philanthropy in Israeli society has expanded, as have the roles of the nonprofit and business sectors, in response to the dramatic downsizing of the public sector. The role of philanthropic funds has become more crucial than before in times of crisis.

124. Therefore, philanthropy should be incorporated into the resilience network – For example, philanthropic foundations may prepare to support ‘essential organizations’, promote a culture of preparedness or prepare their own plans for crisis response.

125. A Resilience Fund – We recommend building an endowment for the purpose of local and national resilience from private donors and institutions that will be matched by the Government of Israel. The fruits of this fund will be used to cultivate the resilience network and culture of preparedness, while the fund itself, in full or in part, will be used to finance immediate actions during a crisis.

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Individual and Family, First-Responders and Civilian-Volunteers

126. **The individual and the family are the basic units of local resilience** and their preparedness should be promoted. The greater the number of people and households that are properly prepared for a crisis by complying with the requirements of the home front command, the better the community’s ability to confront the crisis. In contrast, every individual or household that is unprepared may be a burden on the resilience network and the emergency authorities.

127. **Most of the population is not aware of the requirements set by the home front command** – Despite the efforts of the home front command to raise the issue of preparedness onto the public agenda, the number of citizens exposed to the guidelines and taking steps to implement them is miniscule.

128. **The required approach: Push. The space: Workplaces and educational institutions** – We propose to significantly expand efforts to educate the population on emergency preparedness in workplaces, educational institutions and the media so that a growing number of households will become endpoints of the resilience network by meeting the requirements of the home front command.

129. **Personal preparedness duty should be mandatory for first-responders and for civilian-volunteers** whose proper functioning is crucial during crises.

130. **Furthermore, it is necessary to expand the definition of first-responders** to include all those whose continued functioning is essential in times of crisis. In other words, first-responders should be not only the inner circle of police officers, firefighters and onsite medical staff to doctors, but also nurses, doctors, social workers and soldiers, as well as key positions in the civil service, such as staffers of the Prime Minister and other ministries, heads of local authorities, senior officials, school principals and teachers.
Chapter 5: 
Summary of Main Recommendations

Government and Knesset

131. To formulate a comprehensive approach for the home front as part of the ‘synchronized victories’ framework. The goal: Success of the home front during crises;

132. To adapt the operational approach of governmental ministries and agencies – particularly in the areas of health, welfare, transportation, education, law and order, media, industry and commerce or tourism – to the existence and capacities of the resilience network;

133. To incorporate the resilience network into deliberations of government plenum and relevant ministerial and Knesset committees that discuss the home front, emergency authorities and crises preparedness;

134. To establish standards for preparedness that will accelerate the consolidation of the resilience network, such as for local authorities, nonprofits that are 'essential organizations' or corporations;

135. To design and embed partnerships for preparedness at the national, regional and local levels, via roundtables among first sector (central and local governments), businesses and third sector (nonprofits and philanthropists);

136. To enlist civil servants into the resilience network by ensuring that they (1) constitute endpoints of the resilience network, meeting the home front command’s threshold requirements for preparedness; (2) have a role during a crisis; and (3) report to work during a crisis to ensure the provision of public services. Legislation should be changed and civil servant employment contracts adjusted accordingly;

137. To consider discharging from reserve duties civil servants that hold essential roles in the resilience network, particularly in hubs (such as vital social workers, heads of community centers, etc.);

138. To provide budgetary and financial incentives for consolidating the resilience network;

139. To institute a National Preparedness Week as a formative annual event of the resilience network, during which the culture of preparedness should peak.

Local Authorities

140. To design a strategy for local resilience as part of the local vision;

141. To mobilize employees for the resilience network by ensuring that they are: (1) endpoints of the resilience network; (2) have an additional role during a crisis if their routine role is rendered irrelevant; and (3) obligated to report to duty during crisis. It may be necessary to adjust legislation or revise employment contracts accordingly;
142. To map local endpoints, civilian-volunteers, hubs and catalysts of the local resilience network, linking and training them for crisis response;

143. To pinpoint special needs and secure basic services;

144. To coordinate expectations with residents through a pact between the authority and its residents, as well as local businesses and nonprofits;

145. To establish local roundtables with the business sector and the third sector with the goal of instilling a culture of preparedness;

146. To coordinate emergency plans with neighboring local authorities;

147. To decorate and honor prominent units in the local resilience network, such as civilian-volunteers or local hubs;

148. To prepare emergency plans for mutual support during crises with sister cities and Jewish communities.

**Education System and Academia**

149. In immediate response: schools must continue to operate. Teachers should remain in schools and care for the students during the first several hours;

150. the education system must continue to operate during crisis with necessary adjustments including in shelters and workplaces;

151. Teachers and students must be mobilized to be part of the resilience network during the preparedness, immediate response and crisis stages;

152. To turn universities and colleges – their campuses, facilities, students and teachers – into assets of the local resilience networks.

