'National Resilience'
Victory on the Home Front
A Conceptual Framework

Submitted to the Ayalon Committee of the Government of Israel
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"Israel has nuclear weapons and the strongest air force in the region, but the truth is that it is weaker than a spider's web"

(Hassan Nasrallah, May 26, 2000)

"The durability of spider webs enable them to absorb the concentrated pressure of a weight ten times that of the most durable artificial fiber"

(P. Hillyard, The Book of the Spider, 1994)

"The entire people is the army, the entire land is the front"

(David Ben-Gurion, May 1948)
Victory on the Home Front

Preparedness
Based on the lessons from the 2006 Second Lebanon War, government institutions, civil society and the business community had been mobilized to prepare for emergencies. Israeli society in its entirety understood the principle and significance of ‘National Resilience’. Two National Preparedness Days were designated and observed. The Knesset, the Government of Israel and local authorities worked to improve readiness, and frameworks for coordination and collaboration among state authorities, civil society and the business community had been established and implemented. A culture of preparedness for emergency had become embedded in every organization and many households, thousands of citizens had been trained to serve as first responders in emergencies. Ultimately, the public understood that the key to success is discipline, mutual responsibility and restraint.

Immediate Response
At the beginning of a state of emergency, thousands effectively served as first responders. Their response provided immediate assistance in many sites of destruction and casualties and ensured the flow of traffic. The public received reliable information and clear instructions. Within 48 hours, most Israelis had reached their destinations.

During the Crisis
Israel operated in an emergency routine in an efficient and orderly manner. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) led a ‘Round Table’ that set priorities and allocated responsibilities among government institutions, civil society and businesses. Similar round tables operated in many local authorities.

Basic products and services remained available. Most people who had emergency assignments reported as expected; volunteers secured essential welfare activities; the public received reliable information and clear instructions; the education system had operated in an emergency mode; and evacuations were carried out in an orderly way. The Emergency Appeal of World Jewry efficiently served its purpose. The Israeli public had acted with discipline in the spirit of volunteerism, mutual responsibility and even sacrifice.

The Day After
As the state of emergency ended, a public committee was appointed to study the events and draw lessons. Heroes of the home front and their actions were recognized and inappropriate action was reprimanded. New developments replaced damage and destruction.
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Executive Summary

1. The concept 'Home Front' addresses the Israeli response to national emergency situations that may arise as a result of war or natural disaster.

2. The home front is made up of two main systems:
   a. 'The State' in the form of national and local authorities including the Knesset, the Government of Israel, IDF, security forces and emergency forces, local authorities, or any other entity which carries authority by law;
   b. The Non-Government Sector which includes nonprofits, philanthropists, the business sector, households and individuals. An additional and unique component is World Jewry.

While these systems are often combined, they are also different in structure, values and management.

3. Israel's current National Security Strategy assigns marginal importance to the home front – According to the prevailing approach, Israel's victory will be achieved on the military front. Therefore, other arenas of national security – such as the civilian home front, diplomacy or media – are neglected in terms of resources, strategy or attention. Therefore, a gap exists between the challenge facing Israel and its actions.

4. However, the home front has become a central arena of Israel's national security – The civilian home front has become the weak underbelly of Israel's national security and is perceived as such by our adversaries. Since the early 90's, Israel's home front has been systematically targeted in all confrontations. Furthermore, the home front may be the primary and sole arena of confrontation as was the case during the First Gulf War (1991) or may be in the case of a natural disaster.

5. Therefore Israel needs to be able to win on its home front – At war, Israel needs to strive for victory on both fronts: the military and civilian ones. History teaches that such victory can be achieved – prominent examples include London (1940) or recently NYC (2001).

6. Victory on the home front depends on 'National Resilience' – National resilience is the capacity to recover from a crisis without breaking the social fabric or compromising core human and national values. Israel's National Resilience may turn into a strategic asset and even enhance Israel's deterrence.

7. A 'Narrative of Victory' will emerge through our conduct and be fixed in our perception. It will not be determined by casualties or destruction. History shows that it is disciplined conduct, a core of human values, leadership and a sense of purpose that make 'victory narratives' of societies that faced supreme challenges directed towards their populations.
8. **Four phases of 'National Resilience'** – A narrative of victory of a home front will have four 'chapters' corresponding to four phases of dealing with national emergency: 'preparedness', 'immediate response', 'during the crisis', and 'day after'.

9. **The keystone of 'National Resilience' should be a well-embedded national 'victory narrative'** that is embraced by citizens, households, businesses, nonprofits, foundations and the 'state' with all its institutions. Such a victory narrative will be critical to aligning expectations and actions by the population during states of emergency.

10. **A deeply rooted 'Culture of Preparedness' is the foundation for victory on the home front** – A 'culture of preparedness' relates to a set of values, priorities, patterns of behavior and habits that are embedded into society with the aim of preparing for national emergency situations.

11. **The foundation of a 'Culture of Preparedness' is partnership among 'the state' and the non-government sector** – In this partnership, 'the state' needs to expand its role beyond its traditional role of building the physical infrastructure or training and preparing its own agencies, e.g. law enforcement and emergency forces or local governments. The state should also provide for the legislation, regulation, standardization and enforcement that is essential for the preparedness of the non-governmental sector. The non-governmental sector needs to prepare its members for national emergencies, thus providing nation-wide presence of committed, well-prepared and well-trained citizens.

12. **Based on the above, the Reut Institute recommends the following:**

   a. **To adopt the 'Victory Narrative' of 'National Resilience'.**

   b. **To lay the foundations for 'National Resilience'** by creating the conducive legislative and regulatory environment. In this context, concrete actions may include establishing forums for cooperation and coordination among state institutions and the non-governmental sector; introducing routines of training, orientation and refreshers; training thousands of civilians as first-responders; or encouraging households to own emergency kits.

   c. **To update the national security strategy** by incorporating a chapter on the home front based on the concept of 'National Resilience' and by including the state of the home front in the annual national security assessment;

   d. **To expand the concept of national resilience** in the context of other arenas that are of national importance during emergencies, such as use of civilian...
infrastructure, communications, the role of the business sector, world Jewry emergency appeal, or Israel's Arab citizens.
Guidelines for Quick Reading
Every paragraph contains only one idea, which is captured in one bolded sentence, usually the first of the paragraph. The footnotes do not contain new ideas. Therefore this document can be skimmed through by reading the bolded phrases.

Introduction and Background
1. The purpose of this document is to offer a conceptual framework for organizing Israel's home front based on an analysis of the challenges facing Israel and the resources available to it.

2. A first draft of this document was presented to the Ayalon Committee studying the preparedness of the home front. The document summarized the work of the Reut Institute during the past months. In the future, Reut is planning to incorporate the feedback of relevant experts and organizations and to expand the document to include additional topics that are crucial for victory on the home front.