**Corporations**

153. To integrate culture of preparedness into corporate social responsibility in Israel. This responsibility may include: educating workers, committing to continued operation, providing support to nonprofits and local governments or participating in roundtables on local and national levels.

**Third Sector: Nonprofits, Philanthropies, and the Jewish World**

154. To identify 'essential nonprofits' whose continued operation during crises is crucial on the local, regional or national levels and to establish a Standard of Resilience (*tav hosen*) for them.

155. Criteria for a Resilience Standard for 'essential organizations' should include: direct and strong linkage to resilience, ability to continue and even expand operation during a crisis, collaborations and partnerships with emergency authorities or units of the national or local resilience network, managerial and budgetary transparency, and personal preparedness of staff;

156. To give priority to essential organizations that meet the Resilience Standard in access to resources in Israel and the Jewish world;
157. To develop the 'catalysts' of the resilience network as entities that (1) are eligible for a Resilience Standard; (2) map the network and increase its interconnectedness; (3) collaborate or cooperate with relevant emergency authorities; (4) train, certify, research or debrief; or (5) brand the network and mobilize its membership;

158. To view world Jewry as an integral part of the resilience network in which a culture of preparedness must be instilled, and to establish principles for allocating emergency funds to ensure their designated, effective and efficient use;

159. To instill a culture of preparedness in partnerships between Israeli local authorities and Jewish communities around the world as a permanent component of their relations, particularly within Jewish Agency’s 'Partnership 2000' platform;

160. To treat philanthropies as an integral part of the resilience network and to ensure their preparedness for effective intervention in crises;

161. To build an endowment whose fruits will cultivate resilience and preparedness, while the fund itself will serve for crisis-response.

**Individuals and Families, First-Responders and Civilian-Volunteers**

162. To promote personal preparedness in workplaces and educational institutions;

163. To impose mandatory personal preparedness for first-responders and for civilian-volunteers, and to expand the definition of first-responders to include all whose continued functioning is essential in times of crisis.

End.
Annex A: The Israel Trauma Coalition
Frequently Asked Questions

What is the Israel Trauma Coalition?

Israel Trauma Coalition for Response and Preparedness (ITC) (Registered Association) is an umbrella nonprofit organization of corporations and individuals engaged in the field of resilience, psycho-trauma and preparedness for crises. The ITC was founded in February 2002 by the UJA – Federation of New York.

Members of the ITC incorporate hundreds of professionals and thousands of volunteers throughout the country with extensive know-how. In Sderot and the four regional councils in the Gaza border area, the Coalition has been operating five Resilience Centers in accordance to Government Resolution 746 and engaged in direct treatment of the population and in capacity-building for crisis response. In addition, the ITC operates additional centers in Nahariya, Nazareth, Safed and Kiryat Shemona, and serves as a coordinating body among its members, the home front command and government ministries.

What is the Vision and Mission of the Israel Trauma Coalition?

◼ Convening and organizing those engaged in trauma and resilience in Israel;
◼ Developing a methodical and comprehensive approach to prevent trauma and cope with its effects;
◼ Promoting programs for support and rehabilitation of trauma victims at the individual, family and community levels;
◼ Creating a continuum of services for treating trauma;
◼ Developing, promoting and implementing national and international projects;
◼ Training teams and building infrastructure for coping in times of crisis (social affairs, education, health and more).

Fields of Activity

◼ Direct care of trauma victims including to children, senior citizens, new immigrants, citizens from non-Jewish sectors, young army veterans and people with special needs;
◼ Training professionals in the field of trauma – Within the framework of 'helping the helpers', ITC provides assistance to workers in hospitals and in the education system and to people who work with toddlers, in 'hot lines', first-responders and volunteers. Each training program is created by the Coalition's experts, and enables upgrading of treatment / intervention skills, and also includes a self-help component;
Development of local authorities – The ITC assists local authorities in instilling crisis preparedness by training of local teams, preparing emergency plans that take into account unique characteristics, and supporting the top executive;

Involvement in the field of trauma at the international level – The ITC collaborates with international organizations in trauma response including in: training teams of educational psychologists in Beslan, training clinical psychologists in Chechnya, and building a sense of resilience and training a community and national network in Sri Lanka after the Tsunami. The ITC currently works with educational teams and first responder teams in Mississippi, following Hurricane Katrina, and is preparing a plan for promoting a sense of local resilience in collaboration with local parties.