3. The Reut Institute – www.reut-institute.org – is an NGO that was founded in January 2004 by Gidi Grinstein and has grown significantly since. In 2008, Reut has about twenty full-time employees and a budget of nearly two million US dollars.

4. The mission of the Reut Institute is to sustain significant and substantive impact on the future of Israel and the Jewish world. Our unique contribution stems from our specialization in identifying strategic opportunities or surprises facing Israel, developing knowledge about them and mobilizing the relevant community to make the necessary adaptations. Hence, we deal with issues that are of transformative potential and engage in processes that should lead to deep changes of values, priorities, patterns of conduct or habits that are essential for Israel's prosperity and security.

5. Reut provides its services pro-bono and is supported by a community of donors and supporters. We do not charge the organizations we work with, such as the Prime Minister's Office or the Ayalon Committee, for our work. This allows us to focus exclusively on the issues that have a 'make or break' potential, to speak truth to power, to work with all relevant governmental and non-governmental institutions while orchestrating change and to respond quickly and wholeheartedly to decision-making needs as they emerge.

6. The Second Lebanon War revealed a crisis in Israel's national security Strategy – Since the 2006 Second Lebanon War, Reut has dedicated significant resources to examining the effectiveness of Israel's national security strategy against the political and security challenges posed by the 'Resistance Network'. This network, led by Iran and Hezbollah, denies Israel's right to exist. The analysis of
the Reut Institute on this matter has led us to the conclusion that Israel suffers from inferiority of its national security strategy vis-à-vis the strategic principles guiding the 'Resistance Network'.

7. **Israel is weak on the home front** – One of the arenas where Israel suffers from strategic weakness is its home front. This weakness was exposed in the 1991 First Gulf War and, to a much greater degree, during the 2006 Second Lebanon War when Israel's performance in these arenas was unsatisfactory at best.

8. **Israel seems to have debriefed its performance on the home front and drawn some lessons** – Since 2006, multiple inquiry committees have submitted their recommendations regarding reforms that are required on the home front. For example, in this context, the National Emergency Agency (RACHEL) has been established and the Home Front Command (HFC) of the IDF – [www.oref.org.il](http://www.oref.org.il) – has received greater attention and more resources.

9. **Nonetheless, Israel may be disappointed again with the performance of the home front** – Initial analysis by Reut has led us to question whether these steps will guarantee superior performance of Israel's home front in the case of a national emergency such as a natural disaster or military attack. This analysis will be presented below.

10. **Therefore, Reut has been dedicating a policy team to the challenge of upgrading the home front** – The Reut Institute decided to dedicate one of its teams, led by Mrs. Dana Preisler, to raising the prospects for a successful performance of Israel on its home front preparedness. This team was launched in March 2008.

11. **This report concludes the first phase of the work of this team**. This phase included studying relevant international and Israeli literature; comparative international research; in-depth interviews with representatives of agencies of 'the state', nonprofits, businesses and media. This process was based on a package of theory, methodology and software tools of Praxis, led by Dr. Zvi Lanir.

12. **In the service of the Ayalon Committee** – The Reut Institute offered its services to the Ayalon Committee of the Government of Israel on National Preparedness for Emergencies headed by the Minister in the Bureau of the Prime Minister, Mr. Ami

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1. See the documents which the Reut Institute presented to the Winograd Committee: [Updating Israel's National Security Strategy](http://example.com) (4/07); [A Strategic Support Unit for the Prime Minister](http://example.com) (4/07); [Re-Organization of Foreign Policy in Israel's National Security Strategy](http://example.com) (8/07). See also Reut documents: [Logic of Implosion: The Resistance Network's Political Rationale](http://example.com); [Terror is an Existential Threat](http://example.com).

2. Team members: Ms. Yael Weisz, Mr. Daniel Kerenji and Mr. Yossi Horesh. Other members of Reut's team who contributed to this project include: Mr. Omri Dagan (VP); The Policy Team on Strategy and Structure, led by Mr. Yariv Mann, including Ms. Ronit Gudes, Mr. Yuval Holzman and Mr. Omri Zegen. Ms. Jordana Singer also contributed to this process as an intern.

3. For a list of interviews, see Appendix B. For the bibliography, see Appendix C.

4. See: [www.praxis.co.il](http://example.com)
Ayalon. This report is designed to guide the future work of the Reut Institute in this area and to serve the work of this committee.

What is the 'Home Front'?

13. **The concept 'Home Front'** relates to the manner in which the State of Israel confronts national emergency situations that may arise as a result of war or natural disasters.

14. **The home front comprises 'The State', as well as the non-governmental sector** – The home front comprises all of the 'stakeholders' that are influenced by a state of emergency.5 These 'stakeholders' belong to two major systems:

- **'The State'** including the Knesset; the President of Israel; the government and its agencies, such as the IDF, other defense forces or the National Emergency Authority; local authorities and all other institutions that operate through authority vested in them by law.6
- **The non-governmental sector** comprises all of the stakeholders that are not a part of the state as defined above including, for example, households, communities, nonprofits, businesses and associations, philanthropists, media or academia.

Another central and unique component of Israel's non-governmental sector in national emergencies is the world Jewry. World Jewry – providing financial resources, public and diplomatic support and volunteers – effectively serves as 'strategic depth' in times of emergencies.

15. **The interface between the state and the non-governmental sector is challenging for both** as they have different cultures, structures and *modus operandi*. In general, state institutions are hierarchical, bureaucratic and staffed by full-time professionals. In contrast, the non-governmental sector is often more horizontal, loosely organized and relies on volunteers.7

The Home Front is a Weak Link of Israel's National Security

16. **There is a strategic gap between the home front challenge and Israel's capacity for response. This gap reflects an irrelevant mindset on the part of the Government of Israel.** In the following paragraphs we will outline the current mindset and compare it with the emerging realities.

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7 On the consolidation of Israel's national security strategy in its founding years, see (Hebrew) A. Bizur, *The position of the Home Front in Israel's National Security Strategy 1948-1956*. PhD Thesis (Bar Ilan University).
Current Mindset:

The current mindset underlying the organization of the home front in Israel is based on a number of assumptions:

17. The government is responsible for the home front; local governments are the building blocks of the home front and the frontier agents of the national response – The security and personal safety of citizens is a 'public good', which should be provided by the state in times of peace or emergencies. In this context, the local governments are the primary agents responsible for addressing the needs of the population during emergencies, providing a critical link between the state and its citizens.

18. Victory will be achieved on the military front, which is the primary arena of Israel's national security – Israel's national security strategy rightfully emphasizes the need for Israeli military superiority but neglects other fronts such as diplomacy, media or the home front. According to this mindset, the capacity of IDF to achieve a decisive victory will determine whether a national victory will be achieved.

19. The agencies of the home front 'play defense' by responding to the needs that arise in emergencies (while the IDF is 'playing offense' on the military front) – The objectives of the agencies of the home front in a state of emergency are to ensure the uninterrupted activity of government, smooth continuation of daily civilian activities and to minimize physical damage. When an emergency is caused

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8 Ra'anan Dinur, Director General of the PMO, contends that "the government should care for the basic services and civil society will take care of additional services." See Local Authority – Front and Home Front!!, Union of Local Authorities in Israel and Tel Aviv University, 2007, p. 23 (Hebrew).

9 "The local authority will continue to bear the responsibility and to constitute the basis of managing the Home Front as main interface between the citizen and the government in times of emergency." (Ayalon Committee studying the Home Front's Readiness – second report, February 2007, p.7). See also the report of the State Comptroller: The local authority that is providing for the citizens' needs in moments of calm, should continue providing most of the needs in times of emergency and fulfill additional tasks that derive from the situation. (Report of the State Comptroller – The preparedness of the Home Front and its functioning during the Second Lebanon War, Special Report, 7/18/07' pp. 397-399) (Hebrew).

10 The agencies of the Home Front include: (1) Police (under the Ministry of Internal Security); (2) Home Front Command (part of the IDF, Ministry of Defense); (3) Israeli Emergency Economy Agency (MELACH) (within the Ministry of Defense); (4) Magen David Adom, all hospitals and infirmaries (under the Ministry of Health); (5) Firefighters (under the Ministry of the Interior); (6) Evacuation, Assistance and Slain Persons (under Ministry of the Interior); (7) Units monitoring dangerous substances (subordinate to the Ministry of the Environment); (8) RACHEL – National Emergency Authority (in the Ministry of Defense). (See Second Report of the Committee studying the Home Front readiness in states of emergency, Designing the Home Front arrangement in Israel, February 2007, p. 12-13) (Hebrew).
by war, the mission is to support the war effort and to provide for the conditions on the civilian front that are necessary for military victory.\textsuperscript{10} Hence, the underlying mindset, which is guiding the actions of these agencies, is responsive, reactive and generally defensive until danger passes.\textsuperscript{11} There is no clear definition of a what 'success' or 'victory' would look like on the home front, nor is there a plan on how to achieve it.

\textbf{20. The military front and the home front are intertwined; therefore the Ministry of Defense is responsible for the home front} – This mindset led to the establishment of the 'National Emergency Authority' (RACHEL) within the Ministry of Defense following the Second Lebanon War (12/07). Its purpose is to serve as the national organizing body of the home front.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{21. The home front suffers from limited resources and attention within the Ministry of Defense} – As mentioned and rightfully so, the military front is the primary focus of the Ministry of Defense and Israel's national security strategy. Consequently, other fronts are of lower priority. However, as the home front is located within the Ministry of Defense, it is not only of lower budgetary priority but also of lower managerial priority.\textsuperscript{13} This can also be seen in states of emergency when most resources are allocated to the military arena.

\begin{quote}
"The committee does not discuss issues such as the protection of the home front"
Committee for the Assessment of the Defense Budget Headed by David Brodet (2007)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{10} In states of emergency, the main objectives of the home front are: (1) continued and uninterrupted function of the government and its institutions; (2) providing for, to the extent possible, on-going day-to-day life and enhancing resilience of individuals and communities; (3) minimizing the damage caused to people, property and infrastructure. (From a conversation with the Head of the Authority for National Emergency (Rachel), Brig. Ze'ev Zuk Ram, 9/3/08).

\textsuperscript{11} Some of the main tasks of home front agencies: instructing the population how to behave in emergency, providing basic protection (shelters, kits, etc.) and operating rescuing units. (Based on a conversation with Dr. Avraham Bizur, 9/21/08 the Home Front Command website) (Hebrew).

\textsuperscript{12} The National Emergency Authority was established per the recommendations of a number of reports which examined Israel's emergency preparedness: "The Government should consider establishing a central national body, that bears responsibility and authority, and that will be able to coordinate all efforts necessary for dealing with the Home Front in peace-time as well as in times of emergency, including consolidating a strategy, building forces and training them." (See: Report of the State Comptroller, The Preparedness of the Home Front and its Function During the Second Lebanon War, Special Report, 7/18/07 p.4) (Hebrew).

"...a 'National Emergency Authority', which will constitute a comprehensive body for national emergencies, whose task it will be to coordinate, budget, and prioritize the entirety of the work related to ... all home front agencies..." (See Ayalon Committee On the Home Front's Readiness – Second Report, February 2007, p.7).

\textsuperscript{13} While the home front is under the Ministry of Defense, its budget is not counted within the defense budget. (See: Report of the Committee on the Defense Budget, headed by David Brodet, May 2007, p.16) (Hebrew).

Deputy Defense Minister Matan Vilnai: "The real gap is budgetary ... we need to form a budget for the home front, separate from the defense budget ... this will happen around 2010." (Amos Harel, "Israel is not protected from Rocket attacks on its Home Front," Ha'aretz, 9/5/08, Hebrew).
22. **The agencies of the home front prepare for various scenarios** – The emergency response of the agencies of the home front is organized in the context of 'scenarios'. Thus, a successful transition into a state of emergency depends on identifying the scenario accurately, declaring a state of emergency and deploying the relevant response.

23. **The support of world Jewry in emergencies is supplementary and guaranteed** – In states of emergency, world Jewry will mobilize to help the State of Israel financially, politically and diplomatically, in the media and by sending volunteers. While this mobilization is taken for granted and may be of significant size and importance, it is not viewed de facto as an integral part of Israel's emergency response.\(^\text{14}\)

**The Diverging Reality:**

In practice, these working assumptions are challenged by powerful and consistent trends as follows:

24. **State institutions and local governments are weak and under-performing** – Israel's public sphere is underperforming compared to other developed countries particularly in areas that require cooperation among different agencies in planning and execution.\(^\text{15}\) Many local authorities are weak as well.\(^\text{16}\) Hence, it is difficult to expect these institutions to fulfill their obligations in times of crisis.

25. **Israel's non-governmental sector is playing an increasingly important role in Israeli society** – This is a powerful and consistent trend affecting many areas of social, economic and even national security significance. During the Second Lebanon War, the non-governmental sector played a critical role in providing effective assistance to individuals, households and communities.\(^\text{17}\)

21. **Rising importance of the home front for Israel's national security** – Confrontations of the past twenty years – the Gulf War (1991), the second *Intifada* (2000-2005), the Second Lebanon War (2006) and the battle around Gaza (2005-2008) – demonstrate that Israel's home front has become the enemy's primary target.