Guiding Principles of the Israel Trauma Coalition’s Work

- Collaborating with existing professional and bodies;
- Preparing plans and programs in cooperation with experts and people on the ground;
- Empowering of professionals;
- Engaging with cultural sensitivity;
- Creating a continuum of services and aspiring to prevent overlapping of services;
- Maximizing the utilization of resources;
- Sharing and teaching professional know-how;
- Maintaining transparency of content and budget.

ITC’s Added Value

The ITC is a unique organization in Israel, operating to leverage existing resources by creating synergy between all the professional bodies and resources in order to provide the finest services in the field of preparedness for emergencies, promoting resilience and treating trauma.

The Added Value is Expressed in the Following Fields

- Networking of third sector organizations, government agencies and donors in this field;
- Convening leading experts in the field of research, developing know-how and updating models for direct care, training and qualification; and developing and preserving preparedness at the local and national level;
- Establishing collaborations between third sector organizations and government institutions and leading their joint initiatives;
- Providing understanding and overview of all the needs and services at the national level and definition of service targets, while developing programs in the field of preparedness for emergencies, cultivating resilience and treating trauma for the
public at the national level, developing protocols and professional work procedures for experts in the field of trauma, and advancing their assimilation in professional bodies throughout Israel;

- Representing the third sector vis-à-vis government agencies in the field of preparedness for emergencies, cultivating resilience and treating trauma;

- Efficiently utilizing resources and preventing overlaps, pooling resources and maximizing the utilization of funds;

- Maintaining information collection system;

- Providing professional and system-wide overview and creation of evaluation and measuring tools to examine implementation of programs and their effectiveness;

- Cultivating Abilities to establish bi-lateral and international collaboration for developing new knowhow and its implementation in Israel and throughout the world.
Annex B: The Reut Institute
Frequently Asked Question

The Legal Status of the Reut Institute

The Reut Institute, founded in January 2004, is as an Israeli nonprofit, operating under the Israeli law of nonprofits (Chok HaAmutot), which regulates the work, oversight and supervision of nonprofits in Israel. Accordingly, the Reut Institute is run by a board of directors and a president whose duties and responsibilities are described in our bylaws.

Who Founded Reut?

Gidi Grinstein is the founder and first and current president of the Reut Institute. Ms. Noa Eliasaf-Shoham is Reut's co-founder.

Reut's Vision

The Charter of the Reut Institute establishes that the Reut Institute is a Zionist organization. It frames its vision as: "a secure, prosperous State of Israel; a state whose existence is secured and citizens are safe; a prosperous state that is a leading nation in terms of its quality of living; a state that is predominantly Jewish, offering Jewish added value at the heart of the Jewish world and providing a significant contribution to the existence and prosperity of global Jewish peoplehood; a democratic state, which embraces universal humanistic values and aspires to create a society, which sets an example for the family of nations."

This vision represents for the Reut Institute '21st Century Zionism'. Within this framework, we identify the following topics as ones that require focus:

- Israel's national security: Securing the State's existence, its basic legitimacy, the physical security of its citizens and its Jewish character;
- The ISRAEL 15 Vision, which calls for Israel to become one of the fifteen leading countries in terms of quality of life;
- Pursuing the vision of a 'model society', which offers an example to the family of nations;
- Enriching the Jewish character of the public sphere of the Jewish society in Israel;
- Effective governance.

Reut's Mission

The Charter of the Reut Institute defines our mission as: "to sustain significant and substantive impact on the future of the State of Israel and the Jewish people and to leave an indelibly Israeli and Jewish imprint on the future of the world."

- Sustaining Impact – The Reut Institute is committed to on-going efforts to impact Israel and the Jewish world. We are not only committed to the highest standards of policy research and analysis, but also to offering practical principles and guidelines for progress, as well as to working to effectuate our ideas year-round;
Significant Impact – The Reut Institute focuses on issues that hold great promise or pose grave threats to the State of Israel or the Jewish people. These issues represent 'fundamental gaps', 'relevancy gaps' or 'adaptive challenges'. They require 'leadership', 'transformation', 'adaptation' or 'fundamental impact';

Substantive Impact – The Reut Institute focuses on impacting the design and substance of policies that are essential for the security and prosperity of our nation and people. We work with ideas, concepts and strategies and not with grassroots mobilization or with execution of policies.

Indelible Jewish and Israeli imprint on the future of the world – In accordance with the principles of Tikkan Olam and aspiring for Israel to serve as 'a light unto the nations', the Reut Institute is obligated to contribute to addressing humanity's challenges in a way that will reflect the unique values and abilities of the State of Israel and the Jewish people.