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\(^\text{14}\) See [Jewish Agency Mobilization During the Second Lebanon War — and Moving Forward to Rebuild the Galilee](http://www.jewishagency.org.il/en/Israel/Israel/LebanonWar.htm), (The Jewish Agency for Israel, December 2006). (See also: [Civilians on the Front – Summary Report on the Failures in Treatment on the Home Front During the Second Lebanon War From a Civilian Perspective](http://www.haaretz.com), (Shatil, 2/07), p.24).

The funds that were raised by World Jewry and by Christian organizations have not only funded emergency activity but also rehabilitation. See: Ruthi Sinai, [Ha'aretz](http://www.haaretz.com), 7/11/07; Eli Ashkenazi, [Ha'aretz](http://www.haaretz.com), 9/24/07, Hebrew).

\(^\text{15}\) See Reut Institute: [Public Sector Puts Brakes on ISRAEL 15 Agenda](http://www.reut.org.il).%


Furthermore, Israel's performance on the home front has affected, and even determined the outcome of those confrontations. This trend has been identified by the 'Meridor Report', whose call for adding a defensive element to Israel's national security strategy has yet to be formally endorsed and implemented.

22. **Nations can win on the home front** – History proves nations can emerge from situations of national emergency with a sense of 'victory' which reinforces national pride and cohesion. Furthermore, it has been shown that such victories can be achieved despite high costs in casualties and property damage when the civilian population demonstrated sensible conduct. This was the case of Britain during the Second World War and of New York following September 11, 2001.

23. **The home front and the military front require fundamentally different approaches** – While the test on the military front is of decisive military victories, the home front will be measured by its resilience. Furthermore, the home front is different from the military front in its culture, values, conduct, and management methods.

24. **A huge scope of needs exist in national emergencies** – Cases of national emergency will require a vast amount of resources that far exceed the capacities and resources now available to the home front agencies. In such cases there may be many widely dispersed locations of damage and casualties, numerous urgent calls for assistance to people in need, media and information, traffic jams, shortage of basic products and interruption of vital services.

25. **Increasing difficulty of scenario based responses** – Organizing a home front on the basis of responses to different scenarios is a difficult proposition. In reality, especially in the national security sphere, there are a growing number of possible scenarios. Moreover, Israel may delay a declaration of a state of emergency due to its political, budgetary and legal implications. Finally, most scenarios require responses that rely on similar core capacities.

26. **World Jewry is growing distant; Its responsiveness to Israel's needs is eroding** – This trend is derived from ideological, economical, social and demographical changes in the Jewish world. Decline in the confidence of world Jewry in the

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18 See Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert: "The next war will reach the cities and houses of Israeli citizens and our enemies goal will be the home front… there will be no more wars in far away battle fields, that will leave civilian life unchanged" (Ha'aretz, 20/8/08).

19 For example: natural disasters, conventional and non-conventional wars, waves of terrorism, and even social and economical crises.

capacity of the Israeli government to govern effectively exacerbates this trend. Furthermore, the effects of the current global economic crisis may be compounded by criticism over inefficient use of the 2006 Emergency Appeal\textsuperscript{21} to reduce the scope of a future emergency appeal, especially if a national emergency takes place in the near future.

Conclusions:

27. **A victory on the home front requires a solid partnership between 'the state' and the non-governmental sector** – The home front challenge is beyond the capacity of 'the state' and its institutions, including the home front agencies. Therefore, it requires a systematic integration of forces with the non-governmental sector including the thousands of individuals and households, businesses, nonprofits, philanthropists and world Jewry.\textsuperscript{22}

28. **Israel must learn to win on both fronts: victory on the home front is a necessary condition for Israel's victory.** In certain situations, such as natural disasters or during the First Gulf War (1991), the home front might be the primary or sole front. In case of a prolonged military confrontation, a failure or collapse of the home front may undermine any military success however remarkable. In this context, it is important to mention that similar thinking should guide Israel's approach to the diplomatic and media fronts.

29. **The home front must be integrated into the national security strategy** – Israel's victory must emerge on the home front – as well as on the media, and the diplomatic front - and not only on the military front. Moreover, 'national resilience' may become an asset of Israeli national security and Israeli deterrence. In this context, it is important to mention that the 'Meridor Report' recommended adding the pillar of 'defense' to the other pillars of the national security strategy ('deterrence', 'early warning' and 'victory').

30. **Winning on the home front requires a narrative of victory that is deeply embedded in the population** – Israel's national security strategy and military doctrine have a clear definition of a military victory. Such a definition is essential for the successful operation of the defense establishment. However, Israel has no clear conception regarding what entails victory on the home front. Hence, a narrative of victory must be articulated and embedded in the population.

\textsuperscript{21} For example, see the reports on the poor situation of private shelters that were renovated with donations after the last Lebanon war. (\textit{Ha'aretz}, 23/9/08). See also Katz, Alon, Gidron, Yogev, Ya'acobi, Levinson, and Raviv, \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{22} For example, the non-governmental sector was not a part of the recent national drill of the home front (named 'Turning Point 2') (4/08). See: Meir Elran, "Turning Point 2 for Home Front Preparedness? – The Big Home Front Drill, Main Lessons", INSS, Vol 11, June 2008, pp.17-22.
31. **National preparedness should be based on developing core capacities for response by the entire population** – Mobilizing the non-governmental sector requires keeping a high level of preparedness that is based on a small number of simple guidelines and core capacities such as first aid, fire fighting or managing traffic.

32. **Integrate world Jewry into the design of the home front and its management**

World Jewry should become an integral part of the planning and management of the home front: its actions during the Second Lebanon War should be thoroughly debriefed, new guidelines for emergency appeals should be formulated, and its leading institutions should be within the scope of Israel's preparedness.

### Table no. 1: Fundamental Gaps between Current Mindset and Diverging Reality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing mindset</th>
<th>Diverging reality</th>
<th>Conclusions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The state is responsible for the home front; local authorities are the building blocks of the home front.</td>
<td>Israel's National and local authorities are often weak and ineffective.</td>
<td>A victory on the home front requires on-going partnership between state institutions and the non – government sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory will be achieved on the military front which is the most important front.</td>
<td>Rising importance of the home front for Israel's national security. In future confrontations it might be the only front.</td>
<td>Victory on the home front is a necessary condition for Israel's victory. Israel must know how to win on both fronts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The home front agencies 'play defense' (since victory will be achieved on the military front).</td>
<td>Nations can achieve victory on the home front, as shown in Britain or NY. The key to a victory on the home front is 'national resilience'.</td>
<td>It is necessary to develop a victory narrative for the home front i.e. a rich and textured understanding of what such a victory would be.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The military front and the home front are interconnected. Hence, they should be managed by the Ministry of Defense.</td>
<td>The home front and the military front operate on different cultures, values, needs, and management methods.</td>
<td>Specialized organizational tools need to be developed to mobilize the non-government sector and coordinate with the relevant governmental institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The home front has limited resources relative to its needs.</td>
<td>In states of emergency, the scope of needs will far exceed the abilities and resources of the home front agencies.</td>
<td>Mobilization of the non-governmental sector and establishing partnerships with the 'state' are critical for success on the home front.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response on the home front will be orchestrated based on the 'scenario'.</td>
<td>Difficulties in identifying the scenario. However, most responses require a shared core of capacities.</td>
<td>Nurture core capacities for emergency preparedness in the non-governmental sector.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Victory on the Home Front: 'National Resilience'

33. What is 'National Resilience'? – The concept 'National Resilience' refers to the ability to go through a national crisis without compromising core values or damaging the social texture and to return to the conditions that existed prior to the crisis while having a perception of 'victory'.

34. What are the basic components of a 'Victory Narrative' on the home front and of 'National Resilience'? – Theoretically, any national emergency incorporates components for a narrative of failure such as multiple locations of destruction and casualties, confusion that may border chaos, or shortages in basic products and services.

However, even under harsh conditions, a nation can emerge successful and even victorious as was the case after the Battle for Britain in 1940 or in New York City after the events of September 11, 2001.

Hence, it is important to clearly identify the components of a 'victory narrative' on the home front in order to inspire action. These components are as follows:

- The test of a national emergency challenges capacities, values and management. Casualties or devastation are secondary – History teaches that nations that have emerged victorious from national emergencies tell a story that emphasizes values such as mutual responsibility, camaraderie, solidarity and comprehensive mobilization. The number of casualties or the range of destruction is of secondary importance in such stories. The importance of this insight is that preparedness and conduct are entirely within

"Our victory was that we picked peaches from our orchards close to the border."

Ora Armoni, Kibutz Malkiya, Sep, 2008

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our control, while casualties and destruction are determined by the enemy and by fate.

- **A sense of purpose** – A national emergency requires a clear framing and articulation of the shared mission, which underlies the need to mobilize and respond.  

- **Leadership that focuses on the essential** – The main role of leadership in times of national emergency is to clarify the purpose; to preserve faith and hope that success and victory are possible; to defend society's core values and to indicate appropriate priorities and ways of conduct; to inspire individuals and groups to action; and to block forces that can sabotage the strength of the society.  

In times of crisis, leadership can emerge from various sectors of the society such as public representatives, civil servants, from the business community or from the civil society.

- **Clearly defined expectations for solidarity and sacrifice** – Victory on the home front is conditioned on the public exercising restraint, solidarity and mutual responsibility, discipline and trust. These values derive from the society's 'social capital' and may be reinforced by clearly defined expectations that are enforced.

35. **Four chapters of the Victory Narrative' on the home front; four tests of 'National Resilience'** –


During the second 'Intifada' more then 1000 Israelis was murdered. However according to polls, the Israeli public showed resilience and returned to routine. See: Meir Elran, *National Strength in Israel*, (T.A: INSS, Tel Aviv University, Memo 81, January 2006).


See also: Sir Winston Leonard Spencer-Churchill during the Battle for Britain: "I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat… You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: It is victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival". (Churchill, May 13, 1941).


See also Giddens: "...The state of anomie is impossible whenever interdependent organs are sufficiently in contact and sufficiently extensive. If they are close to each other, they are readily aware, in every situation, of the need which they have of one-another, and consequently they have an active and permanent feeling of mutual dependence." Giddens, A., Emile Durkheim; *Selected Writings*, (London: Cambridge University Press.1972), p.184.

Preparedness\textsuperscript{30} – comprises a range of actions that had been continuously implemented during the period that preceded the crisis. Its foundations are a 'Culture of Preparedness' (see below) in households, workplaces, public institutions and in all public places based on a clear set of mutual expectations between the state and its citizens; preparing emergency plans and maintaining emergency supplies; preparing physical infrastructures; preparation and training; and establishing partnerships between the state and the non-governmental sector. In Israel, this stage requires debriefing the home front's conduct during the Second Lebanon War and in Sderot and the area around the Gaza Strip, drawing conclusions and implementing them.

Immediate Response – This stage spans approximately 48 hours from initiation of the crisis and ends when Israel has transitioned into a state of emergency at which point all the emergency frameworks had been activated. It is characterized by confusion, disorder, and potentially even chaos and panic. During this stage, an immediate response is provided to save lives and property; many citizens act efficiently and professionally where emergency forces are absent; and health, transportation and communication systems go through a supreme test of performance.

During the Crisis – During this stage, Israel is in emergency deployment, aimed at ensuring its 'national resilience'. Public servants and employees of essential industries attend to their work; Round tables, including government offices and representatives of the non-governmental sector set priorities and divide responsibilities; the public receives reliable information and clear instructions; basic products are supplied; crucial activities continue; volunteers ensure the continuation of essential welfare activities in the local authorities; evacuations are conducted in an organized fashion; the education system operates in an emergency format; World Jewry emergency assistance is effectively and efficiently distributed.

Furthermore, during the crisis there are many cases of solidarity, mutual responsibility, volunteerism, discipline and even heroism.\textsuperscript{31}

The Day After – In the aftermath of the national emergency, the objective is to ensure learning and development relative to the condition that existed prior to the crisis. Keys to success in this are debriefing and extracting lessons; rapid repair of damages and reconstruction as an opportunity for development; decoration of heroes; and fully exercising legal and public measures against those who did not fulfill their duties or expectations.

\textsuperscript{30} See the American Governmental report following the event of September 11, 2001: "Emergency response is a product of preparedness," in \textit{The 9/11 Commission Report}, p. 278.

\textsuperscript{31} If the crisis take longer then expected it is even possible to conceive of ‘developing under fire’. (For further information see the activities of \textit{Gvanim}, association in the city of Sderot).
Table 2: 4 stages of 'National Resilience'; 4 Chapters of the 'Victory Narrative'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Key elements of the response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preparedness</td>
<td>Prior the crisis</td>
<td>A culture of preparedness on all levels of the state and society; a clear set of expectations between the citizens and the state; planning, building infrastructure, training; establishing partnerships between the state and non-governmental sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate Response</td>
<td>First 48 hours until full emergency alignment</td>
<td>Immediate response to sites of casualties and destruction by emergency forces and many civilians who are first-responders; launching of emergency settings; etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During the Crisis</td>
<td>Until end of crisis</td>
<td>Public servants continue to attend to their work; supply of basic products and services continues; operating special programs of education, employment and social welfare based on volunteers; organized evacuation from disaster sites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day after</td>
<td>Months to years</td>
<td>Debriefing, drawing and implementing lessons; decorating heroes; legal and public measures against offenders; rapid repair of damage and reconstruction.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'Culture of Preparedness'

36. **What is a 'Culture of Preparedness'?**

This concept refers to a collection of values, priorities, patterns of behavior and habits instilled the society – in households and by individuals, on the community level, in municipalities and businesses, by the civil society and in the government – aimed at ensuring readiness to face emergency situations.