Reut's mission is the bridge between its vision, on the one hand, and its strategy and unique added value, on the other hand.

Reut's Strategy

The strategy of the Reut Institute is designed to serve and realize its mission. It has been refined over the past years and has three pillars:

Fundamental Impact / Adaptive Work – The Reut Institute will work to offer leadership and generate fundamental impact on the issues that are critical to the security and prosperity of Israel and the Jewish world in which 'fundamental gaps' exist;

Model for Emulation – The Reut Institute sees itself as a unique organization specializing in identifying strategic issues, designing appropriate responses and working to effectuate them. The structure and operations of Reut represent innovation on a global scale. Hence, as we strive to have the Government of Israel and its agencies adopt our model, we methodically conceptualize and document our work in order to share it with all interested parties in the public sphere;

Training a cadre of strategic leaders – The Reut Institute recruits and trains individuals that are committed to lifelong service in the Jewish and Israel public spheres. Reut provides Israel's most extensive and intensive training program for strategic leadership and dedicates many resources to grooming its staff to key positions of leadership, influence or authority in the public sphere.

How does Reut Generate Impact?

“Adaptive work consists of the learning required to address conflicts in the values people hold, or to diminish the gap between the values people stand for and the reality they face. Adaptive work requires a change in values, beliefs or behavior.” (Heifetz, Leadership Without Easy Answers, p. 22).
There are seven stages to the cycle of the Reut Institute aimed at generating fundamental impact. They are:

1. **Identifying 'fundamental gaps' / 'adaptive challenges'** – 'Fundamental gaps' – or, interchangeably, 'relevancy gaps' or 'adaptive challenges' – exist when values, priorities, patterns of conduct or habits are irrelevant to the challenges facing the community. Reut specializes in identifying such gaps using a package of theory, methodology and software tools licensed from Praxis (see www.praxis.co.il);

2. **Focused research** – Upon identifying the fundamental gap, the Reut Institute focuses on research and analysis designed to develop adequate responses. In this phase, our teams of analysts research literature, interview experts and create new knowledge using the Praxis package;

3. **New strategic ideas** – Based on our research, the Reut Institute proceeds to suggest new strategic ideas that may help bridge the fundamental gap;

4. **Identifying people in positions of leadership, influence or decision-making authority** – While progressing in focused research, the Reut Institute identifies people and organizations in positions of leadership, influence or decision-making authority that can promote and advance our strategic ideas. This community may include elected officials and senior civil servants in municipal and national government; and leaders in the nonprofit, business, philanthropy or academic sectors, as well as in the Jewish world;

5. **Designing an impact strategy** – At this stage, the Reut Institute designs a strategy for closing the fundamental gap and advancing the adaptive work toward a new vision, which serves as a point of reference. The strategy is implemented in multiple phases based on detailed diagnostics. Ron Heifetz's theory on leadership without authority from his book 'Leadership without Easy Answers' serves as the theoretical basis for this stage;

6. **Reut's role: To be a catalyst** – The Reut Institute's role is to catalyze the adaptive work by: (1) branding the suggested vision; (2) generating a sense of urgency among the relevant constituencies; (3) conducting focused research; (4) creating synergies among people and organizations committed to realizing the vision; (5) enlarging the pie of resources available to this community; (6) identifying, documenting and distributing local success stories; (7) creating a shared and transparent source of information; and (8) advocating to update regulation and legislation;

7. **Exiting** – The Reut Institute will continue to address a fundamental gap so long as Reut has a unique added value to contribute. If we succeed in changing the prevailing mindset or no longer have a meaningful contribution to make, we will abandon the issue to focus on other fundamental gaps.
What is the Reut Institute's Unique Added Value?

In addition to the three pillars of the Reut Institute's strategy, each of which is unique to the Israeli and Jewish public sphere, The Reut Institute:

1. **Identifies strategic surprises and opportunities** – The Reut Institute focuses on the fundamental level of policy, specializing in highlighting tacit working assumptions and checking their relevance to uncover potential strategic surprises;

2. **Asks questions in order to leverage already existing resources** – The Reut Institute provides decision-support services, which focus on how to think and not on what to think or do; We focus attention on issues that are ignored and aim to turn them into the subject of focus by government, academia and other think tanks;

3. **Integrates strategy and operation** – The Reut Institute specializes in integrating the strategic level of decision making that is concerned with systemic and long-term policy design with front-line operators in the field;

4. **Provides quick turnaround** – The Reut Institute provides inputs to decision making processes in very short time-frames;

5. **Is interdisciplinary** – The Reut Institute specializes in addressing inter-disciplinary fields that integrate multiple fields of knowledge;

6. **Develops new knowledge** – The Reut Institute specializes in developing new knowledge in fields that require the design and implementation of a new strategic perspective.