37. **'Culture of Preparedness' requires partnerships between the state and the non-governmental sector** based on the following roles:

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32 See definition at US Department for homeland security website: [http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/homeland/index.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/homeland/index.html). For example, in Florida, a culture of preparedness against hurricanes is based on advanced communication system connecting residents, evacuation plans designed to prevent traffic jams or building regulation etc. Furthermore, thousands of residents are part of the state rescue forces (which normally numbers some 200) and businesses and nonprofits are mobilized to provide immediate humanitarian support. (See Bush, J., "A Bottom-Up Strategy for Catastrophic Events", in: Himberger, D., Sulek, D., Krill, S., "When there is no Cavalry", *Strategy + Business*, No. 48, 2007).
The role of the state is to train, build infrastructure, legislate, regulate, standardize, incentivize and enforce – 'Culture of preparedness' means that the state – the Knesset, the government and its agencies, the defense establishment, local authorities and other entities – have a dual role: to be prepared and to provide for the conditions that will help and encourage the non-governmental sector be prepared as well. Whereas the first role is self-explanatory, the second requires thoughtful interventions in the public sphere. For example, these interventions may include establishing certain legal obligations, creating incentives or providing tools that are essential for emergency preparedness.33

The role of the non-governmental sector is to transform Israel into a network of resilient communities that is effective nation-wide in times of crisis – A 'culture of preparedness relies on individuals and households, businesses and nonprofits mobilizing to prepare themselves for emergency and to contribute to the resilience of their community in times of crisis.34 The 'nodes' of the non-governmental sector – such as community centers, synagogues, businesses, youth groups or schools – are the building blocks of national resilience. They are the spaces where citizens are mobilized, educated and trained before the emergency and supported and cared for in its duration.35

The partnerships are based on an exchange of strengths and weaknesses – Establishing and running partnerships among leaders of the non-governmental sector, on the one hand, and the leading institutions of the state, on the other hand, is critically important for the success of the home front and its victory.36

33 Non-fulfillment of duties by the state, or unclear level of expectations between the state and the public are likely to cause the loss of confidence between the public and the state, just like during the second Lebanon war. (For example, see the last "Haifa Conference for Social Responsibility" which dealt with exactly these issues).

34 The concept of community is defined as "a particularly constituted set of social relationships based on something which the participants have in common, usually a common sense of identity" (Scott J. and Marshall G., "Community", A Dictionary of Sociology, Oxford University Press, 2005).

35 See Interview with Dr. Baruch Sugerman and Avi Sender, the department of community resilience, The Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Services, Jerusalem, 17/09/08.


See round table forums at the Office of the PM which operate at the national level (The Government of Israel, Civil Society and the Private Sector: Partnership, Empowerment and Transparency, The Department for Policy Planning, 02/08 (Hebrew).
The state should provide resources that are exclusively in its power such as legislation, regulation, standardization, tax incentives or large infrastructure projects. The non-governmental sector can offer permanent nationwide presence, abundance of human capital, energy, resourcefulness and commitment that are often missing in state institutions.

38. **A culture of preparedness will turn Israel into a network of resilient communities** – Israel's success, or even victory, on the home front requires a 'culture of preparedness'. It means that in times of crisis ten of thousands of individuals, households, businesses or other organizations immediately turn into nodes of a national network of resilient communities. Or, to use another metaphor, Israel will become dotted with agencies of Israel's Home Front Command.

39. **Hence, the Home Front Command will not be able to micromanage the home front. Therefore the HFC would need to inspire a deeply embedded narrative of victory** – The Home Front Command may be able to effectively manage its own forces in times of emergency. But it is unlikely that it would be able to do so with regard to the thousands of entities that would mobilize for action when a national emergency occurs. These individuals and organizations can only be guided by inspiration and by a set of simple guidelines for action. We believe that such inspiration may derive from a national narrative of victory of the home front that would articulate general expectations of values and conduct.

40. **The areas where the home front and 'national resilience' will be tested** – In cases of national emergency, a number of societal systems are put through a supreme test. Victory on the home front requires imagining what success would require in each of these areas. The list of these areas is:37

- **Health** – Providing first aid in many sites simultaneously; operating the hospitals and HMOs (*kupot holim*) in an emergency format using volunteers; treating numerous post traumatic stress disorder victims; and distribution of medications to isolated persons by volunteers.

- **Social Welfare** – Establishing call centers and activating local emergency teams; addressing food, medical and psychological needs of welfare families and individuals; ensuring delivery of basic services and products to people who are immobile; mobilizing and effectively using volunteers.

- **Transportation** – Ensuring smooth flow of traffic, particularly during the first few hours of the crisis, while securing rapid access of army and emergency forces to locations of casualties or destruction; expediting loading and unloading processes at the ports; and the continuation of public transportation during the crisis.

At the local level, see the round table organized in Sderot by the nonprofit Gvanim, the municipality and other organizations and communities in the area. (Michal Greenberg "**Southern city with a nonprofit organization in its heart**, Ha'aretz, 05/08/08 (Hebrew).

37 The list of areas is based on the work of "**Forum Machshava**, National Security, 07/08 (Hebrew).
Education – Well embedded emergency response procedures during natural disasters or outbreak of war; orderly evacuation of education facilities and relocation of students and faculty; providing psychological assistance to students and faculty; usage of facilities in times of crisis; design and execution of education activities in emergency mode; mobilizing children and youth movements as volunteers.

Law and Order – Ensuring smooth flow of traffic (see above); securing order at distribution sites for food or emergency equipment; operating call centers to address increased needs; preventing of looting and disorderly conduct.

Communications and Media – Providing clear and accurate information and guidance; continuation of postal services; securing the operation of cellular networks.

Vital Economic Activities – Continued operation of industries that are critical during emergency; setting quotas for consumption of products in shortage; ensuring supply of basic products such as water, food, gas, electricity or cash at ATMs; aiding and reinforcing the security industries; collecting essential agricultural produce; providing assistance, guidance and protection to tourists.