How is Reut Different from Think-Tanks and Strategy Consultants?

Reut is unique in its organizational structure. It differs from think-tanks and strategy consultants in the following ways:

- The primary challenge of the Reut Institute is to identify issues that are potential game changers for Israel in the sense that they represent potential strategic surprises or opportunities. We do so by identifying explicit and tacit working assumptions and checking their relevance. Most other think tanks focus on a pre-determined set of issues and research them through collection and analysis of information;

- The Reut Institute's unique added value stems from its quest to master an art of identifying fundamental gaps, researching them and designing responses. Most think-tanks provide mastery of specific fields of knowledge – like economics or national security – often times with political leanings;

- The brand of the Reut Institute stands for its methods and structure. Conversely, the brand of most other think-tanks stands for the seniority of the experts they employ;

- Reut leads through questions while most other think tanks lead through answers. We offer decision-making services while most other think-tanks provide the solutions they would implement were they to have the authority to do so.

How does the Reut Institute Interact with Other Think-Tanks?
The Reut Institute is committed to an effective and efficient public sphere by eschewing zero-sum mentality. This is one of its basic tenets and is manifested in all of its operations. The Reut Institute views other think-tanks as potential partners that complement its abilities. The Reut Institute team masters the art of identifying fundamental gaps and designing adequate responses, yet does not have any specific area of professional expertise. Most other think-tanks have experts, but lack methods for addressing strategic issues.

Whereas most think-tanks use their websites to highlight their own publications, the Reut Institute's website – www.reut-institute.org – is designed as a portal for all work from all organizations that is relevant to the strategic issues we address.

Who is the Target Audience?

The target audience of the Reut Institute is comprises of people in positions of leadership, influence or decision-making authority in the fields in which we work, who can contribute to fundamental impact in Israel or in the Jewish world. This community includes elected officials and senior civil servants in municipal and national government, and leaders in the non-profit, business, philanthropy, academic and Jewish worlds.

Who Funds the Reut Institute?

The primary funder of the Reut Institute is the U.S.-based nonprofit American Friends of the Reut Institute (AFRI). In addition, Reut is supported by a network of Israeli and non-Israeli donors and private foundations who believe in our vision and mission, as well as by prominent Jewish institutions, primarily UJA Federations of New York City and Los Angeles. Any donation that could potentially create a conflict of interest requires a formal and public discussion and decision by our Board of Directors. AFRI is supported by a similar network of donors and private institutions.

A policy of the Reut Institute has been to limit its direct or indirect (through AFRI) exposure to any single source of funding to 10-15 percent of its budget. Hence, the top five gifts in 2009 to AFRI or Reut range between 100-200 thousand dollars.

Why Does the Reut Institute Provide its Services Pro Bono?

The Reut Institute provides its services pro bono to people in positions of leadership, influence or decision-making authority in the Israeli and Jewish public sphere. Reut does not ordinarily charge for its services or projects for the following reasons:

1. **Turnaround Time** – Public agencies in Israel can only sign contracts through a transparent tender, a process that ordinarily lasts a minimum of a few months. In most of our projects, the turnaround time required of Reut is much shorter;

2. **Clients are unable to pay for a blind spot** – The Reut Institute's expertise is in addressing fundamental gaps that stem from irrelevance or 'blind spots'. Consequently, Reut's clients don't know that they need our services and are unable to pay for them;

3. **Reut serves causes, not clients** – The Reut Institute seeks fundamental impact on the security and wellbeing of the State of Israel and the Jewish world. This requires
the freedom to work with multiple organizations and individuals in positions of leadership, influence or decision-making authority, which is often unacceptable in classic client relationships;

(4) **Freedom to think, recommend and effectuate** – The fundamental impact that the Reut Institute seeks requires changes in values, priorities, patterns of conduct or habits in the public sphere at large, as well as often times at our 'client' specifically. Consequently, it is of paramount importance that we retain our independence to think, recommend and act.
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- Sapir College: [http://www.sapir.ac.il](http://www.sapir.ac.il)
- Gvanim Association: [http://www.gvanim.org.il](http://www.gvanim.org.il)
- Forum 15 Municipalities: [http://www.forum15.org.il](http://www.forum15.org.il)

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- International Strategy for Disaster Reduction: [www.unisdr.org](http://www.unisdr.org)
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- Singapore's Total Defense: [www.totaldefence.sg](http://www.totaldefence.sg)
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