For example, the 'victory narrative' in the domain of transportation might read like the following: For years, in preparation for national emergencies, hundreds of citizens were trained to become first-responders in cases of traffic jams. When the crisis began, they successfully deployed themselves and made a critical contribution to a relatively quick alleviation of massive traffic jams while securing quick movement of emergency forces. Public transportation continued to operate during the emergency focusing on routes that had been predetermined to serve the national effort. Wherever necessary, citizens were evacuated efficiently and smoothly. Damages to transportation infrastructure were quickly repaired and most arteries remained open throughout the crisis.

Recommendations for Immediate Action:
Laying the Foundations for 'National Resilience'

39. Laying the foundations of 'National Resilience' – Nurturing a culture of preparedness and creating national resilience require an infrastructure of institutions, practices and incentives which does not exist today. Hence, the Reut Institute recommends that the Ayalon Committee focuses effort and attention on laying these foundations via the following measures:

a. Adopting a narrative of victory for the home front based on the concept of 'National Resilience' – A narrative of victory which articulates clear expectations of values and conduct is critical to the success of the home front and to nurturing a culture of preparedness. We recommend that the committee adopts a 'victory narrative' for the home front which is based on the concept of national resilience' and related to the four stages of preparedness, immediate response, during the crisis and day after.
b. **Establishing a national forum for emergency preparedness, headed by the Director General of the Prime Minister's Office** – The Director General of the PMO should be designated as the chair of a forum that includes the heads of the leading state institutions as well as the leaders of the non-governmental sector. Participants may include, for example, the Chiefs of the Home Front Command, Head of 'RACHEL' or Director General of the Ministry of Interior, on the state side, as well as the Chair of the Industrialist Association, the Chair of the Labor Union or the President of 'MAALA' (a nonprofit specializing in corporate responsibility), on the non-governmental side. The purpose of this forum would be to prepare Israel for national emergencies. The forum should be staffed by the National Security Council and convened in plenum once every two months. Its operation should be legislated.

c. **A forum for emergency preparedness should be established in every local authority, chaired by its leading elected official** – These forums would include the relevant municipal bodies, other relevant government representatives such as from the police or fire departments, as well as representatives of the most important local non-governmental organizations. The operation of these forums should also be anchored in legislation. Their activity should be supervised by the Minister of the Interior.

d. **Designating a list of areas that are critical for victory on the home front** – The Reut Institute recommends that a list be defined of areas that are critical for the victory of the home front. In this context, the Reut Institute recommends the following areas: health, social welfare, transportation, education, law and order, media and vital economic system.

e. **Defining requirements for preparedness in each of the areas cited above** – The Government of Israel should assign the Director General of the Prime Minister's Office of the to articulate a narrative of victory in each of these areas which would synchronize with the concept of 'culture of preparedness'.

f. **Declaring two annual 'National Preparedness Days'** – These days would be devoted to teaching the victory narrative of the home front, refreshing procedures and guidelines for emergency and for training and exercises. We suggest scheduling these days in September and March of each year.38

g. **The Government should convene to review emergency preparedness twice a year** – The government should dedicate two special sessions each year to discuss national preparations for emergencies. These sessions will take place prior to the National Preparedness Days. In addition to the ministers, participants at these meetings would include the Director General of the Office of the PM and the Director Generals of the government

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38 For example, monthly preparedness days take place in South Korea (See Republic of Korea, *National Reporting and Information on Disaster Reduction*, World Conference on Disaster Reduction, 2004, p. 9).
ministries responsible for central areas of the home front (see above). These discussions should be anchored in government regulations.

h. **Establishing a Knesset Committee on the issue of the home front** – The Knesset should appoint a permanent committee to be responsible for the home front's preparedness and to review the government activity in this area. This permanent committee should be a joint sub-committee of the Internal Affairs and Environment committee and the Foreign Affairs and Defense committee.

i. **Standard requirements for emergency preparedness of organizations should be defined** – The Home Front Command should establish standard requirements for emergency preparedness in private and public organizations. The Knesset should pass a law that would make the observance of these requirements obligatory.

j. **An emergency kit in every household and every institution** – The Home Front Command should determine the content of emergency kits for organizations and households. This kit should be made available at subsidized cost.

k. **An Emergency Preparedness Officer in every organization of ten members or more** – All businesses or institutions with a minimum staff of ten should designate an officer responsible for emergency preparedness. The Home Front Command should establish the duties of these officers and provide them with necessary information and support.

l. **Adopting a 'Culture of Preparedness' as part of corporate responsibility** – The government should encourage the business sector to officially assume additional voluntary responsibilities toward their nearby communities as part of its corporate responsibility and in order to enhance the 'culture of preparedness'. The Home Front Command will work together with the representative bodies of the business community to define the alternative scopes of this responsibility.

m. **Training thousands of citizens for the role of 'first responder'** – The Home Front Command should define the number, type and scope of capacities needed for 'national resilience' and create incentives for training these people. Such capacities may include first aid, fire fighting, traffic control, and courses in first response in disaster areas.

n. **Support for nonprofits committed to instilling a 'culture of preparedness'** – The Home Front Command or 'RACHEL' should allocate an annual budget of NIS 10 million for nonprofits that are involved in instilling a culture of preparedness for times of emergency.

**National Resilience: Future Agenda**

40. **Israel needs to develop the conceptual framework of national resilience** – This document offers a conceptual framework for reorganizing the home front titled 'national resilience'. The Reut Institute deems this framework critically important.
for the success of Israel's home front in national emergencies. However, in order to be effective, the ideas that are outlined in this document need to be developed into a rich and textured set of values, priorities, habits and guidelines for action. **Following are topics that require further design of strategy and policy:**

a. **Integrating the home front into Israel's national security strategy** – As noted above, the national security strategy must be adapted to account for the central role of the home front. The state of the home front should be a part of the annual national security assessment.39

b. **Designating the National Security Council as the integrator of Israel's strategy on the home front** – As discussed above, national resilience requires intense collaboration among the state and the non-governmental sector. In other words, many of the components that are central to success on the home front are not under the authority of the national institutions. Hence, only the National Security Council may have the authority to design the overall strategy for the home front and to subsequently determine the directive for the national agencies dealing with the home front such as RACHEL or the Home Front Command, to be responsible for the overall view of the budgetary resources dedicated to the home front40 and to help other government bodies design their strategy for emergency preparedness.

   **Who should be responsible for home front?** – In the last few years there has been a debate on whether the responsibility and authority over the home front should lie in the Ministry of Defense or in a civilian ministry, most likely the Ministry of Interior Security. This debate should be concluded and a decision must be taken.41

c. **International and domestic media and advocacy** – A state of emergency resulting from a war in which the home front is attacked poses a challenge to Israel's international communication and media agencies. At the same time, an emergency situation is a complex challenge for domestic communications and information.

d. **Evacuation plans** – During the Second Lebanon War, a large number of people left northern Israel, to the point of creating a refugee problem. Therefore, a clear policy on evacuations should be formulated and it should be ensured that this policy is implemented in a pro-active and orderly way.

39 As noted in 2006, the ‘Meridor Committee’ recommended adding a fourth pillar (civil defense) to the traditional pillars of Israel's national security strategy (deterrence, early warning and victory) (Ha'aretz, 10/3/06).

40 Deputy Minister of Defense Matan Vilnai: "...we need to reach a national home front budget, external to the defense budget that will be divided among the different governmental ministries and designated to the home front needs. It will happen, I assume, in 2011." (Ha'aretz, 9/5/08).

41 In the aftermath of the Second Lebanon War, a governmental decision has determined that the Ministry of Defense will continue to bear responsibility and authority over preparation of the civilian front for the next five years, until the year 2012.
f. **The Arab community** – The integration of the Arab sector in Israel into the framework of the home front and the vision of 'National Resilience' entails a complex challenge due to the sector's low starting point in terms of the capacities of local authorities, level of infrastructure and quality of services.\(^{42}\)

g. **World Jewry** – World Jewry de-facto comprise an important component in the resilience of Israel's home front. However, to date, world Jewry has not been treated as such and thus integrated into thinking and practice of the state. Hence, preparing for a future emergency situation requires debriefing and drawing lessons from the 2006 Emergency Appeal and articulating the guidelines for future appeals, preparing plans for effective allocation of world Jewry resources, and integrating its leading institutions into the culture of preparedness.

End.

\(^{42}\) For example, Israel needs to establish clear guidelines for allocation of philanthropic resources that will come primarily from Jewish sources. On this issue, see Bashir Nabia, *The Palestinian society in Israel in a time of Emergency*, Attah – the Arab center for consultancy and instruction in emergency situations, 2007).
Appendix A: The 'Victory Narrative' of the Home Front

Preparedness

Based on the lessons from the 2006 Second Lebanon War, government institutions, civil society and the business community had been mobilized to prepare for emergencies. Israeli society in its entirety understood the principle and significance of 'National Resilience': Two National Preparedness Days were designated and observed. The Knesset, the Government of Israel and local authorities worked to improve readiness, and frameworks for coordination and collaboration among state authorities, civil society and the business community had been established and operated. A culture of preparedness for emergency had become embedded in every organization and many households, thousands of citizens had been trained to serve as first responders in emergencies. Ultimately, the public understood that the key to success is discipline, mutual responsibility and restraint.

Immediate Response

At the beginning of a state of emergency began, thousands effectively served as first responders. Their response provided immediate assistance in many sites of destruction and casualties and ensured the flow of traffic. The public received reliable information and clear instructions. Within 48 hours, most Israelis had reached their destinations.

During the Crisis

Israel operated in an emergency routine in an efficient and orderly manner. The Prime Minister's Office led a 'Round Table' that set priorities and allocated responsibilities among government institutions, civil society and businesses. Similar round tables operated in many local authorities.

Basic products and services remained available. Most people who had emergency assignments reported as expected; volunteers secured essential welfare activities; the public received reliable information and clear instructions; the education system had operated in an emergency mode; and evacuations were carried out in an orderly way. The Emergency Appeal of World Jewry efficiently served its purpose. The Israeli public had acted with discipline in the spirit of volunteerism, mutual responsibility and even sacrifice.

The Day After

As the state of emergency ended, a public committee was appointed to study the events and draw lessons. Heroes of the home front and their actions were recognized and inappropriate action was reprimanded. New developments replaced damage and destruction.
Appendix B: List of Experts Interviewed for this Report

**Government Agencies:**
- Ayalon Ami, Minister at the Prime Minister's Office; Head of the Committee Studying the Home Front's Preparedness for Emergencies
- Dr. Bizur Avi, General-Manager of the Ministry of Pensioners
- Brigadier (Res), Zuk-Ram Zeev (Vova), Head of the National Emergency Authority (Rachel)
- Major General (Res) Ronen Dan, Ex-Police Chief of Israel's Northern Region
- Sander Avi, Department of Community Resilience, Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Services
- Col. (Res) Dr. Shaul Shai, National Security Council
- Dr. Sugarman Baruch, Department of Community Resilience, the Ministry of Social Issues and Social Services

**Local Authorities:**
- Ali Hassan, Strategist, Sagur's Local Council
- Alon Nili, Emergency Economy Member, Regional Council 'Mate Asher'
- Gants Shmuel, Chief Executive Officer, Municipality of Haifa
- Goren Tamar, Social Worker, 'Shaar Hanegev' Regional Council
- Koren Yonit, Upper Galilee's Regional Council Chief Executive Officer
- Meyuhas Dror, Social Worker, 'Shaar Hanegev' Regional Council
- Nur Inj Aldan, Head of the Administration Department, Municipality of Haifa
- Pilot Oded, Strategist, 'Shaar Hanegev' Regional Council
- Shtift Yehuda, security officer, 'Mate Asher' Regional Council
- Valerstein Pinchas, General Manager, 'Yesha Council'

**The Academy:**
- Prof. Boehm Amnon, School of Social Work, Haifa University
- Dr. Billig Miriam, Ariel University Center of Samaria
- Dr. Podoler Guy, Department of Asian Studies, Haifa University
- Dr. Keinan Irit, President's Advisor for Social Responsibility at Haifa University
- Dr. Peleg Kobi, Director, Israeli National Center for Trauma and Emergency Therapy Center, Gertner Institute, Tel Hashomer
- Prof. Solomon Zehava, School of Social Work, Tel Aviv University
NGO's:

- Dr. Berger Rony, Natal – Director, Israel Trauma Center for Victims of Terror and War
- Darawshe Mohammed, the Abraham Fund Initiatives, Chief Executive Officer
- Prof. Laor Nathaniel, Cohen-Harris Trauma Center
- Levanon Talia, Director, Israeli Trauma Coalition
- Dr. Kessler Etush (Esther), 'Matov' Program Director – Volunteer Coordination Support System, Volunteering and Philanthropy Division, JDC
- Mouallem Samer, Mobadara Center Chief Executive Officer
- Schreiber Nitay, 'Gvanim' Chief Executive Officer
- Smolash Yonit, Program Manager at ELKA, JDC
- Dr. Sokolov Yaron, 'Civil Leadership' Chief Executive Officer

Private Sector and Media:

- Armony Ora, Journalist and Member of Malkia Kibbutz
- Dr. Tamir Boaz, Business Strategist, Head of Worldview Research Group
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